Sohravardi

The Book of Radiance

پرتونامه

A Parallel English-Persian Text
Edited and Translated with an Introduction by

Hossein Ziai

❖ فصل چهارم ❖

در قوای نفس

[۲۲] بدانکه: چون مزاج آدمی شریفتر بُود از مزاج جانوران دیگر و مزاج نبات، نفسی شریف تر از نفوس ایشان قبول کرد؛ نفسی «مفارق»، «مدرِك»، «عاقل»؛ و قوّتهای حیوانی جمله استیفا کرد. و در حیوان قوّتهای نبات حاصلست، با مزید حسّ و حرکت. و اصول قوای نباتی سه است: أوّل: «غاذیه»، و آن قوّتیست که تصرّف کند در مادّت غذا و او را شبیه گوهر مغتذی گرداند، و بَدَل آنچه متحلّل شده باشد باز آرد. و اگر بدل آنچه متحلّل می شود باز نیامدی، پس ماندن حیوان و غیر آن ممکن

The Book of Radiance

پرتو نامه

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بِسمِ اللّهِ الرَّحْمنِ الرَّحيمِ

هُوَ الَّذى يُصَلّى عَلَيْكُمْ وَمَلائِكَتُهُ لِيُخْرِجَكُمْ
مِنَ الظُّلُمَاتِ إِلَى النُّورِ وكَانَ بالْمُؤمِنينَ رَحِيماً

(القران المجيد : سورة الاحزاب، الآية ٤٣)



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PREFACE

The Book of Radiance, is the first volume in Intellectual Traditions, a series aimed to provide scholars and students of Iranian Islamic heritage with new source materials. Future publications in the series will include studies in philosophy, mysticism and 'Irfān, religion, intellectual history, and literature.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor S.H. Nasr for his permission to use his edition of the Persian text; George Maschke for his invaluable and generous assistance with inputting and formatting the computer files; Christine Canzanella and Dinah Berland for their editorial assistance; and Firouzeh Papan-Matin for typing portions of the Persian text. Special thanks are due my students at UCLA for their engaging class discussions during 1998 that helped bring to light a number of philosophical problems in *Partow Nāmeh.* Lastly, I wish to acknowledge the advisory board of Intellectual Traditions for their guidance and support.

This volume was set in Minion/Bayan-Mashhad on Nisus Writer™, and I am grateful to the staff of Nisus Software Inc. for their technical support.

H.Z.

INTRODUCTION

I

Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash ibn Amīrak Abu'l-Futūḥ Sohravardī was born in Sohravard in northwestern Iran in 549/1154. One of the best known figures in the history of Islamic philosophy, his status as founder of the philosophy of illumination earned him the honorific title, "Master of Illumination" (*Shaykh al-Ishrāq*). The young but influential Sohravardī was executed in the year 587/1191 in Aleppo at age thirty-six.[1] *Partow Nāmeh*, or *The Book of Radiance*, is his major theoretical work in Persian.

Sohravardī's philosophical oeuvre was composed within a span of ten years. The major works in the corpus are cross-referenced, which indicates that they were either composed concurrently, or revised in respect to one another as he taught them.[2] Written in

[1] The major biographical sources on Sohravardī are: Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, *'Uyūn al-Anbā' fī Ṭabaqāt al-Aṭibbā'*, ed. A Müller (Köningsberg; Pr., 1884) I, 168, the edition used here is edited by N. Riḍā (Beirut, 1968), pp. 641-646 (hereafter cited as *Ṭabaqāt)*; *Yāqūt, Irshād al-Arīb*, ed. D.S. Margoliouth, vol. VI, 269; al-Qifṭī, *Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā'*, ed. Bahman Dārā'ī (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1347 A.H.), p. 345; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān*, ed. I. 'Abbās (Beirut, 1965,), VI, 268-274; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī (d. ca. 1288), *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ fī Tārīkh al-Ḥukamā' wa'l-Falāsifa*, ed. S. Khurshid Aḥmad (Heydarabad, 1976), II, pp. 119-143 (hereafter cited as *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ*).

[2] E.g., Sohravardī, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I*, pp. 59, 121, 128, 131, 146, 183, 185, 192, 194, 195, 278, 340, 361, 371, 401, 484, 506. Sohravardī himself stipulates that all of the major texts are related. I have discussed this issue in detail in my *Knowledge and Illumination* (Atlanta, 1990), Ch. I.

Arabic, his most important and novel work, *The Philosophy of Illumination*,[3] was completed in 582/1186 in Aleppo where he had settled three years earlier.[4] *The Book of Radiance* is a short epitome of illuminationist philosophy, and applies the terminology and other elements of Sohravardī's new illuminationist arguments. Its level of discourse suggests that Sohravardī intended it as an introduction, in Persian, to his new philosophical system. The work is cited by his chief biographer, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī, in a list of forty-six other treatises by Sohravardī.[5]

Sohravardī's biography is fairly well known and has been discussed in earlier publications.[6] Some of the more significant events may be summarized here. Sohravardī entered the service of Prince al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Ghāzī, governor of Aleppo and son of the Ayyūbid Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, commonly known as Saladin. The young philosopher's special position at court[7] was resented by the judges, viziers, and jurists in Aleppo—especially of the Nūriyya madrasa[8]— and resulted in letters from Qāḍī al-Fāḍil to Saladin requesting Sohravardī's execution.[9] According tomedieval historians, Sohravardī was charged

[3] Shahrazūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ*, II, pp. 124ff.

[4] See Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Ṭabaqāt I*, 168; and Yāqūt, *Irshād*, VI, 269.

[5] Shahrazūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ*, II, pp. 125-127.

[6] See my, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine," in *Aspects of Islamic Political Philosophy*, ed. Charles Butterworth (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1992), pp. 294-334; and *Knowledge and Illumination* (Atlanta, 1990), Ch. I.

[7] See my, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine," pp. 294-334.

[8] Shahrazūrī reports (*Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ*, II, 125-126) that Sohravardī defeated two elderly and respected jurists of Aleppo, the brothers Jahbal, in a publicized debate at the Ḥalāwiyya Madrasa, one of whom, Ṭāhir b. Jahbal had founded the traditionalist Nūriyya Madrasa (See Ibn al-'Adīm [1192-1262], *Zubdat al-Ḥalab*, Princeton mss, Reel I, fol 83v.).

with "heresy," "corrupting religion," and "corrupting the young prince, al-Malik al-Ẓāhir," with the result that Saladin ordered the prince to have him killed.[10] These accusations were, however, unfounded.[11] As I have shown elsewhere, Sohravardī's demise was a consequence of his political teachings that formed the "Illuminationist political doctrine."[12]

The name of a few of Sohravardī's teachers are known. They include Fakhr al-Dīn al-Mārdīnī (d.594/1198),[13] and Ẓahīr-i Fārsī, who taught him the *Observations* (*al-Baṣā'ir*) of the famous logician 'Umar ibn Sahlān Sāvī (fl. 540/1145).[14]

Sohravardī's important writings on the philosophy of illumination are *Intimations* (*al-Talwīḥāt*), *Apposites* (*al-Muqāwamāt*), *Paths and Havens* (*al-Mashāri' wa'l-Muṭāraḥāt*),[15] and the *Philosophy of Illumination* (*Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*).[16] These four major works constitute an integral corpus and are written in Arabic.[17] Though not a major

[9] *Ṭabaqāt,* p. 642. The Qāḍī had been a trusted counsellor to Saladin (H.A.R. Gibb, *Life of Saladin,* p. 49).

[10] *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ,* II, 125-126.

[11] The biographers differ in their opinions regarding Sohravardī's execution. For example, Ibn Khallikān states: "I saw her [city of Aleppo] people differ concerning his affair . . . some attributed him with heresy (*al-zandaqa wa'l-ilḥād*), while others were of the opinion that there was good in him and that he was from among the people blessed with miraculous powers." (*Wafayāt,* VI, 273). Shahrazūrī states: "I saw people differ concerning his execution." (*Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ,* II, 125).

[12] See my, "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine," pp. 294-334.

[13] Yāqūt, *Irshād,* VI, 269.

[14] Sohravardī, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I,* edited by Henry Corbin (Istanbul: Maarif Matbaasi, 1945), pp. 146, 278, 352.

[15] Published in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica I,* 1-121. .

[16] Published in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica II,* pp. 1-260.

philosophical work, *The Book of Radiance* is a summary of topics selected mainly from *Intimations* and the *Philosophy of Illumination,* and closely corresponds with the Arabic.

II

The Book of Radiance was composed for the Seljuk ruler Sulaymān Shāh, who is said to have been a great patron of philosophy.[18] This point is supported by Sohravardī's own statement in the text (§1) where he states: "Know that this is a short treatise named *The Book of Radiance,* which was composed by command of one of the lovers of virtue.'" The work is in an elegant philosophical Persian in ten chapters in which topics selected from logic, physics, and metaphysics are presented, usually in a straightforward style.

The last chapter closely resembles the final chapters in each of Sohravardī's four major works in Arabic where, expounding on the principles of "Illuminationist political doctrine," just rule is associated with learning philosophy and practicing wisdom, as well as with clairvoyance, true dreams, divine inspiration, and other such extraordinary qualities.[19] It also stipulates the ancient Persian

[17] The "syllabus" on illuminationist philosophy begins with a "first" level discussion of problems in the *Intimations* in a style and language that is both introductory and standard. While the text does parallel Avicenna's Peripatetic texts, it is not confined to Peripatetic principles and arguments, but goes beyond to introduce novel illuminationist principles, laws, and arguments. The "final" level of the syllabus includes a complete presentation of illuminationist philosophy in both language and method in the text *Philosophy of Illumination.* I have presented the details of such characteristics of Sohravardī's major texts in my, *Knowledge and Illumination* (Atlanta, 1990), Ch.I; and in "Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī: founder of the Illuminationist school," in *History of Islamic Philosophy,* ed S.H. Nasr and O. Leaman (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 434-464.

[18] Quoted from Ibn Bībī's *Mukhtaṣar-i Tārīkh-i Salājiqa* by B. Furūzānfar in his *Zindigānī-yi Mawlānā Jalāl al-Dīn* (Tehran, 1987), pp. 24-28.

concepts of *Kiyān Kharreh* (Kayanid Glory) and *Farreh-ye Izadī* (Divine Glory), as manifest signs of a ruler's divine authority (§94). The weight of Sohravardī's engagement with political philosophy can be measured by the fact that he sought the patronage of several Seljuk rulers, including Prince 'Alā' al-Dīn Kay-Qubād; Sulaymān-Shāh; Malik 'Imād al-Dīn Urtuq, ruler of Kharpūt; and the Ayyubid King Saladin's young son, in order to bring about a new political order.[20]

III

A detailed discussion of illuminationist philosophy is beyond the scope of this introduction. However, in order to facilitate the reader's comprehension of the new illuminationist arguments found in *The Book of Radiance*, a brief account of selected principles that serve to distinguish Suhravardī's approach from that of Avicennan philosophy is provided below.

In general, in his philosophy of illumination, Sohravardī deals with a number of problems in the Islamic Peripatetic style; but elsewhere, his arguments follow an illuminationist approach. Some of these problems are illuminationist by common association, such as the multiplicity of Intellects (*kathrat-e 'uqūl*; §54-§61); the attribution "rich" and "poor" to equivocal being; and his adding of "nobility" and "degree of intensity" to standard Aristotelian types of priority (§50). Other problems are more complex and require a closer examination below.

[19] I have discussed this aspect of the text in detail in my "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine," pp. 230-334.

[20] For details see my "The Source and Nature of Authority: A Study of al-Suhrawardī's Illuminationist Political Doctrine," pp. 317ff

In the domain of epistemology, Sohravardī's unified theory of apprehension (Arabic, *idrāk*; Persian, *daryāftan*), is well-known in Islamic philosophy as "knowledge by presence" (*'ilm-e huzūrī*). This theory rests on an inquiry into the relation between being and knowing, which is first rendered into Persian in *The Book of Radiance*. Here self-consciousness plays a fundamental role. "I-ness"; (*manī*, in Persian) is expanded to include "thou-ness" (*to'ī*) and "he/she/it-ness" (*ū'ī*); i.e. ipseity (*huwiyya*) is generalized and encompasses the second and third persons as well (§27, §44). The subject, or the "one who apprehends/knows" (Arabic, *mudrik*; Persian, *daryābandeh*) apprehends the object (*mudrak; daryāfteh*) when an atemporal relation is actualized between them. Self-consciousness/self-apprehension does not derive from the dyadic differentiation of being but is prior to any differentiation. Thus, "I think" and "I am" are "sameness," which is a non-predicative identity relation. In *The Book of Radiance*, this relation is named *be-ham būdan*, lit., 'togetherness' of subject (*daryābandeh*) and object (*daryāfteh*); and is applied to the rational soul (*nafs-e nāteqeh*) and body (*tan*; §32, §71).

Togetherness is an identity preserving one-to-one correspondence between each and every member of the set of all knowing subjects and knowable objects. Sohravardī here extends a logical principle of identity on to a metaphysical principle of relational correspondence. Each side of the relation is defined as a continuous domain consisting of multiple things, and the sum total of all things constitutes the whole. Every member of each of the two domains is said to be self-consciouss, which is further attributed with "living"; therefore, the whole is also said to be self-conscious and thus "alive" (*ḥayy*; §41-46).

The reasons for Sohravardī's departure from Avicenna's Aristote-

lian methodology—where the first principles are constructed as predicative, essentialist definitions—are complex. To put it succinctly, he questions the universal validity of predicative laws. Aristotelian scientific theory must necessarily be constructed on principles that are most prior and most well known. Aristotle reiterates that such principles cannot be obtained by syllogistic demonstration. And though he states in more than one place, that principles of science are known not by the temporally extended process of inference-specific demonstration, but through some "other way" (i.e., "immediate knowledge") he is uncertain regarding their validity, never completely distinguishing "immediate knowledge" from "opinion." This was regarded as ambiguous by later philosophers, and Sohravardī tried to overcome the problem. For example, Aristotle names the necessary primary knowledge of first principles a kind of "immediate knowledge," or "intuition" and states that it is "a starting-point of knowledge," but then leaves it unclear as to whether this type of pre-inference knowledge is "opinion," valid by "common acceptance," or something known as "scientific knowledge."[21] This ambiguity is resolved by Sohravardī's "Science of Lights" (*'ilm al-anwār*), which is the methodology of his new philosophy of illumination.

Further, illuminationist philosophy contests the Aristotelian position that the laws of science formulated as *A*-propositions (the universal affirmative, *al-mūjiba al-kulliya*; i.e., $\forall\alpha f(\alpha)$) are both necessary and always true, or universal. Through an elaborate process of arguments starting with the sections on logic in his major Arabic texts, Sohravardī establishes future contingency (*al-imkān al-mustsaqbal*) as a scientific principle. Using this and other principles

[21] Aristotle's notion of "immediate knowledge" is mentioned in *Posterior Analytics*, I.2; *Metaphysics* XII, as well as in several places in *De Anima*, III.

he argues that contrary to the Aristotelian position, laws of science cannot be universal. For us, this would mean that the current laws of science, such as $\Gamma(\alpha)t_n$ formulated as, or equated with the formula $\Gamma(\alpha) \Leftrightarrow \forall\alpha f(\alpha)$ are inherently refutable, and may in fact turn out to be wrong, because at time τ_{n+m}:$\Diamond\exists\alpha_\varphi \ni f(\alpha_\varphi) \rightarrow \neg (\forall\alpha f(\alpha))$ thus invalidating universality of $\Gamma(\alpha)$.[22]

Sohravardī sought to construct a system that would yield the same type of certitude in intuitive knowledge as is obtained by mathematical deductive reasoning. This means that atemporal and non-spatially extended intuitive knowledge obtained by the acts of the self-conscious "I-ness" (*al-ana'iyya al-mudrika*) would permit primary principles to be obtained and given validity beyond the predicative, temporal mode of inference.

Sohravardī first critically evaluates the Law of Identity in logic, then, among other problems, examines the physics of continuity (*ittiṣāl*) and discontinuity (*infiṣāl*) against the notions of "equality" (*tasāvī*);"union" (*ittiḥād*); and "connection" (*ittiṣāl*) between the apprehending subject (*al-mawḍū' al-mudrik*) and the apprehendable object (*al-mawḍū' al-mudrak*).[23] The theory is formulated in full for the first time in the section on Metaphysics in *Paths and Havens: Book Three*. It replaces Aristotelian predicative knowledge, thought to be inapplicable to the process of obtaining Primary Principles,[24] with the unified theory of "knowledge by presence." In logical terms,

[22] Sohravardī's novel criticism of Aristotelian logic is paralleled in William of Ockham's *Summa Logicæ: Pars Prima*: 13, 14. Other parallels include: Illuminationist critique of Aristotelian *horos* and *horismos*, in the *Philosophy of Illumination, Part One*, I.7, §13 through §16, with *Summa Logicæ, Pars Prima:* 26: "On Definition"; and *Summa Ligicæ, Pars Prima*: 12: "Second intentions," with *i'tibārāt 'aqliyya*, in *the Philosophy of Illumination, Part One*, III.3.1, §56ff.

this means that forms of equality such as "x is y" and "x = y," are replaced with a unified law of relational correspondence between each and every (*kull wāḥid wāḥid*) individual member (*āḥād*) of aggregate wholes (*al-ijtimā'*, a novel illuminationist term): the "realm of knowing," and the "realm of being." This relation between subject and object is named "*al-iḍāfa al-ishrāqiyya*," meaning "illuminationist relation."

The idea of relational correspondence between thinking and being, subject and object, thinker and the thing thought, is one of illuminationist philosophy's great achievements. The theory clearly defines the multi-level relation between the thinking subject and the knowable object as a relation function between each member of the two realms: thinking and being. Thus, non-predicative knowledge

[23] Consider: *Selbsgefühl*, as "the central and original idea that underlines all of subsequent writings [of Fichte]" states the translator Daniel Breazeale (See Fichte, *Early Philosophical Writings*. Translated and Edited by Daniel Breazeale [Ithaca: Cornell UP. 1988], pp. 11-13). In addition, Breazeale reports Fichte's discussions with Henrick Steffens (a former student who wrote the conversation in vol. IV of his *Was ich erlebte* [Breslau: J. Max, 18421], pp. 161-162). In one passage we read: "For some time he [Fichte] had dimly realized that truth consists in the unity of thought and object. He . . . thought that the act by which self-consciousness seizes and holds onto itself is clearly a type of knowing. The I recognizes itself as something produced through its own activity; thinker and thought, knowing and its object, are here one and the same. All knowledge proceeds from this point. . . . he tried to establish the I as the principle of philosophy" (*Was ich erlebte*, p. 13).

Now consider sohravardī's statement as explained by his commentator Shahrazūrī: "All things self-apprehending are 'pure lights' and all pure lights are evident (*Evidenz* of German texts) to their I-ness (*al-ana'iyya*, which is extended in Persian to include *manī, to'ī*, and *ū'ī*). . . . so here the self-conscious subject (*al-mudrik*) and the knowable object (*al-mudrak*) and awareness itself (*al-idrāk*, as *Vernehmen* in German philosophical texts) are one" (Shahrazūrī, *Sharḥ Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, ed. Hossein Ziai [Tehran, 1992], pp. 301ff).

[24] Aristotle concurs on this, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 2.

by presence is given priority over predicative knowledge, and finally, X = Y is replaced by $\{x_i\}\Re(\theta)\{y_j\}$, which is named a unified law of metaphysics.[25]

IV

Partow Nameh has been printed twice before: first, by Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sabzevari in *Chahārdah Risāla* (1961),[26] which is here named S; and second, by Seyyed Hossein Nasr in *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica III* (1970),[27] here named N. The present edition is based on S, N, and one other manuscript, F, which was identified and described by Helmut Ritter in 1937-38.[28] F is one of the oldest known manuscripts (mss #5426; copied in 726 A.H.), and is housed in the Soltan Fātiḥ Library in Istanbul. The text of the present edition does not differ greatly from N, which, however, shows major differences with S. In preparing it for publication, I have compared all three texts and added punctuation and voweling where necessary to facilitate reading. In the Persian text whenever که and چه are used as logical connectives in compound syllogisms, I have added a "comma" to distinguish from their use as pronouns.

[25] Consider also the following: "If $\Re$ is relation such that for *all* [my emphasis] u, v, y, if $\langle u,v\rangle \in \Re$ and $\langle u,y\rangle \in \Re$, then v = y; [and]then the relation $\Re$ is called a "function" . . . defined in terms of a set" (see Hilary Putnam, *Philosophy of Logic*, [London: Alen & Unwin, 1972], p.46).

[26] See S. M. B. Sabzevari, *Chahārdah Risāla* (Tehran, 1961), pp. 220-272.

[27] See S. H. Nasr & H. Corbin, *Opera Metaphysica et Mystica III* (Tehran, 1970), pp. 2-81.

[28] See Helmut Ritter, "Philologika IX: Die vier Suhrawardī," *Der Islam*, vol. 24 (1937), pp. 270-286; and vol. 25. (1938), pp. 35-86.

✦

The Book of Radiance

پرتو نامه

✦

❖ The Book of Radiance ❖

In the Name of God, Whose Assistance Ensures Success

[1] Know that this is a short treatise called *The Book of Radiance*, which was composed in compliance with the command of one of the "lovers of virtue." In certain instances where the terminology of Peripatetic philosophers was difficult to understand, we have elaborated on the terms for clarification. The aim is to expound on some issues in the science of metaphysics, some of which we have presented in the past. Other scholars and the Giver of Life are implored to facilitate the journey to its successful end. This work comprises ten chapters.

❖ پرتو نامه ❖

بسم الله المُوفّق لإتمامه

[۱] بدانکه این مختصریست که ساخته شد بحُکم اشارت بعضی از محبّان فضیلت، و نامش «پَرتو نامه» کرده آمد. و بعضی مواضع که اصطلاحات علمای مشّائین درآنجا صعوبتی داشت، تا مُفضی بُوَد، بتطویل اصطلاحی نزدیکتر کردیم. و غرض ایراد نکته ای چند است از علمِ الهی؛ و پیش، نکته ای چند را از آن تقدیم کرده آمد. تسهیل طریق را، از علمای دیگر و از واهبِ حَیوة، توفیقِ اتمام درخواسته می آید. و مجموع این ده فصل است:

❖ Chapter One ❖

On the Explanation of Some Philosophical Terms; and on Defining the Body and Some of Its States

[2] Know that whatever you perceive, your cognizance and knowledge of it is such that a form of that thing is obtained by you, because you have come to know something you previously did not know. For if something of the thing's image were not obtained by you, then your state before and after knowledge would be the same, which is impossible. Furthermore, if that which you have obtained does not completely correspond with the thing you have come to know, then you have not acquired knowledge of it, as-it-is. Therefore, it is necessary that what you acquire corresponds to the thing as-it-is in itself and that this be its true form.

[3] Know that whenever the meaning of a single "term" applies equally to many things, we call it a "general term," and we call its meaning a "universal meaning." And whenever the meaning of a single term is associated with only one thing we call it a "particular term." An example of a general term is "human," in which many specific humans partake, even as the term "human" applies equally to Zayd, ʿAmr, and Khālid. Examples of the particular term are Zayd, Bakr, "this man," and whatever is specifically indicated.

[4] Whenever a real thing is described by an attribute, then that attribution is either: (1) necessary, such as the predicate "animal"

❖ فصل أوّل ❖

در شرح بعضی اصطلاحات وتعریف جسم وبعضی احوال او

[۲] بدانکه هرچه تو آن را بشناسی، شناخت و دانش تو اورا آن باشد که صورتی از آن او در تو حاصل شود، زیرا که تو چیزی بدانی که ندانسته ای. و[اگر] مثال او[۱] در تو هیچ حاصل نشود، پس حال تو پیش از دانش و پس از دانش یکیست، و این محال است. و اگر در تو چیزی حاصل شود[۲] [که] مطابق آن چیز که تو او را دانستی نباشد، پس چنانکه اوست ندانستی. و چون او را چنانکه اوست بدانستی، باید که آنچه پیش تو است مطابق آن چیز باشد که در نفس خویش و صورت او بُوَد.

[۳] بدانکه هر لفظی که شاید که به یك معنی بر بسیاران افتد، آن را «لفظ کُلّی» خوانیم، و مَعنی آن «معنی کُلّی». و هر لفظ که به یك معنی بر یك چیز بیش نتوان گفت، آن را «جُزوی» خوانیم. مثال أوّل، هم چون «مردم»، که بسیاران در مردمی انبازند، و مردم به یك معنی بر زید و عمرو و خالد افتد. مثال دوم، هم چون «زید» و «بکر» و «این مرد»؛ و هر چه بدو اشارت افتد.

[٤] هر حقیقتی را که بچیزی وصف کنند: یا «ضَروری» بُوَد آن وصف او را، هم چون «حیوانی» مر انسان را؛ و یا «مُمکن»

[۱] N: مثلا اگر از او؛ S: ومثل او

[۲] N: اگر مطابق؛ S: ومطابق

applied to human; (2) possible, such as "the ability to write" predicated of human; or (3) impossible, such as the predicate "inanimate" for human. That which is necessary for a thing's essence cannot be taken away from it, in the same way that it is impossible to construct a triangle without three angles. Whatever is "possible" may exist or not exist, because it is neither "necessary" nor "impossible." The attribute of something is more general than the thing itself, such as the attribute "black" predicated of tar—since all tars are black, but not every black thing is tar. This is also true of the attribute "animal" predicated of human. On the other hand, an attribute may be equal to something, such as "with three angles" predicated of a triangle. Furthermore, an attribute may be more specific than the thing itself, such as "writing" predicated of humans, since [the class] "all humans" cannot be described by an attribute more specific than "human" itself.

[5] Whenever a real thing has a necessary attribute inherent in the reality of the thing itself, then wherever that thing exists, that attribute will also exist. For example, "with angles" is the necessary attribute of a triangle; and "burning" is the necessary attribute of fire—for whenever you behold a fire burning, and know that its "burning" is because of the fire, you will then deduce that every fire that exists has the attribute of "burning." Any attribute predicated as a proven deduction for the thing itself, however, does not necessarily participate in that thing's general attribute. For example, water and fire share the predicate "body," yet burning attributed to fire is not

بُوَد، هم چون «نویسندگی» مر انسان را؛ و یا «محال» باشد، هم چون «جمادی» انسان را. و آنچه ضروری بُوَد، مرذات چیز را بعینه، از او زایل نتوان کرد؛ چنانکه اگر کسی خواهد که مثلّثی را بی سه زاویه کُند نتواند. و هر چه شاید که باشد، شاید که نباشد؛ زیرا که «ممکن» است نه «ضروری» و نه «ممتنع». و «وصف» چیزی باشد که: ۱- عام‌تر از او باشد؛ هم چون «سیاهی» قیر را. که «هر قیری سیاه باشد»، امّا «نه هر سیاهی قیر بُوَد»؛ و هم چنین «جانوری» مردم را. و باشد که: ۲- برابر چیز باشد، هم چون «سه زاویه» مثلّث را. که «هرمثلّثی سه زاویه دارد، و هر چه سه زاویه دارد مثلّث باشد». و باشد که: ۳- خاصّ تر باشد، هم چون «کِتابت» مردم را. و همهٔ مردم را بِوصفی که خاصّ تر از مردمی باشد نعت نتوان کردن.

[٥] هر حقیقتی که او را وصفی ضروری باشد - از بهر عین آن حقیقت - هر کجا که آن حقیقت بُوَد، آن وصف با او باشد؛ هم چون «زاویه ها» مثلّث را، و «سوزندگی» آتش را. که، چون یك آتش را سوزنده بینی و بدانی که سوزندگی او از بهر آتشیست، بدانی که هر آتشی که هست سوزنده باشد. و هر حُکمی که حقیقت را از بهر خصوص خویش ثابت است، لازم نیست که مُشارك او را در وصفِ عامّ آن حُکم باشد. که، آب مُشارك آتش است در جسمی، ولکن سوزندگی آتش را نه از بهر جسمیست،

a necessary attribute for "body-ness," otherwise it would also be necessary for water to burn. Rather, "burning" is a necessary attribute specific to fire [and not to body].

[6] Know that "induction" is a conclusion based on examining numerous particulars. An example of this is when someone says: "All animals move the lower jaw when they chew, because in whatever animals we have observed, from cows and horses to humans and other animals, we have found this to be true." This method of reasoning is incorrect, however, because the possibility exists that the person has not yet observed the evidence contrary to [the conclusion drawn from] what he did observe. For example, the crocodile moves its upper jaw when it chews. Hence, in this case, the induction "all animals move the lower jaw when they chew" is proven to be false. [In sum,] if someone does not actually observe something, or does not know of it, this does not prove the nonexistence of that thing. True philosophers, when drawing a general conclusion, ponder the principle of a thing, and based on careful analysis, they then deduce the necessity, possibility, or impossibility of a thing's attributes. Thus, the proposition "All humans are animals" is not constructed by means of induction. Rather, [it is deduced, because] the attribute "animal" is necessary to conceive the essence of "human" in the mind, whether for one human, or for many.

[7] Know that, in this short epistle, we will use the term "attribute" to refer to any quality whose existence is in a real thing such that it is altogether subsumed by that thing, such as "blackness" or

تا لازم آمدی که آب نیز سوزنده باشد، بلکه از بهر خصوص آتشیست.

[۶] و بدانکه «استقرا» حُکمیست بر کُلّی بدانچه در جزویات بسیارش یافته باشند. چنانکه، کسی گوید: «همهٔ جانوران در وقتِ خاییدن چانهٔ زیرین جُنبانند، زیرا که هرچه ما دیدیم از گاو و اسب و مردم و جانوران دیگر، چنین دیدیم». و این نَمَط درست نیست، زیرا که حُکمِ آنچه ندیده باشند بخلاف آن بُوَد که دیده باشند؛ هم چون نهنگ در این مثال، که استقرا را باطل می کند، از بهر آنکه در وقت خاییدن چانهٔ بالایین جنباند. و نا دیدن و نا دانستنِ کسی مر چیز را دلالتِ نکند بر نابودن آن چیز. و محقّقان چون حُکم کُلّی کنند، به اصل حقیقت نگرند در عقل، و از آنجا ضرورت و امکان و امتناع اوصاف بدانند. هم چنانکه گویی «هر آدمی جانور باشد»، و این نه به استقرا معلوم شده است، بلکه ماهیّتِ مردم را در عقل، جانوری ضروریست؛[۳] خواه یکی باد، خواه بسیار.

[۷] و بدانکه هر چیزی که وجود او در چیزی باشد، چنانکه همگیِ «این» با «آن» مُجامع و مُلاقی بُوَد – هم چون سیاهی و سپیدی در جامه – او را در این مختصر «صفت» نام کنیم، و آنچه در او ست «محلِّ صفت». و آنچه گفتیم که، همگیِ آن مُلاقی آن

[۳] N: ضرورتیست؛ S: ضروریست

"whiteness" in a garment; and whatever it is in, we will call "the substratum of the attribute." Be apprised that when we say the "totality" of it is subsumed in the thing it is in, we do not mean cases such as water in a jar or a nail in a wall—because water is not an attribute of the jar, even though it is "in" it. This is because the totality of the water is not subsumed in the totality of the jar.

We will call every possibly existent being that does not have a substratum "substance"; briefly, we shall define "substance" as "that which does not have a substratum"; and we define "accident" as "that which does have a substratum." These are easily grasped definitions. But [to explain comprehensively] the way the Peripatetic philosophers employ the technical terms "substance" and "accident"—and to distinguish among their uses of "accident," "attribute," and "form"—would unduly protract this discussion. Prior to the Peripatetics, these technical terms were defined and known as we present them here; our intention is primarily to indicate the "meaning" [signified by the term]. We will call every substance that by necessity is extended in length, width, and depth "body"; and we shall define body as a substance that can be physically indicated [i.e., "this thing," "that thing," etc.].

[8] Know that a general meaning never occurs outside of the mind. For if it existed in external reality, then it would have an objective "it-ness" in which other real things could not share. But, as we have already established, a general meaning is that in which many things can share. Every universal has many particulars related to it, and these particulars must differ among themselves; otherwise, they would all be one and the same, and this is impossible. The

بُوَد که در اوست، احتراز کردیم از بودن آب در کوزه و میخ در دیوار. که، آب را «صفت» کوزه نخوانند، اگر چه دروست، از بهرآنکه «همگیِ آب» مُلاقی «همگیِ کوزه» نیست.

و هرچه «محلّ» نیست، از ممکنات، او را «جوهر» خوانیم، و بر آن اختصار و اقتصار کنیم؛ که گوییم: «جوهر آنست که محلّ ندارد، و عَرَض آنست که محلّ دارد»؛ که این اصطلاحی نزدیکست. امّا، اصطلاح علمای مشّائین در «جوهر» و «عَرَض»؛ و فرق میان «عَرَض» و «صفت» و «صورت»؛ دراز می شود، و در این مختصر بدان حاجت نیست. و پیش از مشّائین اصطلاح همین بوده است که یاد کردیم؛ و مقصود ما «معنی» است. هر «جوهر»، که البتّه خالی نشود از طولی و عرْضی و عُمقی، ما آن را «جسم» خوانیم. و تعریف «جسم»، درین مختصر، بدان کنیم که: «جوهریست مقصود به اشارات».

[۸] و بدانکه «معنی کُلّی» در بیرونِ عقل هرگز واقع نشود. که، اگر در اعیان حاصل شود، او را «اویی» باشد که دیگران را در آن شرکت نباشد. و ما گفتیم که: «کُلّی آنست از معانی، که درو بسیاران را شرکت تواند بودن». و هر کُلّی، که او را جزویّاتِ بسیار باشند، آن جزویّات را، چون شرکت است در کُلّی، باید که فرق باشد میان ایشان؛ و اگر نه، همه یکی باشند، واین محالست. و فرق بچیزی باید، ورای آنکه شرکت دروست.

difference among the particulars must be something other than the shared quality [by virtue of which they are included in the universal]. Since all bodies are included in the universal "body-ness," there must be a difference between particular bodies; and this difference is expressed by attributes. Attributes differ from each other either in terms of: (1) the "what-ness" of a thing, as when something is called "black" or "white" [by virtue of which it is distinguished from another]; or (2) in terms of the "where-ness" of a thing, such as when two things are called "black" but differ because each is situated in a different substratum [i.e., "this thing is here" and "that thing is there"]. Should it happen that both black bodies occupy the "same" substratum, then they must differ in terms of time. One will be in that substratum at one time and the other at a different time. Should it happen that both bodies exist at the same time and in the same substratum, then they would be one and the same, which is impossible. From this we deduce that two like things cannot exist in the same substratum at the same time.

[9] Know that an attribute cannot move from one substratum to another; for if it could move by itself, it would become extended in direction in the future, and whatever has the six directions must necessarily have the three dimensions (length, width, and depth), as well; from which it could be concluded that an attribute is a body, which is absurd. Furthermore, if it were a body, how could a body be totally subsumed in a different body, in such a way as to be inclusive of each other? The impossibility of this is apparent. Know, however, that many attributes can exist in one substratum, such as the attributes "yellowness" and "sweetness" predicated of honey. But opposite, or near opposite, attributes cannot exist in one

و اجسام همه، چون در «جسمی» مُشارکند، و ز فرق چاره نیست، پس فرق بصفات باشد. و صفات را فرق یا: ۱- به حقیقت باشد، هم چون سیاهی و سپیدی؛ و یا: ۲- بمحلّ باشد، هم چون دو سیاهی. که، فرق میان ایشان بدان باشد که هر یکی را محلّی دیگر باشد. و اگر هر دو را محلّ یکی باشد، دو سواد را [مثلاً]، فرق میان ایشان بزمان باشد؛ یکی در زمانی باشد، و دیگری در زمان دیگر. و اگر هر دو در یك محلّ و در یك زمان جمع شوند، پس هر دو یکی باشند، و این محال است. و از اینجا معلوم شد که: دو مِثل در یك محلّ، و در یك زمان، جمع نشوند.

[۹] و بدانکه «صفت» از محلّی بمحلّی نقل نکند. که، اگر حرکت پذیرد بنفس خویش، مستقبل شود بجهات، و هرچه شش جهت دارد، سه بُعدش لازم آید: طول و عرض و عمق؛ پس صفت جسم باشد، و این محالست. و چون تواند بود که، جسمی در جسمی بکُلّی شایع و مُلاقی شود؟ که این «تداخل» باشد، و استحالتش ظاهر است. و بدانکه صفات بسیار تواند بودن که آن را یك محلّ بُوَد، هم چون «زردی» و «شیرینی عسل [را]؛ إلاّ در صفاتی که اضداد باشند، یا نزدیك به ضدّ.

substratum.

[10] Know that some people [the dialectical theologians] have put forward the proposition that every body can be divided to the point that its further divisibility cannot be conceived in the mind. They have called this [ultimate smallest atom] the "singular substance." But the philosophers hold that it is impossible for a body to have a part that is indivisible either in the mind or in any of the mind's faculties, such as estimation. Of course, it may be true that in the external world, due to the existence of an actual infinitesimal thing, we may not be able to divide it further, but we will be able to divide it further in the mind. The proof of the impossibility of an indivisible substance [the atom] is this: Let us posit a substance [S_m] in between and touching two other substances [S_1 and S_2]. If S_m blocks S_1 from S_2, then both S_1 and S_2 would be contiguous with S_m differently; in which case S_m would be further divisible. If, on the other hand, S_m does not block S_1 from S_2, then S_1 and S_2 would be contiguous with each other, in which case the existence or nonexistence of S_m would be irrelevant, as all substances would be inclusive, from which it follows that the volume of one hundred thousand substances could be added to S_m without any further quantity resulting, which is absurd. Should we also place S_m on top of S_1 and S_2, in such a way that it is contiguous with the whole of both of them, then S_m would be more than two and not singular. And it is impossible that S_m is contiguous with only S_1 or S_2 but not both, because we postulated in the beginning that S_m should touch both equally. If S_m is contiguous with just a part of S_1 and S_2, then all three would be divisible. We conclude, therefore, that "body" is not composed of indivisible parts and that it is divisible infinitely in the mind. Our opponents

[۱۰] و بدانکه بعضی از مردم حُکم کردند که: «هر جسمی پاره پذیرد تا بجایی رسد که در وهم قسمت نپذیرد»، و آن را «جوهر فرد» نام کردند. و نزدیك حکما محالست که جسم را جزوی باشد که قسمت نپذیرد در عقل ووهم -اگرچه تواند بود که در بیرون، از غایت کوچکی، ما آن را پاره نتوانیم کرد، ولکن در عقل قسمت پذیرد. و برهان آنکه: این جوهر را در میان دو جوهر تقدیر کنیم. اگر میانگین حجاب کند، یك طرف از طرف دیگر، پس هر یکی از کنارین چیزی مالد از میانگین، جز آنکه دیگری مالد، و لازم آید که منقسم شود. و اگر حجاب نکند یك کنارین را از دیگر، پس آن هر دو کنارین یکدیگر را مالند، ووجود و عدم میانگین یکی باشد، و تداخل لازم آید و باید که حجم صد هزار جوهر بر یکی بیافزاید و در عالم هیچ مقداری نباشد، اگر همگی هر دو را مالد، پس یکی چندِ دو باشد، پس فرد نباشد. و اگر یکی مالد، و آن دیگری نمالد، محالست؛ که، برمُلتقای هر دو تقدیر کردیم؛ و اگر از هر یکی چیزی مالد منقسم شو[ن]د هر سه. پس معلوم شد که: جسم مرکّب نیست از «جزو لایَتَجَزّی»، ودر وهم جسم بی نهایتست. و آنچه خصم تشنیع زند که: «اگر

object that: If a pebble and a mountain are both infinitely divisible, then they would be equal to each other. This [objection] is not worthy of attention, because we are not saying that this infinite divisibility takes place in the external world—rather it is in the mind, where we can consider one division after another.

It is also possible that two things be infinite in the mind, and that one be larger than the other. For example, compare two sequences: all possible multiples of 10 [σ_1] to all possible multiples of 100 [σ_2]. The number of possible multiples of 10 is greater than the number of possible multiples of 100, because in every 100 there are ten 10s, although in both [sequences], numbers can be increased to infinity.

ریگچه قسمت بی نهایت پذیرد و کوه نیز، پس کوه و ریگچه برابر باشند»، سخنی متوجّه نیست، زیرا که ما نمی گوییم که این «قسمتِ بی نهایت» در اعیانست، بلکه وهمیست، که تقدیر کنیم قِسمتی بعد از قسمتی.

و تواند بود که دو چیز بی نهایت باشند در عقل، و یکی از یکی بیشتر باشد؛ هم چون اعدادِ عشراتِ ممکن، و اعدادِ مئاتِ ممکن؛ که، عدد عشراتِ ممکن بیش از اعداد مئاتِ ممکن است، از آنکه در هر صدی ده «ده» موجود است، و با این همه، هر دو را «عدد» در وهم بی نهایت است.

❖ Chapter Two ❖

On the Bounds of the Limited; Space and Time; and Remarks on Generation and Corruption

[11] Know that any numerical set of things whose members can be grouped and ordered must be finite in the mind—whether the order is situational, as with bodies; or by nature, as with causes and effects and with things and their attributes, where one attribute is after another and before yet another. Actual infinity cannot be conceived; for if an infinite extension—or an ordered sequence of infinite numbers—could be found, one would then be able to detach finite quantities from them in the mind, such as ten yards from an extension or ten numbers from a sequence. Then one could join both ends of the quantity that had been cut in such a way that there would be no gap between them. Take the sequence or the extension once with the amount that was cut—which is equal to itself—and place one alongside the other. If both extensions, or both sequences, are equal—so the amount taken away from one end is equal to the amount taken away from the other—it follows necessarily that the additional amount will also match the decreased amount, which is absurd. If a difference exists, it must necessarily be in relation to one end. It would then follow that the decreased part would remain, and the added part would not. Thus, the decreased part will be finite, the added part will add only a finite amount to the sequence or the extension, and whatever is added to a finite amount will also be finite.

❖ فصل دوم ❖

در نهایت مُحدّد ومکان وزمان واشارتی بکُون وفساد

[۱۱] بدانکه هر عددی از چیزها، که «آحاد» آن مُجتَمَع شوند، و درو ترتیبی باشد، خواه وضعی -هم چو[ن] اجسام را؛ و خواه طبیعی - هم چون علل و معلولات را، و صفات و موصوفات را که یکی بعد از یکی باشد و پیش از دیگری؛ [آن مُجتَمَع] در عقل باید که متناهی باشد. و بی نهایت متصوَّر نشود؛ که، اگر امتدادی بی نهایت - یا سلسله های مرتّب از اعداد بی نهایت - موجود بهم توانستی بود، ما از آن امتدادِ بی نهایت - یا آن سلسله - قدری متناهی در وهم قطع توانستمانی کردن؛ هم چون ده گز از امتداد، و یا ده عدد از هر سلسله هایی که باشد؛ و هر دو طرف آن قدر، که قطع کردیم، بِهم پیوندیم، چنانکه در میان هیچ خللی نباشد، و آن سلسله را، یا امتداد را، یکبار با آن قدر مقطوع بکردیم، که چیزیست بسر خویش؛ و هر دو را باز نهیم: اگر هر دو امتداد، یا هر دو سلسله، برابر باشند؛ چنانکه هم چندانکه از یکی رفته باشد، از دیگری [هم] رفته باشد؛ لازم آید که زاید مثل ناقص باشد، و این محال است. و اگر تفاوت افتد، بضرورت باید که در طرف افتد. ناقص بِایستد، و زاید رفته باشد؛ پس ناقص متناهی باشد، و زاید برناقص بیافزاید بقدر متناهی، و هر چه بیافزاید بر متناهی، هم متناهی باشد.

[12] Know that since the body is necessarily finite, it must also have a specified quantity and a specified shape. If this quantity and shape were required of a body—qua only body—it would then follow that all bodies would be the same in quantity and shape; where as this is not the case. You have also learned that bodies differ from each other in terms of attributes; for if all these attributes ceased to exist, then the multiplicity of bodies and their existence would be impossible. Furthermore, if these attributes, by which bodies are distinguished, were required of "body-ness," then all bodies would be equal in respect to them. Since the finitude of bodies has been established, then what gives quantity, attributes, and existence to bodies is "something" that is neither itself a body nor a bodily attribute.

[13] Know that people point to directions, such as "above" and "below." Movements differ in relation to whether they are from above or from below. If directions were not something real, then people could not point to them, for moving toward or pointing toward nothing is impossible. Furthermore, if all directions appeared the same to an observer, then there would be no real distinction among them, so the priority of directions in terms of "above-ness" and "below-ness" would not exist. Because bodies are finite in every dimension, this implies that the possible reference points of a real thing are also limited and this limit is not divisible. Otherwise, there would be no real things beyond the posited upper bound, and the motion associated with bodies would be unreal and directed toward something nonexistent, which is an impossibility. Therefore, that which is the all-encompassing limit of all directions, beyond which no real thing can exist, cannot itself be divisible. It is also not

[۱۲] و بدانکه جسم را چون نهایت لازم آید، مقداری معیّن و شکلی معیّن لازم آید. و اگر این مقدار و شکل را جسمی اقتضا کردی – از آن روی که جسم است – همهٔ اجسام در مقدار و شکل یکی بودندی، و نه چنین است. و نیز بدانستی که اجسام را جدایی از یکدیگر بصفاتست، و اگر همهٔ صفات، مثلاً، نبودندی، اصلاً کثرتِ اجسام و وجود آن محال بودی. و این صفات، که اجسام از یکدیگر بدان جدا می شوند؛ اگر اقتضای جسمی بودی، همهٔ اجسام در آن برابر بودندی. و چون اجسام را تناهی ثابت شد، همهٔ اجسام را دهندهٔ مقدار و صفات و وجود «چیزیست» نه جسم و نه صفت جسم.

[۱۳] و بدانکه مردم اشارت میکنند به «جهات»، همچون «بالا» و «زیر»، و حرکات مختلف میشود ببالا و زیر. اگر جهات چیزی نبودندی موجود، اشارت بدان نشایستی کردن. که، حرکت و اشارت سوی ناچیز، محالست. و اگر همهٔ جهات، به یك چشم متشابه بودی، ازو جهات مختلف حاصل نشدی، که بعضی به «بالایی» و«زیری» اُولیتر نبودی از بعضی. و چون اجسام را تناهی واجبست از هر سوی، اشارت را غایتی باشد. و آن غایت پاره نپذیرد. که، اگر پاره شود ورای غایت چیزی نباشد، [و] حرکتش در ناچیز افتد و سوی ناچیز، و این محالست. پس، آن چیز که مُحدّدِ جمله جهاتست، و ورای او

possible that the limits of bodies be multiple, whether upper or lower; otherwise, many different bodies could possibly combine and then separate. And if the limits became separated, then the motion associated [with bodies] would be in nothing and directed toward nothing, which is impossible. Nor is it possible that [motion and directed motion] be confined to a single body and to a single direction [such as up or down]; since, in such a case, other directed motions could neither be observed nor determined. Therefore, there must exist a single body from which all other directed motions are obtained. Such a "single" body can only be that which encompasses all bodies, which is not itself distinguished by having some parts "above" and others "below"; because, as we have said, this body is homogeneous throughout and cannot be differentiated. Thus, this all-encompassing body has no parts whereby other parts can be distinguished as being "upper" or "lower"; hence, this body encompasses everything above as well as everything below. The farthest point away from this all-encompassing body is the "center," which is determined by the encompasser. But the "center" is not able to determine that which encompasses it, because one may postulate an infinite number of circles around a single center. The principle directions are "up" and "down," and the remainder [north, south, east, and west] are added directions that may vary depending on the position of the observer.

[14] Know that should the all-encompassing limit move, then its motion cannot be linear; for in linear motion there is always another "upper" increment, and thus an outermost limit can not be fixed. Furthermore, that which is contained within the encompasser cannot be a "void." In general, "void" is impossible, for should "void" be

چیزی نیست، پاره نپذیرد. و نشاید که غایات جسمها بسیار باشند، خواه زیر و خواه بالای آن. که، جسمهای بسیار را [اگر] اجتماع ممکن بُوَد، پس افتراق ممکن بُوَد. و چون غایات متفرق شوند، حرکتشان در ناچیز و سوی ناچیز افتد، و این محالست. و نشاید که در یك جسم باشد در یك جهت، [چون] که دیگر جهات ازو متعیَّن نشود. پس، باید که یك جسم باشد که همهٔ جهات ازو حاصل شود، و آن نتواند بود إلاّ محیط همهٔ اجسام. و بعضی از آن جسم بالا نباشد و بعضی زیر، زیرا که آن جسم متشابه است. که، بگفتیم که از مختلفات نشاید. پس، بعضی ببالایی و زیری اُولیتر نباشد از بعضی؛ پس باید که محیطِ جمله «بالا» باشد، و جهت زیر غایت دوری باشد ازو. و غایت دوری از محیط «مرکز» باشد. و محیط مرکز را تعیین کند، و مرکز محیط را تعیین نتواند کردن؛ که، بر یك نقطه دایرهای بی نهایت فرض توان کردن. و اصل جهات «بالا» و«زیر» است، و باقیِ جهات اضافتست و متغیِّر شود بر یك شخص به حسبِ اختلافِ وضعش.

[۱٤] و بدانکه اگر مُحدّد حرکت کند، راست نشاید که بجنبد. که، اگر راست جنبد، ورای او جهتی بُوَد، پس او محدود نباشد. و میان مُحدّد تهی نشاید که باشد؛ و فی الجمله «خلاء» محالست. که، اگر خلا[ء] متصوَّر شود، آن خلاء که جسمی

conceivable, then that "void" in which a body could fit would be greater than that which is lesser—namely, the body contained in it. Thus, "more" and "less" would be in the void, and half, inclination, and so on could also be supposed, in which case the void would be a quantity having length, width, and depth and would be self-subsistent yet not coordinated in space. Therefore, it would be a substance extended along three dimensions and thus must be a body [which is impossible]. The only possibility is that "void" might be considered an immaterial body.

[15] Know that the quantity of specific bodies is something added to the idea of "body," because all bodies share alike in the universal [general term] "body-ness," while they differ in respect to quantity. Therefore, quantity is an accident in "body." If "void" is postulated as a quantity not in a body, then it must be—by virtue of itself—independent of a substratum, which would imply that all quantities are independent of substratum, which is clearly not the case. Therefore, "void" is impossible, and every part of the universe is copious. The place of a body is where it is situated, and no other body can coexist with it in the same place, but a body may move from its situated place. From this, we conclude that "substance" is not the place of attributes, because attributes cannot change position [if something is to remain what it is]. Also, "where" a body is situated is not a real [or fixed] place, because one cannot say that the body is in it [for it may move away from it]. Therefore, the place of a body is the inner limit of the all-encompassing body, which is contiguous with the outer limit of the encompassed body. A body cannot be in the same body at the same time, and a body cannot be in a different body at the same time; for this would imply the inclusion [of many bodies] in one, all touching the limit.

درو گنجد پس از آن بُوَد که کمتر از آن جسمی درو گنجد. پس، درو «بیشی» و «کمی» بُوَد؛ و «نیمه»، و «میل»، و مانند آن درو تقدیر توان کرد؛ پس مقداری باشد که طول و عرض و عمق دارد و بخویشتن ایستاده باشد نه در محلّی، پس جوهریست که سه امتداد دروست، پس جسم است. غایت آنست که جسمی لطیفش تقدیر کنند.

[۱۵] و بدانکه «مقدارِ» اجسام زایدست بر جسم، که اجسام در «جسمی» یکی اند، و در «مقدار» مختلف؛ پس «مقدار» عَرَضیست در جسم. اگر خلاء را «مقداری» فرض کنند نه در جسم؛ پس از محلّ مستغنی باشد، از بهر حقیقت خویش، و باید که همه مقدارها مستغنی باشد از محلّ، و نه چنین است. پس خلاء باطلست، و همهٔ جهان ملاء است. و «مکان» جسم آنست که جسم دروست، و غیر او با او در آنجا نگنجد، و ازو نقل تواند کرد. پس «جوهر»، «مکان صفات» نیست، زیرا که نقل ممتنع است در صفات. و آنچه جسم برو قرار گیرد مکان حقیقی نیست، زیرا که نتوان گفت که دروست؛ پس، مکان جسم حدّ درونیِ جسم محیط باشد که حدّ بیرونیِ جسمِ مُحاط را مالد. و جسم در عینِ جسم نباشد؛ که، این «تداخل» بُوَد، و ملاقات بحدود باشد.

[16] Know that every accident that cannot be conceived to be stationary must be "motion." Also, know that for anything that was nonexistent but came into existence, its nonexistence is prior to its existence. This "priority" is the same as the [former] nonexistence of something generated in time, such that only after it has become existent will it continue to exist. Priority qua priority is never combined with posteriority. This priority is not itself a real thing that exists together with a generated thing in contrast to a cause, a substance, or an accident—inasmuch as the latter three can all exist along with something generated. As the priority of the thing generated does not exist together with it, it is thus a non-static accident, which is "motion." There are "priors" more "prior" than others, and there are differences among them. Therefore, they have quantity and are thus priorities in terms of time. "Time" is the "measure of motion," as when we think of "before" and "after" [some event] in the mind. But it is not the measure of any type of motion; rather, time is the measure of continuous motion—and the most apparent of all. Such motion, for example, is the daily movement of the sun from the east to the west. Hence, if time were something [itself] altogether generated in time—in such a way as to have a "beginning" and its "place"—then it would also need to have a "before," which is also "time," as we have already explained. Therefore, before any particular measurement of time, an [eternal] time—as well as an [eternal] motion—would need to exist from which all variable time, place, and motion are derived. However, should there be a specifiable "interruption" of this primary time and its substratum, then it also must have an "after." In this case, the argument would lead in two ways: (1) there would be a specific

[۱٦] و بدانکه هر عَرَضی، که درو ثبات متصوَّر نشود، آن «حرکتست». و بدانکه هر چیزی، که نَبُوَد، پس ببُوَد، نابودِ او پیش از بودِ اوست؛ و این «پیشی» نه عبارت است از مجرّدِ نابودِ این حادث، که تا بُوَد، بعد نیز باشد. و«پیشی» هرگز – از آن جهت که پیشی است – با «پسی» جمع نشود. و این «پیشی»، عبارت نیست از چیزی که با حادث بِهم نتواند بود – هم چون «فاعلی»، یا «جوهری»، یا «عَرَضی» – زیرا، که این همه در وقتِ وجودِ حادث موجود نتوانند بود. و«پیشیِ» حادث، با حادث جمع نشود؛ پس عَرَضی ناثابتست، و آن «حرکت» باشد. و «پیشیِ» دورتر از «پیشی» باشد؛ که، پیشیها متفاوتست، پس کمیّتی دارد؛ پس، این پیشیها[٤] از زمانست. و «زمان»: «مقدارِ حرکتست»، چون متقدّم و متأخّر او را در «عقل» جمع کنیم؛ و نه مقدار هر حرکتی، بلکه مقدار حرکتی نامنقطع که ظاهرترِ آن همه باشد؛ و آن حرکت یومیست آفتاب را از مشرق تا بمغرب.

پس، اگر زمان حادث باشد بجملگی، چنانکه او را نخستی باشد، و محلّش را نیز، او را «پیشی» بُوَد. و آن «پیشی» هم «زمانی» باشد، چنانکه بیان کردیم. پس، پیش از همهٔ زمان، زمانی باشد، و حرکتی، که «زمان» ازوست و محلِّ حرکت را. و اگر زمان را، و محلّش را، انقطاعی باشد، او را «پسی» بُوَد [و]

[٤] N: این پیشیها نا ثابت؛ S: این پیشیها از

time before and after all time, which is absurd—if time were associated with linear motion, then it could not continue indefinitely, and its end would be knowable; or (2) if time were to return after an interval, still the same would apply—for this would necessitate that time be "interrupted" [i.e., be discrete, not continuous; and, as we have said, this is impossible. Therefore, time is the measure of "circular motion," which has no limit. Any motion that requires a potentiality associated with body, when it can only move in a single direction, is called "natural"—such as the motion of a stone falling toward a given point. Should the motion propelling a body be capable of moving in many directions, it is called "voluntary." But if something is moved by something else, its motion is called "compulsory" constraint—such as the movement of a stone upward [by external force]. Every body has a natural rest place to which, when moved away from by constraint, it desires to return. Furthermore, each kind of body has a specific place appropriate to it not associated with body-ness in general to which, if not constrained, it would incline. The all-encompassing limit has no "place," because beyond it there is no body.

[17] Know that a simple body is that in which there are no different potentialities such that, should it be divided, all its parts would be homogeneous. Simple bodies may only be spherical in shape, for a non-round spherical body is not homogeneous in all its parts. A simple reality does not require different attributes, and that shape

هم برین قیاس قبلی، «زمانی» لازم آید ازین هر دو تقدیر، که پیش از همهٔ زمان، و پس از همهٔ زمان، «زمانی» باشد، و این محالست. و، اگر «زمان» از «حرکت مستقیم» بودی بی نهایت نرفتی، کنارش ظاهر شدی؛ و، اگر باز گردیدی بعد از انقطاع هم چنین؛ و لازم آمدی که زمان منقطع شود، و بگفتیم که این محالست. پس، [زمان] مقدار «حرکتی مستدیر» باشد که او «کناره» ندارد. و هر حرکتی که قوّتی اقتضا کند که بجسم تعلّق دارد، اگر نتواند بُوَد إلاّ بریك نَسَق، آن را «طبیعی» خوانند، هم چو حرکت سنگ سوی مرکز. و اگر توانای آن باشد، آن قوّت را، که بر جهات مختلف جنباند، آن را «ارادتی» خوانند. و اگر چیزی بیرونی جنباند، آن را «قِسری» خوانند، هم چو جنبانیدن سنگ سوی بالا. و هر جسمی را «حیّزی» طبیعی باشد، که اگر بِقِسر از آنجا شاید جنبانیدن، بطبع دیگر باره قصد آنجا کند. و هر یکی را از انواع بخصوص خویش مکانی مُلایم باشد، نه بجهت عموم جسمی. و «مُحدّد» مکان ندارد، ازآنکه بالای او هیچ جسمی نیست.

[۱۷] و بدانکه «جسمِ بسیط» آن باشد که درو اختلاف قوّتها نباشد؛ چنانکه اگر پاره کنندش همه پاره های او متشابه بُوَد. و «جسمِ بسیط» هیچ شکلی را اقتضا نکند، إلاّ گرد؛ زیرا که، شکل ناگرد در همهٔ اجزاء جسم متشابه نبُوَد. و «یك حقیقت»

that is homogeneous in all its parts is the sphere. Both the all-encompassing limit and the circumference are simple. Therefore, they must be spherical. It is also impossible that two different universes be subsumed under two all-encompassing limits. This is because one limit would then require a direction different from the other, which would imply that yet another direction exists other than the two supposed, with an all-encompassing limit of its own. Therefore, the supposition of two all-encompassing limits does not hold. Furthermore, two spherical shapes without an interval between them cannot come together. This would imply a void between them, and "void" is impossible [as we have shown].

[18] It is also not possible that a single species of body have two [specific] places; for if such were the case, the body would require neither one, both spaces being equal to it. Thus it would not move toward either of them. But bodies naturally move from one direction toward another. From this, we deduce that bodies have a single "restplace." Composite bodies tend to move toward the dominant place. Note that a perfectly balanced composite of the four elements is not possible, because there is no common boundary between each of the four equidistant from [the restplace of the body] so that the body could come to rest there and not incline toward one of the four elements [more than another]. If this were so, it would not need any restplace, which is absurd.

[19] Know that there are three types of motion: (1) motion around a center; (2)– motion away from a center; and (3) motion toward a center. The first type is like that of the celestial bodies, which move in a circular motion around a specific center and are unable to move in a linear way. As for that which moves in a linear way by

چیزهای مختلف اقتضا نکند؛ و متشابه در همهٔ اجزا[ء]، از اشکال گرد است: «محیط» و «مُحدّد» بسیط است، پس گرد باشد. و نشاید که دو عالَم باشد زیرِ دو مُحدّد؛ که، یك مُحدّد برجهتی باشد از آن مُحدّد دیگر؛ پس، بیرون ایشان جهتی باشد و مُحدّدی باید ایشان را. پس، ایشان مُحدّد نباشند، و نیز دو شکلِ گرد بی فُرجه با هم نتواند آمد؛ پس، در میان دو مُحدّد خلاء افتد، و خلاء محالست.

[۱۸] و نشاید که یك نوع جسم را دو مکان باشد؛ که، اگر چنین باشد اقتضای هیچ یك نکند، که هر دو او را برابر باشند. پس سوی هیچ نجنبد، و چونِ بطبع از یك سوی می جنبد، پس مکانش یکیست. و مرکّب میل بسوی مکان غالب کند. و مرکّب معتدل از چهار عنصر نشاید که باشد؛ زیرا که، در میان هر چهار [عنصر] حدّی مشترك نیست، که بنسبت دوریِ او هر چهار یکسان باشد، تا آنجا بایستد، و سوی هیچ یکی از مکان چهار گانه میلش ننماید، پس اقتضای مکان نکند، و این نشاید.

[۱۹] و بدانکه متحرّکات بر سه قسم اند: ۱- متحرّك بر وسط؛ ۲- و متحرّك از وسط؛ ۳- و متحرّك بسویِ وسط. أوّل؛ هم چون افلاك، که ایشان را حرکتِ دوری باشد برگرد مرکز، وراست نشاید که بجنبد. و هر چه راست جنبد، اگر بطبع از جهت میان بسوی بالا جنبد، گرماش لازم آید؛ و اگر بطبع بسوی میان جنبد،

nature, it has two possibilities: (1) if it moves naturally from below upward, it must have been heated; and (2) if it moves naturally downward toward a center, it must have been cooled. The bodies of the four elements, which have linear motion, fall into either of these two categories. Every body that can move linearly can also be divided. Whatever can easily conjoin and separate, form, take shape and break apart, is humid; and whatever does so with difficulty is dry. And whatever moves linearly is associated with these two. Inasmuch as the Natures can be combined in four ways: (1) hot and dry, (2) hot and humid, (3) cold and humid, and (4) cold and dry. By these four combinations, the four elements are realized. The first, from among the simple things which is like fire, ranks above all other elemental entities beneath the sphere of the moon. It is also called the "absolute light element." The second, which is like air, is both hot and humid, and its position is beneath [the element] fire. It is light because of its nearness to fire. The third is cold and humid like water, and the fourth is cold and dry like earth. The [fourth], earth, is called the "absolute heavy element," because it inclines toward the lowermost limit. Water is heavy because of its nearness to earth. That earth is heavier than water is evident, for whenever we pour some earth into water, it sinks, while the water remains standing over the earth. As for air being lighter than water, this is proved whenever you submerge a leathern bottle full of air into water: it will undoubtedly surface. Some people have thought that water compels the bottle to rise, because whenever water comes together [where the bottle is resting], it exerts force on it and pushes it up. But this is a false supposition, because [we know that] heavier bodies have greater resistance to external force. It would then have

سرماش. و اجرام عنصری، که حرکت راست کنند، ازین دو خالی نباشند. و هر جسمی، که حرکت راست پذیرد، پاره پذیر باشد. و هرچه، اتّصال وانفعال وشکل وترك شکل، بسهولت پذیرد، «تر» باشد؛ و هرچه بصعوبت پذیرد «خشك» باشد. هرچه حرکت راست پذیرد، ازین هر دو نیز خالی نباشد. و چون ترکیب کنیم، چهار قسم باشد: ۱- گرم و خشك؛ ۲- و گرم و تر؛ ۳- و سرد و خشك؛ ٤- و سرد و تر. و بدین چهار قسم، چهار عنصر تمام شوند: أوّل؛ هم چو آتش از جمله بسایط، و جای او بالای همه عنصریات باشد زیر فلك قمر، و او را «خفیفِ مطلق» خوانند. و دوُم؛ هم چو هوا، که گرم و ترست و جای او زیر آتشست، و او خفیفست بنسبت. و قسم دیگر سرد و ترست، هم چو آب. و قسم دیگر سرد و خشکست، هم چو زمین. و زمین «ثقیل مطلق» است؛ که، قصد غایت زیری دارد؛ و آب، ثقیل است، بنسبت. و دلیل برآنکه زمین سنگین ترست از آب، آنست که قدری خاك در آب اندازیم بزیر نشیند؛ و آب هر آینه باید که بر روی زمین ایستد. و دلیل برآنکه هوا خفیفتر است از آب، آنست که خیکی پر از هوا چون به آب فرو بری بر بالا اندازد. و گروهی پنداشتند که، آب آن را بدر می اندازد بِقِسر، که آب، چون بِهم آید، او را بفشاردن بدر اندازد. و این خطاست، که جسم، چندانکه بزرگتر باشد، قِسر کمتر قبول کند؛ بایستی که

to be the case that larger bottles would better resist the external force of the water and would thus rise more slowly. But we have observed the opposite of this: the larger the bottle [submerged in water], the faster it ascends.

[20] Know that the ethereal bodies, by which we mean the celestial bodies, are neither heavy nor light, because lightness is a potential in bodies to move from the center upward; while heaviness is a potential in bodies to move downward toward the middle. The celestial bodies move neither toward a center nor away from a center, but rather they move around a center in a circular motion, never making or accepting any form of linear motion. Therefore, the celestial spheres cannot be characterized as hot, cold, humid, or dry.

[21] Know that the four elements can change into one another. Water, given intense heat, will turn into air; and air subjected to cold will turn into water. For example, if a dry vessel is filled with ice and covered, drops of water will appear on its outer surface. These drops of water did not seep out from inside the vessel, because not even hot water seeps out of a vessel, let alone ice water. Therefore, the drops were [particles of] air that became cold due to their proximity to the vessel and turned into water. Water can also turn into earth; since [it is observed that] in certain places, when water drips it turns into stone. Conversely, earth can turn into water. Magicians can turn a stone into water by their acts, and air blown with vigor may turn into fire. A flame of fire instantly turns into

چون خیك بزرگتر بودی قِسر کمتر قبول کردی از آب، پس حرکتش سست تر بودی، و ما بِخَلاف این می بینیم؛ که، چندانکه بزرگتر می باشد، حرکتش تیزتر می شود.

[۲۰] و بدانکه اجسام اثیری، اعنی افلاك، نه سبك اند و نه سنگین؛ زیرا که: «سبکی» قوّتیست در جسم، که او را از سوی مرکز ببالا جنباند؛ و «ثقل» قوّتیست در جسم، که او را بسوی وسط جنباند. و فلك، نه بِوسط جنبد، و نه از وسط؛ بلکه بر وسط جنبد بحرکت مستدیر، و میل مستقیم؛ و حرکت مستقیم هرگز قبول نکند و نپذیرد؛ پس، نه گرم است، و نه سرد، و نه تر، و نه خشك.

[۲۱] و بدانکه این چهار عنصر، یکی دیگری شود: آب، بگرمای سخت هوا گردد؛ و هوا آب شود بسرما؛ که، مثلاً° اگر طاسی را خشك، مثلاً پر از یخ بکنند، روی بیرونش را بینند که قطرهای آب بر آن بسته باشد، و آن نه از اندرون رشح کرده باشد – که آب گرم در طاس رشح نکند، تا به یخ چه رسد – پس، آن هواست که بمجاورتِ طاس سرد شود و آب گردد؛ و آب زمین شود، چنانکه در بعضی مواضع افتد که چون آب فروچکد سنگ گردد؛ و زمین آب شود. و اصحابِ حِیَل سنگ را، بحِیَل، آب کنند. و هوای دَمَنده بنفخات، آتش شود. و شعلهٔ آتش در حال

°N: اگر طاسی را خشك؛ S: + مثلا

air, for were it to remain as fire, it would burn the ceiling or whatever else is above it, while this is not the case.

[22] Know that when we say "water turns into air," this does not mean that water in all its parts totally ceases to exist and turns into air, because then water could not become air. Nor is it that water, while it is water, also becomes air, because a single thing cannot be both water and air at the same time. Rather, the thing which had the form of water becomes transformed into air as the form of water leaves it. The thing which accepts all these different forms is called "Prime Matter." Prime Matter extended is called "body." In the form of water it is called "water," and in the form of earth it is called "earth." The Prime Matter of all beings composed of the four elements is the same. When one form leaves Prime Matter, another takes its place. But the "ethereal" things are not subject to generation and corruption, because their Prime Matter is not the same.

[23] Know that the form "water-ness" is not exactly the same as "humidity" and "coldness"; because when we heat water, its coldness disappears; and when it turns into ice, its humidity disappears—all this while it is still water. Therefore, the forms "water-ness," "fire-ness," "air-ness," and "earth-ness" are different from the Four Natures—hot, cold, humid, and dry—and [we may note that] there are imperceptible things that may come to reside in Prime Matter

هوا می شود؛ که، اگر هم چنان آتش بماندی، بایستی که سقف را و هر چه بالای او بودی بسوختی، و نه چنین است.

[۲۲] و بدانکه چون گویی که آب هوا شود، نه آن باشد که آب، به کلّی و بجمله اجزا[ء]، باطل شود، و هوا حاصل آید؛ که آنگه، «این»، «آن» نشده باشد. و نه آنست که آب، با آنکه آبست، هوا نیز شود؛ که یك چیز، در یك حال، آب و هوا نباشد. بلکه، آنست که، آن چیز که صورت آبی داشت، صورت آبی ازو زایل شد، و صورت هوایی درو حاصل آمد. و آن «چیز»، که این صورتها برو می آید، او را «هیولی» خوانند. و «هیولی» را، «بإمتدادٍمّا»، «جسم» خوانند؛ و با صورت آبی، «آب»، و با صورت خاکی، «خاك». و عنصریات را، «هیولی»، مشترکست؛ که، چون صورتی ازو بشود، دیگری درو حاصل گردد. أمّا، «أثیریّات» کون و فساد نپذیرد، که هیولای ایشان مشترك نیست.

[۲۳] و بدانکه صورتِ آبی، مجرّدِ تری و سردی نیست؛ که، آب را، چون گرم کنیم، سردی او برود؛ و چون بفسرد، تری ازو گم شود، هم چنان آب باشد. پس، صورت آبی، و آتشی، و هوایی، و زمینی، جزین کیفیّات چهارگانه است: «حرارت»، و «برودت»، و «رطوبت»، و «یبوست»؛ و آن چیزهای نامحسوس است، که چون در «هیولی» حاصل شود، بعضی را ازین کیفیّات

requiring some of these Natures. What is called "transformation" takes place when a quality associated with a certain body ceases and another quality takes its place. What is called "generation and corruption" occurs when one form [associated with a thing] leaves it and another form takes its place. Corruption is associated with what has ceased, and generation is associated with that which has appeared. Some people have rejected the possibility of transformation and have said that when water is heated, its heat is not due to the water becoming hot but is due to the mixing of the particles of fire with the particles of water. But this is false because if it were so, then when an earthen and a metal container, both full of water, are placed in a fire, the water in the earthen container should heat up first, since the particles of fire would be able to penetrate the pores of the earthen container more quickly than the metal one, according to their respective hardness and softness. However, [we observe] that this is not the case.

[24] Furthermore, heat is caused by intense motion and the friction of bodies rubbing together, without particles of fire passing between them. The same people, however, have said that heat and particles of fire are concealed inside bodies, and when bodies are moved they come out [producing heat]. This position is also false, because we observe that water and other liquids are altogether cold, both internally and externally. If we agitate them severely and continually, we observe that the liquid becomes uniformly warm. If [the position held by our adversaries were true], then only the outer part of the liquid should have become warm, while the interior should have remained cold, and this is not the case. As you know, heat is merely an accident; it cannot move by itself from the inner to the outer

اقتضا کند. و چون کیفیّتی، از جسمی زایل شود، و کیفیّتی دیگر حاصل آید، آن را «استحالت» خوانند. و چون صورتی برود، و صورتی دیگر حاصل شود، آن را «کُون و فساد» خوانند؛ «فساد» بنسبت باآنچه رفته است، و «کُون» بنسبت باآنچه آمده است. و قومی استحالت را منع کردند، و گفتند که: «آب گرم شود نه آنست که گرمی در آب حاصل شود، بلکه اجزای آتش با آب بیامیزد»، و این باطلست، که اگر چنان بودی، که کوزهٔ سفالین را و کوزهٔ آهنین را چون پر از آب کردمانی و در میان آتش نهادمانی، بایستی که کوزهٔ سفالین زودتر گرم گشتی، که جزوهای آتش در مَسامّ کوزهٔ سفالین زودتر نفوذ تواند کردن از کوزهٔ آهنین، بر نسبت سختی و سستی ایشان، و نه چنین است.

[۲٤] و نیز، حرکتِ سخت، و مالیدن اجسام یکدیگر را، گرمی می آرد، با آنکه اجزای آتش از یکی در دیگری حاصل نمی شود. و این گروه گفتند که: «گرما، و جزوهای آتش، در اندرون جسم کامن باشند، چون بجنبانند بیرون آیند». و این باطلست؛ که، ما آب را، و مایعات را، ظاهر و باطن، همه سرد می بینیم، و چون بسیار می جنبانیم، جنبانیدنی سخت، گرم می شود ظاهر و باطنش؛ و چون ظاهر گرم می شود، بایستی که اندرونش سرد شدی، و نه چنین است. و چون گرما تنها بدانستی که عَرَض است، نقل نکند از باطن بظاهر؛ و شعاع نیز چیزها را گرم کند،

part of something. Rays also heat up things without fiery particles ever becoming attached to them. The same people also think that rays are rarefied bodies containing heat. This, too, is false. For if rays were bodies, then when the windows of a house are suddenly covered, we should still see the rays [in the house], whether they are moving or stationary. But this is not the case; rather, the rays cease instantly. Furthermore, were rays bodies, then the sun itself would become diminished. Moreover, because rays are rarefied, their [bodily] motion would be upward and not downward. All of this is false. Nay, the truth is that rays are accidents which, by encountering one body, illuminate another body. The rays themselves do not move, because accidents cannot move. Instead, that which bestows light is something other than bodies, which we shall explain later. Warmth comes from the rays and not from the sun itself; for, were heat due to the sun [independently], then what is higher up should become warm more quickly than what is lower down, and this is not the case. On the contrary, it happens that what is below may burn, while what is above may not show a trace of heat at all.

[25] Whatever arises from the earth—namely, things that are easily diffused and the like—is rarefied by heat. Among them, whatever is dry and not black is called "smoke." Whatever is humid is called "vapor." When vapor ascends and becomes cold, it becomes massive and turns into clouds; and if the cold becomes more intense, the vapor will turn into rain and pour down. In baths, people observe vapor rising and becoming massive, such that it heats up the vessels in the bath, covering them with moisture, which in turn drips on the floor. When vapor encounters more intense cold, it solidifies

بی آنکه اجزاءِ ناری بدو تعلّق دارد. و این گروه پنداشتند که: «شعاع جسمی لطیف است، و گرما با اوست». و این خطاست؛ که، اگر جسم بودی، چون روزن خانه ناگاه بگرفتندی، اگر ساکن بماندی و اگر حرکت کردی بدیدمانی، و نه چنین است، بلکه در حال باطل می شود. و اگر جسم بودی، بایستی که از آفتاب بکاستی به قدر شعاع؛ و نیز، چون لطیف باشد، حرکتش ببالا بودی، نه بزیر. و این جمله باطلست؛ بلکه شعاع عَرَضیست، که بمقابلهٔ جسمی روشن در جسمی دیگر حاصل شود، نه آنکه نقل کند. که، عَرَض نقل نپذیرد؛ بلکه بخشندهٔ آن چیزیست جز اجسام، و بیان آن کرده آید. و گرمی، از شعاع است، نه از آفتاب؛ و اگر از آفتاب بودی، بایستی که بالا زودتر گرم گشتی از زیر، و نه چنین است؛ بلکه می باشد که زیر سوخته میشود، و بر بالا اثری بسیار نباشد گرمی را.

[۲۵] و هر چه از زمین متصاعد شود، از چیزهایی که شعاع و غیر آن بحرارت تحلیل و تلطیفش کند، هر چه از خشك باشد، آن را «دخان» خوانند؛ و اگر نیز سیاه نباشد، و هر چه از تر باشد، آن را «بخار» گویند. و «بخار»، چون ببالا رود، و سرما برو افتد، کثیف شود [و] ابر شود؛ و اگر، سرما سخت تر گردد، باران شود، و بزیر آید. و در حمّام، مردم ببینند ببالا رفتنِ بخار و کثیف شدن، چنانکه جام گرمابه را حجاب کند، و بزیر چکدش. و اگر

and floats down like flakes of cotton, which we call "snow." When smoke becomes cold, turning downward and inclining toward the air, it moves the air and causes wind. When wind or smoke remains inside a cloud but seeks to come out and is not able to find an orifice, it becomes extremely agitated, producing a loud boom known as "thunder." From that friction, a fire is also caused to leap forth, which we call "lightning." Should smoke ascend until it reaches the element of fire, it will catch fire itself and become a flame that will appear [in the heavens] and move harmoniously with the celestial sphere. This is called a "meteor." When all of a meteor burns up, it will disappear; which is why people consider it to have died out. When fire becomes pure, it is colorless; for if it had color, it would block our vision of the stars. Any part of smoke that does not burn up completely becomes dispersed in the air, causing red and black traces to appear. Vapor and smoke that remain trapped in the earth without a way out will cause the earth to tremble severely, and this is known as an "earthquake." It is also possible that these vapors may come out of the earth due to force in the form of fire [i.e., volcanoes]. As for vapor that does not have much force, it will eventually come out from the earth as running water.

[**26**] Know that the three kingdoms of nature—"animal,"

آب را[۶] سرمای سخت تر بزند بیفسرد، و هم چون پنبه بزیر آید، و آن «برفست». و«دخان»، چون سرد شود، و باز پس آید و بر هوا میل کند، هوا را بجنباند، «باد» حاصل شود. و «باد»، یا «دود»، چون در میان ابر بماند و قصد آن کند که بیرون آید، و منفذ نیابد، و در میان آن مُتَقَلقِل شود، ازو بانگی سخت بر آید، آن را «رعد» خوانند. و از اصطکاك آن آتشی بجهد، آن را «برق» خوانند. و اگر دخان ببالا رود تا بنزد آتش رسد، آتش درو افتد، و شعله ازو حاصل شود، و بموافقت آتشی که بموافقت فلك بجنبد حرکت کند؛ آنست که، کوکبِ «ذاتِ ذَنَب» و «گیسودار»ش خوانند. و چون تمام بسوزد، از چشمِ غایب گردد، پندارند که فرومُرد. و آتش، چون صافی شود، رنگ ندارد؛ که اگر رنگ داشتی، ستارگان را حجاب کردی. و آنچه از دخان تمام بنسوزد، و در هوا پراگنده شود، ازو علامات سرخ و سیاه در هوا پدید آید. و بخاری، و دخانی، که در زمین محتبس شود، و راه نیابد بیرون آمدن را، زمین را سخت بجنباند، و آن «زلزله» است. و باشد که از شدّت حرکت،[۷] هم چون آتش بدر آید. و آن بخار که قوّت ندارد، آب شود، و متوالی بدر آید.

[۲۶] و بدانکه از آمیزش این «چهار عنصر»، «موالید سه گانه»

[۶] N: اگر آنرا؛ S: اگر آب را

[۷] N:- حرکت

"vegetable," and "mineral"—come into existence due to the "admixture of the four elements," and the more balanced the combination, the nobler the species produced.

حاصل می شود: «معادن»، و «نبات»، و «حیوان». و چون آمیزش به اعتدال نزدیکتر باشد، نوعی شریفتر حاصل شود.

❖ Chapter Three ❖

An Inquiry into the Self

[27] Know that although you may [at some time] cease to feel any or every part of your body, and some bodily parts may even become annihilated, yet a human being's life and perception do not decline on account of this. Some parts of the body—such as the brain, the heart, and the liver—can only be known through dissection and comparing them to other parts. In short, you may be cut off from any bodily or contingent perception but will remain cognizant of yourself and know "yourself" without recourse to any phenomenal thing. Therefore, your "essential self" or "thou-ness" is not dependent on the body, either in part or in whole. If it were inside a part of your body, then you could never be conscious of your "thou-ness" without that part. Therefore, your essential self or "I-ness" is not limited to the bodily nor accidental.

[28] Another inquiry is this: You call yourself "I," but you refer to all the parts of your body, each one of them, as "it." And whatever you call "it" cannot be the speaker of the "I" in you, because that which you regard as "it" cannot be your "I" at the same time. Were it so, you would have to separate it from itself and from its own "I-ness" and this is impossible. Thus, all things pertaining to you called "it" are neither all of you nor part of you. If it were possible for you to separate a part of yourself from your "I-ness," your "I-ness" would not remain as "I-ness." Just as if you separate even one part from a house, like a wall or a door, it can no longer be called a house. Therefore, since you refer to all your bodily

❖ فصل سوم ❖

استبصارِ نفس

[۲۷] بدانکه هر جزوی از اجزاءِ بدن خود فراموش کنی، و بعضی اعضارا بینی که از نابودش «حیات» و «ادراك» مردم را نقصان نمی شود. و بعضی را، چون «دماغ»، و«دل»، و«جگر»، بتشریح ومقایست دانی. وفی الجمله، هرجسمی، وعَرَضی که هست، از او غافل توانی بود، واز «خود» غافل نباشی، وخود را دانی بی نظر با این همه. پس، «تُوییِ تُو»، نه با این همه است، ونه بهیچ یکی ازاین؛ که، اگر یکی از این را مدخل بودی در «تُوییِ تُو»، خود را هرگز بی او در خاطر نتوانستی آورد، پس «تُو» وَرایِ اجسام واعراضی.

[۲۸] استبصاری دیگر آنست که: خود را می گویی[۸] «من»، و هرچه در تنِ تُست همه را اشارت توانی کرد به «او»، وهرچه اورا «او» توانی گفت، نه گوینده «من» است از «تُو»؛ که، آنچه «تُو» را «او» است، «منِ» «تُو» نباشد؛ که، هرچه اورا «او» گویی، از «خودش»، واز «منیِ» خودش جدا کرده ای. پس، نه همهٔ «تُو» باشد، ونه جزوِ «منِ تُو». که، جزو «منیِ تُو» را از «منیِ تُو» اگر جدا کنی، «منی» نماند. چنانکه، خانه را اگر جزوی، هم چون دیوار ودر، جدا کنی ازاو، خانه نباشد. پس،

[۸] N: میگویی که؛ S: میگویی من

parts—such as the brain, heart, liver, and other parts—by "it," as well as whatever else is in heaven and earth, your essential self is beyond all this.

[29] Another proof regarding the self is this: You know the idea of "animal" as a universal such that you are able to predicate it of an elephant just as you predicate it of a mosquito. You have not determined a specific measure or a specific nature for this general animal. Thus, there exists a form in you that can be predicated equally to all [particular animals] differentiated by measure and place. If this general meaning "animal" in your mind required taking on the particularized form of an elephant, then it is certain that it would no longer be general and could no longer be predicated in the same manner to a mosquito. But since the idea "animal" is predicated equally of all [animal] kinds—and it has no specific shape, measure, or position—then it does enter into a body or anything subsisting in a body; for bodies have quantifiable attributes. Whatever is determined by a body will necessarily result in a specific position and shape. Therefore, the general form cannot be something distinguishable by means of measurement, position, and shape. Moreover, since it is predicated of many things simultaneously, and this form is in you; your essential self is, therefore, neither a body nor anything in a body nor anything extended in space.

[30] Another proof is this: You know that the meaning of "absolute one" is something that does not accept divisibility in any way at all. Now, were the form "one" in a body, then—since bodies are divisible, and whatever is in a body is also divisible—it follows that the form "one" would also be divisible and thus could not be the form "one" [which is a contradiction]. Therefore, that in you in which the

همه را اشارتِ «اویی» می توانی کرد از اعضای تو، چون: دماغ، ودل، وجگر، وغیرِ آن، وآسمان، وزمین، وهر چه دروست؛ پس «تُو» ورایِ این همه ای.

[۲۹] و برهانی دیگر بر «نفس» آنست که: تو «جانوری» را معلوم کرده ای مطلق، چنانکه بدان معنی که بر پیل گویی بر پشه نیز بگویی؛ و در «جانوریِ مطلق» هیچ مقداری معیّن نگرفته‌ای و هیچ نهادی معیّن؛ پس صورتی است در تو، که بر همه مختلفات مقادیر و اوضاع راست می آید. و اگر «جانوریِ مطلق» با مقدار پیل در ذهن تو بودی، از اطلاق بیرون شدی، پشه را مطابق نبودی. و چون مطابق همه است و مقداری ندارد معیّن و وضع و شکلی معیّن، در جسم و در چیزی که قائم باشد بجسم حلول نکند، که جسم مقدار دارد. و هر چه در متقدّر حاصل شود متقدّر شود بضرورت تبعیّت مقدار او، و[پس] وضع و شکلی معیّن او را حاصل شود؛ پس بر مختلفات مقادیر و اوضاع و اشکال راست نیاید. ولیکن چون مطابق می شود، و این صورت در تو است، پس «تو» نه جسمی و نه چیزی که در جسم باشد، و نه چیزی که در جهت آید.

[۳۰] برهانی دیگر آنست که: تو معنی «واحد مطلق» می دانی که چیزیست که بهیچ وجه قسمت نپذیرد. و اگر صورتش در جسم باشد، و جسم قسمت پذیرد، و هرچه در قسمت پذیر

form "one" exists is neither a body nor something in a body nor something extended in space.

[31] Yet another proof is this: You have determined something to be absolute, not specifiable by measure, by bodily or accidental attributes, nor by the genus animal. Now, if this thing were in a body, it too would be divisible, since bodies are divisible. Thus, should any part of the form of this [hypothetical] general meaning be a real, extended thing, then there would be absolutely no difference between its "whole" and its "part," which is impossible. Furthermore, since parts are similar, then the whole and the part could be predicated of the same real thing. But the whole and the part differ in terms of quantity, while in the universal form there is no measure by which the whole and the part can be distinguished. If a part [of the form] is something real and added, then it follows that the part would be greater than the whole, which is absurd. On the other hand, if the part is not a real thing and not determined, then it must be nothing, which would mean that it is not a part. Since we have proved that such ideal, absolute things are not divisible, it follows that those things called "universal" are not bodily things.

[32] Know that the "soul" does not exist prior to the "body." For if the soul did exist prior to the body, it necessarily could not have

حاصل شود بتبعیّت او قسمت پذیرد. پس، صورت وحدت چون در جسم است بتبعیّت او قسمت پذیرد، پس صورت وحدت نباشد. پس آنچه از «تو»، که این صورت وحدت دروست، جسم و چیزی در جسم و چیزی جهت پذیر نباشد.

[۳۱] طریق دیگر آنست که: چیزی را مطلق معلوم کردی، بی خصوص «مقداری» و بی خصوص «جسمی» و «عَرَضی» و «جانوری». اگر در جسم باشد، و جسم قسمت پذیرد، او نیز بتبعیّت محلّ قسمت پذیرد. پس، هر جزوی از صورت «چیزی مطلق» اگر چیزی باشد، پس مطلقاً میان کلّ و جزو فرقی نباشد، و این محالست. و جزوها چون متشابه باشند، کلّ و جزو را یك حقیقت بُوَد. ولیکن کلّ و جزو بمقدار مختلف شوند، و در صورت چیز مطلق مقداری نیست، تا کلّ و جزو بدان مختلف باشند. و اگر هر جزوی چیزیست و زیادت، پس جزو[۹] بر کلّ زیادتست، و این نشاید که باشد. و اگر هر جزوی چیزی نیست، و چیزی مخصّص نیست، پس هیچ نیست، پس جزو نباشد. و چون، از این وجوه قسمت ممتنع است، پس آنچه کلّیّات را می داند جسم و جسمانی نیست.

[۳۲] و بدانکه «نفس» پیش از «بدن» موجود نباشد. که، اگر پیش ازتن[۱۰] موجود بودی نشایستی که یکی بودی و نه بسیار، و

[۹] N: جزورا؛ S: جزوبر

been one nor many, which is absurd. As to why there can be no multiplicity of souls prior to the existence of the body, it is because all souls are in the same shared [class] reality which indicates that humanness is—and the included members are—all one species. It is through the multiplication of the species that souls become distinguished from one another. Furthermore—prior to the existence of the [human] body—actions, perceptions, and differences of bodily disposition do not exist; thus, individual class members are not distinguished as different souls. That reality of the soul signified by the class is the same for each individual member and thus cannot be many. As to why, prior to the body all souls cannot be one: this is because if the singular soul was [later] separated and became divisible, then it would be a body, but we have proved this to be impossible. Furthermore, should there be only one soul occupying every human body [at the same time], then it would follow that whatever one individual knows would be known by everyone else as well, inasmuch as all would share the same soul. But this is not the case. Hence, it is clear that the soul cannot exist prior to the body. Rather, both come into existence together; and a mutual [dynamic] attachment, love, and desire exist between them, unlike the [corporeal, static] attachment existing between bodies and accidents.

این محالست. امّا، آنکه نشاید که نفوس پیش از بدن بسیار باشند، از برای آنست که همه در حقیقت آنکه نفس مردمی اند مشترك و از یك نوع اند، و چون بسیار شوند ممیّز باید. و پیش از بدن، افعال و ادراکات و اختلاف هیأت بدنی نیست، تا فرق کند در میان ایشان. و آنچه حقیقت نفس اقتضا کند در همه یکی باشد، پس بسیار نَتَواند بودن. و أمّا آنکه: نشاید که همه نفسها پیش از بدن یکی باشد؛ که، اگر پاره شود و قسمت پذیرگردد جسم باشد، و ما گفتیم که محالست. و اگرهم چنان یکنفس بماند و در جمله ابدان مردم تصرّف کند، پس هرچه یکی [نفس] داند باید که همه دانند، زیرا که همه را یکنفس باشد، و نه چنین است. پس، ظاهر شد که نفس پیش از بدن نتواند بود؛ که، هر دو بهم حاصل شوند. و میان ایشان علاقه ای است «عشقی» و «شوقی»، نه چون علاقهٔ اجسام و اعراض.

[۱۰] N: از این؛ S: از تن

❖ Chapter Four ❖
On the Faculties of the Soul

[33] Know that, since the human constitution is nobler than the constitution of other animals and plants, a nobler soul is obtained in incorporeal humans—a perceptive and intelligent soul that employs at the same time all the animal faculties. In animals, the vegetative faculties exist in addition to the faculties of sensation and voluntary motion. The principal vegetative faculties are three: The first is the faculty of nutrition, a faculty that works on food that has been consumed by turning it into a nutritive substance, and then discarding the residue of what is broken up. Without the nutritive faculty, animals and others species could not exist. The second faculty is growth, which increases the substance of the nourished parts [of the body] in proportion to what they already contain, for acquiring mass is part of growth. If this faculty did not exist, animals and other species could not grow to perfection. The third faculty is the reproductive faculty, due to which parts of the matter of an animal or plant are separated from it so that another individual can be reproduced. Because of this faculty, the species of every plant and animal continues to exist even though its individual members do not.

The faculty of nutrition is itself served by four faculties: The faculty of attraction, which obtains food; the faculty of retention, which retains food so an individual can use it; the faculty of digestion, which digests food and prepares it for nutritive uses; and the faculty of excretion, which discards waste. The nutritive faculty exists prior to the reproductive faculty, and the reproductive faculty continues to function after the faculty of growth has ceased. The nutritive

❖ فصل چهارم ❖

در قوای نفس

[۳۳] بدانکه: چون مزاج آدمی شریفتر بُوَد از مزاج جانوران دیگر و مزاج نبات، نفسی شریف تر از نفوس ایشان قبول کرد؛ نفسی «مفارق»، «مدرِك»، «عاقل»؛ و قوّتهای حیوانی جمله استیفا کرد. و در حیوان قوّتهای نبات حاصلست، با مزید حسّ و حرکت. و اصول قوای نباتی سه است: أوّل: «غاذیه»، و آن قوّتیست که تصرّف کند در مادّت غذا و او را شبیه گوهر مغتذی گرداند، و بَدَل آنچه متحلّل شده باشد باز آرد. و اگر بدل آنچه متحلّل می شود باز نیامدی، پس ماندن حیوان و غیر آن ممکن نشدی. دوم: «نامیه» است، و آن قوّتیست که ازو حاصل شود زیادت در اجزای متغذّی بر نسبت مضبوط در جمله اقطار؛ که فربه شدن جز نموّ است. و اگر این قوّت نبودی جانور و غیر آن بکمال نشو نرسیدی. سوم: «مولّده» است، و آن قوّتیست که پارهای از ماده جدا کند تا شخصی دیگر ازو حاصل شود، و بدین بماند نوع آنچه شخصش نماند از حیوان و نبات. و غاذیه را چند قوّت خدمت کنند: «جاذبه» که غذا آود؛ و «ماسکه» که نگاه دارد تا متصرّف کند؛ و «هاضمه» که غذا را پخته کند و مستعدّ تصرّف غاذیه گرداند؛ و «دافعه» که ثقل را بدر اندازد. و غاذیه پیش ازمولّده موجود باشد، و مولّده پس از نامیه بماند، و غاذیه

faculty continues to function after the reproductive faculty has ceased, lasting until death. Animals also have a "motor faculty" and an "appetitive faculty." The appetitive faculty has two modes of expression: "anger," by which one repels what is undesired; and desire, by which one attracts the desired. It is the appetitive faculty that causes motion in the individual animal through desire.

[34] There are two kinds of senses: "outer" and "inner." As for the outer senses, these are five: the first is "touch," which is a faculty spread over the entire surface of the body. The four natures [hot, cold, dry, and moist—as well as lightness and heaviness, softness and hardness, smoothness and roughness—are all perceived by this sense. The second is "taste," which is a faculty located in the nerves distributed on the surface of the tongue. By means of moisture present in the nerves of the tongue, this faculty perceives tastes, so that the taste of whatever comes in contact with it is perceived. The third is "smell," which is a faculty in the brain's two frontal protuberances, which resemble breast nipples. Smells are perceived by this faculty by means of [inhaled] air, which holds the scent of things, and by the vapor emitted from their bodies. The fourth is "hearing," which is a faculty located in the holes of the ears. By this faculty, sounds carried in the air are perceived. "Sounds" are produced by air waves, as when bodies are struck together or when heavy objects fall. From such occurrences, air is forcefully expelled from between the bodies and vibrates until it reaches the air in the ear hole, causing it to vibrate in similar fashion. This vibration then

پس از مولّده بماند تا وقت مرگ. و حیوان را قوّت «محرّکه» است و قوّت «نزوعی»، که آن دو شعبه است: یکی «غضبی» است، که دفع ناشایسته کند؛ و دیگر «شهوانی» است که جذب بایسته کند، و قوّت نزوعی به آرزو قوّت[۱۱] محرّکه را بجنباند.

[۳٤] و حواسّ دو گونه است: «ظاهر» و «باطن». امّا حواسّ ظاهر پنج است: یکی: «لمس» است، و آن قوّتیست پراگنده در جمله ظاهر تن. کیفیّات چهارگانه و سبکی و سنگی و نرمی و سختی و ملاست و خشونت را بدو دریابند. دوم: «ذوق» است، و آن قوّتیست پراگنده در عصبی، که بر سطح ظاهر زبان پراگنده است و گسترده، که طعمها دریابد بتوسّط رطوبت خویش که هم در عصب است، که هر چه بروی آید طعم گیرد. سوُم: «شمّ» است، و آن قوّتیست که در دوزایدهٔ پیشگاه دماغ نهاده است، که مانند سرپستانند، و بویها را بدان دریابند بتوسّط هوایی که بوی چیزی گیرد و بخاری که از آن چیز برخیزد. چهارم: «سمع» است، و آن قوّتیست نهاده در اندرون سوراخ گوش که آوازها را بدو در یابند بتوسّط هوا. و «آواز»، موج زدن هوا است؛ که از کوفتن اجسام، یا از برکندن جسمهای سخت حاصل شود، هوا بسختی از میان آن بیرون آید و موج زند تا برسد به هوایی که در اندرون گوش ایستاده است و او را بشکل خویش گرداند، تا

[۱۱] N: به آرزو محرکه؛ S: به آرزو قوت

strikes the membrane covering the inner cavity of the ear, which is like a skin tightly covering a drum, causing it to resonate, and the phenomenon of hearing is produced. An echo is a sound that comes from a high place and is produced by the collision of noise. The fifth is "sight." Now, some scientists have thought that seeing a thing is caused by rays emitted from the eye reaching the object. But this is impossible, because (1) if these rays are accidents, then they cannot move independently; and (2) if they are bodies, how is it possible for them to spread instantaneously over all that the eye sees at the moment it opens? Moreover, the rays would have to traverse the long distance up to the sun, the fixed stars, and the other celestial bodies, which is absurd. Likewise, the rays [if they were emitted from the eyes] should cause us to see colored liquids inside a closed bottle much more clearly, because rays penetrate liquids very well. Once again, this is not the case. Therefore, sight takes place when the forms of objects become impressed in the vitreous humor of the eye, which is in accordance with the opinion of the philosopher Aristotle. The necessary conditions for eyesight are "luminosity," [an unobstructed] clear view between subject and object, and "mediation" only by a translucent body.

[35] The inner senses are also five. The first is "common sense" [*sensus communis*], which is a faculty that integrates all of the sense-perceived data. Were it not for this faculty, we would not be able to judge that this yellow thing before us is also sweet; because, in each

برافتد بر پوستی که کشیده است بر عصبهٔ مقعّر – هم چو پوست بر طبل – و ازو طنینی برآید، [پس] آن قوّت آگاه شود. و «صدا» انعکاس آوازست از جای بلندی که مصادم آواز شود. پنجم: «بصر» است. و گروهی پنداشتند که: دیدن «چیز» به شعاعیست که از چشم بیرون آید و بپیوندد بدان چیزها، و این محالست. که، این شعاع اگر: ۱– عَرَض است، نقل نکند؛ و۲– اگر جسم است، چون تواند بود که جسم، در آن حالت که چشم برگشایند، در همه عالم منتشر شود. و نیز باید که افلاك را خرق کند تا آفتاب را و ثوابت را و غیر آن را ببیند، و این محالست. و بایستی که آنچه در شیشهٔ سر گرفته است چنان بدیدمانی که چیزها را که در زیر مایعات رنگ دارست، زیرا که شعاع در مایعات نفوذ بهتر تواند کرد، و نه چنین است. پس، دیدن چیزها بصورتی است که منطبع شود در رطوبت جلیدی از چشم، بر رأی ارسطاطالیس حکیم؛ و شرطش «روشناییشت» و «مقابله» و «توسّط» [تنها به] جرم شفاف.

[۳۵] و أمّا حواسّ باطن نیز پنج است: أوّل:[۱۲] «حسّ مشترکست»، و او قوّتیست که جملهٔ محسوسات پیش او جمع شوند. و اگر نه او بودی حُکم نتوانستمانی کردن که «این زرد» حاضر «این شیرینی» است. زیرا که، در هر یکی از حواسّ ظاهر

[۱۲] N: اولش؛ S: اول

of the outer senses, only one form can appear. In order to make this judgment [that something is both yellow and sweet], two forms must be associated in the mind at the same time. An example of how this sense works is the following: You perceive a dot moving in a circular path as a circle. This is because what was perceived by the eye went to the *sensus communis,* which integrated the two forms and made you imagine the dot's movement as a circle. Otherwise, sight by itself would only have perceived the form of the dot [and not the circle]. This faculty is situated in the frontal lobe of the first cavity of the brain. Whatever is integrated by means of the *sensus communis,* the subject will actually see. The second is the faculty of "retentive imagination," which is the repository of all the forms integrated by the *sensus communis.* It is located in the anterior lobe of the first cavity of the brain. The third is the faculty of "estimation," which enables a subject to judge the imperceptible intentions of individual sensible objects. For example, by this faculty a lamb recognizes that a wolf it has never seen before is an enemy from which it must flee. The estimative faculty functions only based on sensedata. This faculty may also contend with the intellect concerning the results of reasoning and accept a syllogistic demonstration while denying its conclusion, because it is a corporeal faculty. Its place is in the middle cavity of the brain. The fourth inner sense is the faculty of "compositive [and creative] imagination," which both synthesizes and differentiates forms and the judgments based on them. For example, through this faculty, the subject can imagine an animal whose limbs have been disjointed, or it can imagine an animal composed of the limbs of different animals. This faculty is continuously active and never at rest, whether in

یکی بیش صورت نیست، و حُکم کننده را باید که هر دو صورت حاضر باشند، تا این حُکم تواند کرد. و نقطه گردان را که چون دایره اش می بیند، بدانست که صورت، أوّل که در دیده آمد، بحسّ مشترك رفت و صورتی دیگر از آن اِبصار حاضر در دیده حاصل شد و بدان پیوست. و اگر نه چنین بودی، در بصر إلاّ صورت مقابل نبودی، و آن نقطه است. و جای این قوّت در پیشگاه تجویف اوّلست در دِماغ. و هرچه در حسّ مشترك آید مشاهده بیند. دوم: «خیال» است، و آن خزانهٔ[۱۳] حسّ مشترکست، که درو جمله صورتها بماند. و جای او در جزو بازپسین تجویف أوّل است. سِوُم: «وهم» است، و آن قوّتیست که حُکم کند بر محسوسات بچیزهای نا محسوس. و بدو حُکم کند گوسفند که گرگ دشمن اوست وازو بباید گریخت. و این وهم جز حواسّ را متابعت نکند، و با عقل در معقولات منازعت نماید، و برهان را مسلّم دارد و نتیجه را انکار کند. زیرا که قوّتی جرمانیست. و جای این قوّت تجویف میانین است. چهارم: «متخیّله» است، و آن قوّتیست که ترکیب و تفصیل صور و احکام کند. و او جانوری را تصویر کند اندامهاش از یکدیگر جدا شده؛ و جانوری را اعضای جانورانی مختلف ترکیب کند؛ و پیوسته در حرکت باشد و آرام نگیرد، نه در خواب و نه در

[۱۳] N: خزینه؛ S: خزانه

sleep or in wakefulness. It may imitate the states of the body, or it may imitate the contents of the intellect, and for both it can imagine what is either contrary to or in accordance with reality. Were it not for this faculty, we would not be able to think. When this faculty is used by the mind, we call it "cogitation"; otherwise, it is called "imagination." Its place is in the middle cavity of the brain. The fifth is memory, which is a faculty situated in the rear cavity of the brain. It is the repository for the estimative faculty. This faculty retains all the judgments made by the other ones. The difference between these five faculties is known when the proper functioning of some faculties is examined together with the malfunction of others. Each faculty is thus specified, and its place in the brain made known.

[**36**] The vehicle for these faculties is the "animal soul," which is a warm, subtle body produced by the subtle humors of the body, just as the limbs are produced from the dense humors. The animal soul originates in the left cavity of the heart, and the part of it that goes to the brain and becomes temperate due to the cooling activity of the brain is called the "sensual soul." Sensation and motion are achieved by this part of the soul. The other part of the animal soul, which goes to the liver and produces the vegetative faculties, such as the nutritive faculty, is called the "natural soul." Whenever the passage of this soul to one of the limbs is blocked, the soul dies, causing the limb to die as well. Also, when one of the limbs is tightly squeezed, then that part will soon decay and remain deprived of the soul whose passage has been closed. The [usual] definition of the "rational soul" is a substance neither bodily nor in a body; rather, it manages and controls the body, and it is capable of

بیداری، و محاکات احوال مزاج کند، و از چیزی او محاکات خبرهای عقل کند و بضدّ و شبیه و مجاور او رود. اگر این قوّت نبودی ما فکرت نتوانستمانی کردن. و این را چون عقل استعمال کند «متفکّره» خوانند، و اگر نه «متخیّله»، و جای او آخر تجویف میانین است. پنجم: «حافظه» است، و آن قوّتیست در تجویف آخر دماغ، و او خزانه وهم است، که همهٔ احکام او یاد دارد. و تغایر آن قوّتها، به اجتماع، خلل بعضی با سلامت بعضی بدانستند، و اختصاص هر یکی بلزوم خلل او، و از خلل جایش معلوم کردند.

[۳۶] و حامل این جمله قوّتها «روح حیوانی» است. و این روح، جسم لطیف و گرم است که از لطافت اخلاط تن حاصل می شود، هم چو اعضا از کثافت آن. و آن از تجویف چپ دل بیرون می آید، و «روح حیوانی» خوانندش. و آن شاخ که بدماغ رود، و معتدل شود بتبرید دماغ، آن را «روح نفسانی» خوانند، و حسّ و حرکت ازین شاخ حاصل شود. و آن شاخ که بجگر رود قوّتهای نباتی دهد چون غاذیه و غیر آن. و این را «روح طبیعی» خوانند. و کسی را که راه نفوذ این روح بعضوی بسته شود آن روح کشته شود و آن عضو بمیرد. و اگر نیز اندامی را محکم ببندند حالی تفسیده شود و روح از نا یافت گذرگاه بازماند از نفوذ. و حدّ «نفس ناطقه» آنست که: «جوهری است و نه جسم و نه در

perceiving the intelligibles.

جسم»، بلکه جسم را تدبیر کند، و ادراك معقولات تواند کرد.

❖ Chapter Five ❖

On the Essence of the Necessary Being and Its Attributes

[37] Know that the Necessary Being is that which cannot possibly *not* exist, rather it must necessarily exist. Impossible Being is that which cannot possibly exist. And Possible Being is that which has the possibility either to exist or not to exist. The possible becomes necessary by the condition of the existence of its cause and becomes impossible by the condition of the nonexistence of cause. Regarding existence or nonexistence, when one ponders the essence of such a thing itself, one will find that it is possible. When a possible thing's existence depends on, and is caused by, something else, then that thing is possible in itself. For should it be necessary in and of itself, then by the nonexistence of something else it would not cease to exist. Therefore, since a possible thing's existence is due to something else, it is possible in and of itself; but a possible thing does not exist by itself, because the possibility of existence in itself is not greater than the possibility of its nonexistence. Rather, the priority for its existence is due to the existence of its cause, and the priority for its nonexistence is due to the nonexistence of its cause. Otherwise, should a possible thing's existence be due to itself, then it must necessarily exist and will itself be necessary, while we had postulated it to be possible.

[38] We name a thing's "cause" by that which the thing's existence is obtained and by which it becomes necessary. Should a possible existent thing be caused by something's opposite, such that the opposite must exist for the thing to exist, then every constituent of the opposite is part of the cause, and together they comprise the cause itself. Whenever a cause is obtained by the sum total of the

❖ فصل پنجم ❖

در ذات واجب الوجود و صفاتش

[۳۷] بدانکه «واجب الوجود» آنست که نشاید که نباشد، بلکه البته باید که باشد. و «ممتنع الوجود» آنست که نشاید که باشد. و «ممکن الوجود» آنست که شاید که باشد، و شاید که نباشد. و ممکن واجب شود بشرط وجود علّت، و ممتنع شود بشرط عدم علّت. و در حالت وجود و عدم، چون نظر بذات او کنند ممکن باشد. و هرچه بر چیزی وجودش موقوف گردد در نفس خویش ممکن باشد، که اگر در نفس خویش واجب بودی از نابود او واجب نشدی. پس چون وجودش بغیری باشد، در نفس خویش ممکن باشد. و ممکن بنفس خویش موجود نباشد، زیرا که وجود ممکن در نفس او از عدم اُولیتر نیست. بلکه ترجیح وجودش وجود علّت باشد، و ترجیح عدمش بعدم علّت. که، اگر بذات خویش باشد، البته باید که موجود باشد، خود واجب باشد، و سخن ما در ممکن است.

[۳۸] و ما «علّت» چیز آن را گوییم که وجود آن چیز ازو حاصل شود، و بدو واجب گردد. و اگر ممکنی بر ضدّ چیزی موقوف شود که هر ضدّ بباید تا او موجود شود، هر یکی از آن ضدّ جزو علّت بود و مجموع یك علّت باشد. و چون علّت بجملگیِ اجزا حاصل شود، البته معلول باید که حاصل شود. که، اگر معلول حاصل

constituents, then the effect must also be observed; for otherwise, if the effect is not obtained, then the obtained cause itself cannot have been the cause of the effect but rather the cause of other things. This is while a thing's presence; or the absence of an obstacle to the thing's existence; or the existence of a will, an instrument, matter, or a receptive activity—all of which cause a thing's existence—will cause the realization of the potential effect. This is different than when each part itself is an equal part of the cause, by means of which the effect is obtained. Further, since every single possible existent thing requires a cause, and the totality of all possible existent things also is possible; then, since the whole is dependent on its constituent parts, and the parts are all possible, the whole must also be possible. Therefore, the whole must have a cause. The cause of the totality of all possible existent things cannot be a possible existent whole thing itself; because that would mean that it, too, would be a part of the totality. Thus, the cause of the whole must be something other than a possible existent, and—since it cannot be an impossible existent—it therefore follows that the cause as well as the First Origin and the prior existence of the set of all possible things be the Necessary Being.

[39] It is not possible that there be two Necessary Beings; for if we assume that there are two, then they are either similar or not similar. If they are similar, they cannot be so from each and every perspective, because there must necessarily exist a distinguishing characteristic between two things such that they may be deemed different; otherwise they would both be the same thing. It is also not possible that they be dissimilar with respect to everything, since they at least share the attribute Necessary Being. But if there is something

نشود آن چیز که حاصل شده است خود علّت او نیست، بلکه بر چیزی دیگر موقوف است، و اگر چه حضور وقتی باشد، یا زوال مانعی یا وجود ارادتی یا آلتی یا مادّتی یا فعل قبول کننده ای تا فعل قبول کند، و غیر آنکه این هر یکی جزو علّت آن چیز باشد که برو موقوف شود. و چون هر یکی را از ممکنات بعلّت حاجتست و جمله ممکنات هم ممکن باشد – چه کلّ تابع اجزا باشد، و چون اجزا ممکن باشند کلّ نیز ممکن باشد – پس او را علّتی باید. و علّت جملهٔ ممکنات چیزی ممکن نباشد، زیرا که او نیز ازین جمله باشد، پس باید که چیزی باشد نه ممکن. و چون ممتنع نشاید، پس باید علّت و مرجّح وجود جمله ممکنات «واجب الوجود» باشد.

[۳۹] و نشاید که دو چیز واجب الوجود باشند. که، اگر دو واجب الوجود باشند، با هم شرکت دارند، یا ندارند. اگر شرکت دارند با یکدیگر، از جمله وجوه، نشاید. زیرا که در میان دو چیز بضرورت ممیّزی باید تا فرقی حاصل شود، و اگر نه هر دو یکی باشد. و اگر در هیچ چیز شرکت ندارند هم محالست. که، کم از آن نتواند بود که در واجب الوجودی شرکت دارند که هر دو واجب الوجوداند. و اگر در چیزی ایشان را اشتراك باشد، و در چیزی افتراق؛ اگر آن چیز که افتراق بدوست نبودی، هیچ یکی از ایشان موجود نبودی. و اگر آن چیز که اشتراك بدوست در هر

common between them as well as something they do not share which distinguishes them from each other, then should the unshared distinguishing attribute not exist, neither one of them would exist. While on the other hand, should the common element between them not exist in one, then neither would exist. Moreover, since the common element, which distinguishes them, is itself dependent on the differentiating attribute, then that thing could also not exist without the common element existing at the same time, which means that both would be possible existences and not necessary existences. Therefore, we conclude that the Necessary Being must be one.

The Necessary Being cannot be a part of a whole comprising different parts; because if its existence depended on [some or all other] parts, then it would itself be caused by parts and thus not be the Necessary Being. It is also not possible for the Necessary Being to have a necessary part, since we have proven It to be one. Since only bodies, species, and accidents are many, the Necessary Being cannot, therefore, be many; for otherwise, all of them would be possible only. Therefore, we conclude that the most prior being and the cause of all existent things is the Necessary Being, which is the upper limit of the sequence of all causes. We have also proven that the sequence of causes and effects has an upper limit as something that has no cause itself, and that thing is the Necessary Being, Exalted be His Glory.

[40] Another proof that the Necessary Being is one: If we assume that there are two Necessary Beings, then the necessity of one—or that of the other, qua the necessity of existence of that one—must be due to something else; which would mean it must be due to a

یکی موجود نبودی، پس وجود هر یکی نبودی. و آنچه اشتراك بدوست، چون بر ممیّز موقوف باشد، ممکن باشد. آنچه افتراق بدوست هم بی آنکه اشتراك بدوست نتوانست بود،پس ممکن الوجود باشند نه واجب الوجود. پس، واجب الوجود یکی باید که باشد. و واجب الوجود را نشاید که جزو باشد، که اگر وجود او بر اجزا موقوف شود، معلول اجزا گردد، پس واجب الوجود نباشد. و نیز هر یکی از اجزاء او واجب الوجود نتواند بود، که ما بیان کردیم که واجب الوجود یکی باشد. و اجسام و انواع و اعراض بسیارند، و واجب الوجود بسیار نشاید، پس همه ممکن باشند. پس مرجّح و علّت جمله واجب الوجود باشد و منتهای جملهٔ علل اوست. و نیز بیان کردیم که علل و معلولات را نهایت باید، پس بچیزی رسد که او را علّت نباشد، و آن واجب الوجودست، جلّ جلاله.

[۴۰] برهانی دیگر بر آنکه واجب الوجود یکیست آنست که: اگر حقیقت وجوبِ وجود اقتضای آن کند که درین یکی باشد، پس وجوب و[۱۴]وجود، درین یکی، از بهر عین وجوب وجود نیست، پس از بهر علّتی باشد، وواجب الوجود نتواند بود. و اگر اقتضای آن نکند که درین یکی باشد، پس وجوب وجود، درین یکی، از بهر عین وجوب وجود نیست، پس از بهر علّتی باشد،

[۱۴] N: وجوب وجود؛ S: وجوب ووجود

cause. Thus, it would follow that one or the other be possible and not necessary. But should the necessity of one or the other not be qua the necessity of existence of that one, then it must again be due to something else. This would mean that it must be due to a cause, from which it would also follow that one, or the other, be possible and not necessary. This is a contradiction, since we postulated that they both be necessary. Now, should someone argue that "[if] it is certain that the Necessary Being exist, it must be one," but "why have you claimed that the Necessary Being exists?" To such an objection we respond thus: Since it has been proven that the Necessary Being is one, and that bodies and accidents are not one but many. It is then [proven] that the multiple bodies and accidents cannot be necessary but are possible. All possible things, [as previously proven] require [a cause and] also a being most prior in respect to them. We thus conclude that the Necessary Being is the upper limit [of the sequence of] all causes.

[41] Another proof is this: Bodies are composed of form and Prime Matter and need specific attributes for their existence, so they are not necessary beings. Specific attributes of forms exist in bodies, so they cannot be necessary beings either. In addition, it is not possible for two things to be the cause of one another. For this would mean that one of the two exists prior to the other and thus exists prior to itself and so would cause its own cause, which is absurd. Therefore, we conclude that since bodies are possible beings, they must necessarily require the Necessary Being to exist [and since they do exist, the Necessary Being must also exist].

[42] Another proof is this: You have known that rational souls cannot exist prior to bodies and are thus temporally generated

پس ممکن الوجود بُوَد وواجب نباشد؛ و سخن ما در واجب الوجود است. اگر کسی گوید که: «مسلّمست که واجب الوجود، اگر باشد، یکی باشد؛ ولکن چرا گفتی که واجب الوجودی هست؟» جواب گوییم: چون مسلّم شد که یکی باشد؛ و اجسام و انواع و اعراض یکی نیستند، بلکه بسیارند؛ پس واجب الوجود نباشند، پس ممکن الوجود باشند، و ممکن را مرجّحی باید و نهایت جمله علل بواجب الوجودست.

[٤١] طریقی دیگر آنست که: اجسام مرکّب اند از هیولی و صورت و محتاج اند بمخصّصات، پس واجب الوجود نباشند. و مخصّصاترا، از صفات صورتها، وجود در اجسامست، هم واجب الوجود نباشند. و نشاید که دو چیز علّت یکدیگر باشند، که هر یکی پیش از دیگری باشد، و پیش از خویش باشد و علّت خویش را بکند تا او کرده شود، و این محالست. پس جون اجسام ممکن اند، بضرورت محتاج باشند بواجب الوجود.

[٤٢] طریقی دیگر آنست که: نفوس ناطقه[١٥] بدانستی که پیش از تن موجود نیستند، پس حادث باشند، و ممکن الوجود. و علّت

[١٥] N: ناطقه چون؛ S: ناطقه بدانستی

possible beings. But their cause cannot be a body, because a thing cannot cause something else that is more noble; how is it then possible [that rational souls be caused by a body], since bodies are controlled by souls? There must exist something prior. Should the prior thing be also possible, then it, too, must sequentially reach the upper limit, which is the Necessary Being. Moreover, the Necessary Being can never become nonexistent, because the Necessary Being is precluded from nonexistence necessarily. In addition, should the Necessary Being accept nonexistence, then it would become a possible being, and whatever is a possible being may also be a possible nonbeing, which leads to a contradiction, since we had assumed it to be a Necessary Being.

[43] The Necessary Being cannot have an attribute additional to its essence, since the attribute cannot be a necessary being; and here we conclude, based on our proof of the uniqueness of the Necessary Being, that there can be no attributes in addition to the essence of the Necessary Being. Also, attributes are necessarily self-existing, so their existences and subsistences depend on essence; thus they may not be necessary beings, but must be possible beings. Further, the Necessary Being cannot have a possible attribute, because then the possible attribute must have a cause, while the essence of the Necessary Being accepts an effect, neither from something else, nor from itself. For should the First cause an effect, then the Necessary Being will have accepted an effect from Itself; because that which causes an effect is a bestower, and that which accepts the effect is a receiver, while the mode of action is different from passion. This would then require that the Necessary Being have two separate mental modes [action and passion]; and thereby

ایشان جسم نباشد، که چیزی وجود چیزی را که ازو شریفتر بُوَد نتواند داد. فکیف؟ که بدن مقهور نفس است، پس مرجّحی باید، اگر مرجّحش هم ممکن باشد سخن درو باز آید تا بواجب الوجود رسد. وواجب الوجود هرگز نشاید که معدوم شود، زیرا که واجب الوجود ممتنع العدم باشد. و نیز اگر عدم پذیرد شاید که نباشد، و هرچه شاید که نباشد شاید که باشد، پس ممکن الوجود باشد، و سخن ما در واجب الوجود است.

[۴۳] و نشاید که واجب الوجود را «صفتی» باشد زیادت بر ذات. زیرا که این صفت واجب الوجود نشاید که باشد؛ هم از بهر برهان که: گفتیم که دو واجب الوجود نشاید که باشند. و نیز بضرورت صفت قائم باشد بذات، پس وجودش و قیامش بذات بُوَد، پس واجب الوجود نباشد، بلکه ممکن الوجود بُوَد. و نشاید که واجب الوجود را صفتی ممکن باشد؛ زیرا که آن ممکن را علّتی باید، و ذات واجب الوجود از چیزی تأثیری نپذیرد، و نه از خود. که، اگر نخستین تأثیر کند و هم بخویشتن تأثیر پذیرد، در جهت کردن نه جهت تأثیر پذیرفتن است. که «تأثیر کننده» دهنده است، و «تأثیر پذیرنده» ستاننده؛ و جهت ستانندگی نه جهت دهندگی است. پس واجب الوجود[۱۶] را در ذات خویش دو جهت عقلی لازم آید، پس مرکّب و متکثّر شود، و بگفتیم که این

[۱۶] N: واجب؛ S: واجب الوجود

it would be composite and multiple, which we have proven to be impossible. Also, action as an act of bestowing perfection is more noble than passion as an act of receiving, which is a relative imperfection. The result of all of this would be that the essence of the Necessary Being be composed of two modes: one noble and one base. Now should the modes be in the Necessary Being's essence, then it would be composite; and should they be additional to its essence, the same absurdity would follow—namely that the necessary be a possible nonbeing; and, as a possible nonbeing, its modes of action and passion would be necessary; resulting in an impossible, infinite, ordered sequence of things and attributes, all existing together.

[**44**] Know that when you know yourself, you do so not because of a form of thou-in-thou, because knowing your thou-ness by a form can be in only one of two ways: either you know that the form of your thou-ness is equal to thou or you do not. If you do not know that the form is the same as your thou-ness, then you would not know your self, while we are here assuming that you do know it. If you do know that the form of your thou-ness is equal to thou, then you would have known yourself with the form of your thou-ness so as to know that it is equal to your thou. Therefore your knowledge of yourself is not by the form. It can only be that your essence is self-subsistent, free from corporeality and always self-cognizant.[1] And any thing whose essence is absent from you, so you cannot perceive its essence, then you cannot [also] perceive its form.[2] However, the Necessary Being is an essence free from

[1] Lit. "self-evident" or "evident to itself."

[2] Related to knowledge by presence.

محالست. و نیز، دهندگی کمال بخشی است، و کمال بخشی شریفتر از کمال ستانیست؛ و کمال ستانی نقص است، بنسبت با کمال بخشی. پس در ذات واجب الوجود جهتی «خسیس» باشد، و جهتی «شریف»؛ اگر در ذات او باشد مرکّب شود، و اگر زاید بر ذات باشد، همین سخن باز آید که واجب نشاید که باشد. و چون ممکن بُوَد؟ که ستانندگی و دهندگی لازم آید. و سلسلهٔ بی نهایت از صفات و موصوفات مترتب موجود بهم محالست، پس در آخر بدُو جهت رسد – در ذات واجب الوجود – و آن محالست.

[٤٤] و بدانکه «تو» چون خود را دانی، نه بصورت[۱۷] دانی از تو در تو؛ که، اگر تُویِ ترا بصورتی دانی، از دو حال بیرون نباشد: یا دانی که آن صورت مطابق تست، یا نه؛ اگر ندانی که آن صورت مطابق تست، پس خود را ندانسته باشی – و سخن ما در آنست که بدانسته باشی. و اگر دانی که آن صورت مطابق تست، پس خود را بی آن «صورت» دانسته باشی، تا بتوانی دانست که آن صورت مطابق تست. پس، معرفت تو بخود بصورت نیست. و نتوان بود إلاّ آنکه ذات تو ذاتیست قائم بخود، مجرّد از مادّت، که از خود غایب نیست. و هرچه ذات او از تو غایب است و استحضار ذاتش نتوانی کرد، استحضار صورتش نکنی. چه،[۱۸]

[۱۷] N: نه بصورتی؛ S: نه بصورت

corporeality; and it is self-cognizant. Further, It exists by intellect, knowledge and perfection, qua its own existence, and does not require multiplicity. Thus the Necessary Being's essence is not impossible being, and whatever is not impossible to the Necessary Being is necessary. This is because the modal "possible" may not be attributed of It. For the possibility of a thing necessitates that it be possibly extended, which would then necessitate that it become multiple; but [the Necessary Being] is Exalted and Sanctified [and not given to multiplicity].

Abstraction from matter may be determined through negation, and the "absence" of "presence" from "self"—[which indicates "self-cognizance"]—is also [known] by negation, and the Necessary Being has attributes made known by negative predication. The Necessary Being [for example] has attributes such as "Eternal Sanctified" and "Eternal Peacegiver," where the latter is said of the Necessary Being by negating "eternal fault" from It, and the former is said of It by negating the attribute "eternal imperfection." The Necessary Being also has attributes made known by positive predication such as "Origin," "Creator," and "Giver of Grace"; however, positing attributes additional to Its essence are not possible, as we have proven before.

[45] We have proven that the Necessary Being is not a body, because bodies are composite while the Necessary Being is not; and bodies have common elements with other bodies, while the Necessary Being does not have anything common with anything else. Necessary Being is also not an accident, because accidents subsist in other things and are thus *not* necessary beings. In short, the Necessary

واجب الوجود ذاتیست مجرّد از مادّت، و از خود غایب نیست، و نیز بعقل و دانش کمال موجود است، از آن روی که موجودست، و اقتضای تکثّر نمی کند؛ پس بر ذات واجب الوجود ممتنع نباشد. و هرچه بر واجب الوجود ممتنع نباشد، واجب بُوَد. زیرا که برو نشاید که چیزی ممکن باشد، که امکان جیزی برو اقتضای آن کند که درو جهت امکانی باشد، متکثّر شود، تعالی و تقدّس.

و تجرّد از مادّت هم[۱۹] سلبی است؛ و عدم غیبت از خود هم سلبی است. و واجب الوجود را صفات سلبی هست، همچون «قدّوس»، و «سلاّم»؛ که، حاصل «سلاّم» با نفی عیب[۲۰] از اوست، و حاصل «قدّوس» هم با سلب صفات نقض ابد ازو. و او را «صفات اضافی» تواند بود: هم چون «مبدئی»؛ و «خالقی»؛ و «رازقی». ولکن «صفات ایجابی» زاید بر ذات او، محالست؛ چنانکه بیان کردیم.

[۴۵] و واجب الوجود، چون بیان کردیم که جسم نیست – زیرا که جسم مرکّبست، و واجب الوجود مرکّب نیست، و جسم را مشارکان هستند در جسمیت، و واجب الوجود را مشارك نیست – و عَرَض [هم] نیست؛ که، عَرَض را قیام بغیری باشد، پس

[۱۸] N: و؛ S: چه

[۱۹] N: مادت – هم؛ S: مادت + هم

[۲۰] N: عیب + ابد؛ S: عیب – ابد

Being cannot be indicated spatially; It can only be indicated ideally in the mind. Therefore, the Necessary Being is not corporeal and is cognizant of Its concomitants and of Its Self. All of existence is either Its essence or some concomitant of Its essence; the Necessary Being is therefore cognizant of all existence, and all things are present to Its knowledge. The Necessary Being is living; because a living, knowing subject is also creative, and whatever knows itself is necessarily alive. The Necessary Being knows Itself, and Its knowledge is not additional to Its essence; so Its life is not additional to Its essence, and Its power and knowledge are the same.

[**46**] The Necessary Being has absolute perfection and beauty. The beauty of a thing is that the perfection that befits it be obtained unto it. So nothing has beauty like the beauty of the Necessary Being, because its perfection is not other than its essence. Necessary Being is the giver of all perfection; thus, complete beauty and perfection belong to it. The Necessary Being is the perfect good; they call It the "Giver of good," meaning benefactor; nothing is more beneficial than It, and all things exist because of It. It is named "Giver of good," also, because all things desire It. Therefore nothing is more beneficial than It, and all things need It and Its generosity. And, since the Necessary Being is unique, It has no equal nor opposite. The multitude mean by "opposite" that which

واجب الوجود نَبُوَد. و فی الجمله مُشارٌ إلیه نیست، إلاّ به اشارت عقلی؛ پس مجرّد است از مادّت، و از خود، و از لوازم خود، غایب نیست. و همهٔ وجود، یا ذات اوست، یا لوازم ذات او. پس عالم است بهمهٔ وجود [و] هیچ از علم او غایب نشود. وحیّ است، زیرا که حیّ «دانندهٔ کننده» باشد؛ و هرچه خودرا داند بضرورت زنده باشد. و واجب الوجود خود را داند، و دانش او چیزی زیادت بر ذات او نیست. پس حیات او زیادت بر ذات او نیست؛ و قدرت او علم اوست.

[۴۶] و «کمال»، و «جمالِ» مطلق واجب الوجودراست. و جمال چیز آنست که کمالِ او، که لایق او باشد، او را حاصل بُوَد. پس هیچ چیز را جمال چون جمال واجب الوجود نیست؛ زیرا که کمال او بیرون از ذات او نیست. و او بخشندهٔ جملهٔ کمالاتست، پس کمال و جمال بحقیقت اوراست. و واجب الوجود «خیر محض» است؛ که «خیّر» گویند بمعنی نافع، و هیچ چیز نافع تر از واجب الوجود نیست، که وجود جملهٔ چیزها ازوست. و نیز «خیر» گویند بمعنی آنکه چیزها بدو آرزومند باشند. پس بدین معنی هیچ چیز خیّرتر از واجب الوجود نیست، که همهٔ چیزها مشتاق اند بدو و بجود او. و چون واجب الوجود دیگری[۲۱] نیست، پس واجت الوجود را ندّ نیست و ضدّ[۲۲] نیست؛

[۲۱] N: واجب الوجودی دیگر؛ S: واجب الوجود دیگری

is either contrary to something or equal to it in terms of power. Since all things are caused by the Necessary Being, nothing is Its opposite. It is not situated in place, and has no opposite in the sense used by the adept—a sense understood by the novice as well, as it is applied to two things that may occupy the same place while at the same time are extremely far from one another; [for example] "black" and "white" [said of the same thing in a single place]. Greatest glory and magnificence belong to the Necessary Being, Exalted and Sanctified.

که، عوام ضدّ چیز آن را گویند که ممانع و مساوی چیز باشد در قوّت. و چون همه معلول واجب الوجودند، هیچ [چیز] ضدّ او نباشد، و چون واجب الوجود را محلّی نیست، پس ضدّ ندارد به اصطلاح خواصّ؛ که ضدّین، به اصطلاحی نزدیکتر بفهم مبتدی، دو چیزاند که بر یك محلّ متعاقب توانند بود، و میان ایشان غایت دوری باشد – هم چون بیاض و سواد. و بهای عظیم تر، و جلال شریفتر، واجب الوجود راست، تعالی و تقدّس.

[۲۲] N: ضد + نیز؛ S: ضد – نیز

❖ Chapter Six ❖

On the Activity of the Necessary Being

[47] Know that from the one, which is one in reality and unique in respect to every mode, only one [other thing] may be obtained. For if two things are obtained from it, then the exigency of one of them will not be the same as that of the other. Because if their two requirements were the same, then they would be exactly the same. Thus, a mode from which one thing is exigent must differ from the other's mode. A multiplicity of modes and attributes is impossible in the Necessary Being; It is one with respect to every mode. Therefore ,only one thing becomes existent due to It; and this thing cannot be a body, because a body is a composite of form and Prime Matter and is further necessarily distinguished by specific differences. This indicates that bodies are multiple, which in turn requires that their causes be multiple, while the Necessary Being is beyond and absolved of multiplicity. But attributes and forms require a place in which to exist; therefore, that which is obtained from the Necessary Being is neither a thing extended spatially, nor a body, nor [a] bodily [attribute]. It is therefore not possible that a soul or body be obtained from the Necessary Being, and thus that which is obtained from it

❖ فصل ششم ❖

در فعـل واجب الوجـود

[٤٧] بدانکه از «یکی»، که بحقیقت یکی باشد از جمله وجوه، جز یکی حاصل[٢٣] نشود. که، اگر دو چیز ازو صادر شود و حاصل گردد، اقتضای یکی بعینه اقتضای آن دیگری نباشد؛ که اگر اقتضای این اقتضای آن بُوَد،[٢٤] این بعینه آن بودی. پس از جهتی که اقتضای این کند، عین او اقتضای چیزی دیگر نکند؛ پس اقتضای دیگر بجهتی دیگر باید. و در واجب الوجود کثرت جهات و صفات محالست؛ و او یکیست، از همهٔ وجوه. پس، آنچه ازو در وجود آید یکی باشد. و این یکی جسم نباشد، زیرا که جسم مرکّبست از «هیولی» و «صورت» – و از مخصّصات چاره نیست او را – پس در جسم کثرتست، [و] در کنندهٔ او کثرت لازم آید، و واجب الوجود مقدّس است از کثرت. و صفات‌را و صورت را محلّی باید، پس آنچه از واجب الوجود صادر شود چیزی در محلّ نباشد، و جسم و جسمانی نَبُوَد؛ و نفس نباشد، که نفس را جسم باید که درو تصرّف کند. و از واجب الوجود نشاید که نفسی و جسمی حاصل شود؛ پس آنچه ازو صادر شود جوهریست مجرّد از مادّت، از جمله وجوه. که، نه

[٢٣] N: صادر؛ S: حاصل

[٢٤] N: بودی؛ S: بود

is a noncorporeal substance absolved of material extensions from every perspective; whatever is such we call "intellect."

[48] Know that philosophers have said that it is not possible for the Necessary Being not to act and then act later in time. Because if It is the most prior Being of all things; then since priority and firstness are eternal, It must be eternal. And if the Necessary Being is obtained, but nothing possible is obtained, then possibles-qua-possible have no First dependent on a temporal extension nor a condition nor a state nor the removal of an obstacle to their being nor the existence of a will. But prior to the existence of all possible things, a temporal extension—as a condition—could not have been determined such that all beings would depend on it. And, there is no specific state in absolute, unrestricted nonexistence so that it be given preference by the Necessary Being. It will be said about anything that you determine to be generated in time—due to a will, a condition, or a time—that its existence is continual if the First is so.

In sum, the essence and attributes of God are eternal, and prior to all possible beings, nothing else exists except the Necessary Being. If it is the most prior existence, it must have eternal preeminence, and if existence is not obtained from it, it will never be obtained. Because before the existence of a possible being, nothing exists with it to act as a cause. It is a false fancy to say, as some people do, that "if the First Being and its effects are together eternal, they must be the same and equal." For example, you can know that "when a

مادّیست و نه متصرّف در مادّت. و هر چه چنین باشد ما او را «عقل» گوییم.

[٤٨] و بدانکه حکما گفته اند که: نشاید که واجب الوجود چیزی نکند پس بکند؛ که، اگر مرجّح وجودِ چیزها اوست، چون مرجّح دائم باشد، ترجیح دائم بُوَد. و اگر واجب الوجود حاصل باشد و از ممکنات چیزی حاصل نباشد، پس ممکنات را مرجّح تمام حاصل نیست؛ پس موقوف باشند بوقتی،[٢٥] یا بشرطی، یا حالتی، یا زوال مانعی، یا وجود ارادتی. و پیش از جمله ممکنات، وقتی و شرطی نیست، تا چیزی بر آن موقوف شود. و در عدم بَحت حالتی نیست، که واجب الوجود را در آن حالت، کردن از نا کردن اُولیتر باشد. و هر چیزی که تقدیر کنی که حادث شود، از ارادت و شرط و وقت، سخن درو باز آید. که، اگر مرجّحش دائم بُوَد او نیز دائم بُوَد.[٢٦] و فی الجمله، ذات و صفات حقّ دائم است. و پیش از جملهٔ ممکنات چیزی دیگر نیست، إلاّ واجب الوجود. اگر مرجّح اوست ترجیح دائم باشد، و اگر ازو حاصل نشود هرگز حاصل نشود، زیرا که پیش از جملهٔ ممکنات با او چیزی دیگر نیست تا تأثیر کند. و آنچه گویند که: اگر مبدء أوّل و معلولات او دائم باشد، هر دو برابر باشند؛ و همی نا درست بُوَد. از آنکه،

[٢٥] N: بر وقتی؛ S: به وقتی

[٢٦] N: باید؛ S: بود

finger moves, then the ring will also move," but you never say, "The ring moves, therefore the finger moves," because the ring's movement is caused by the finger's movement and not the other way around. Moreover, when the ring's movement ceases, the finger's movement must have ceased prior to it. Therefore the finger's movement is prior to the ring's movement in the mind, even though it may not be prior in time. Therefore, the cause—and not temporal priority—has essential priority in relation to the effect, even though their motion may be together and continuous. The same situation is the priority of "breaking" to "being broken." The existence of an effect is due to the cause and not vice versa.

[**49**] Know that the reason for the effect's attachment to the cause does not involve a temporal "before," because the nonexistence of "before" has no impact on the coming to being of the thing generated in time due to a cause. It is simply attached to its cause because its being possible is made necessary through the cause. Otherwise, if its existence would continually depend on it, then it would be a continual effect. Since a possible being is always so, never becoming a necessary being by essence, then as long as it exists it will be due to the continual existence of the cause. For should the cause—which is prior to the effect—not exist, then the effect would not exist either. Indeed, it is possible that something be the cause of something else's existence and the cause of the permanence of another thing—for example, the form of a statue whose existence is caused by the sculptor, while the cause of its withstanding is the dryness of

مثلاً، تو دانی گفت که: «انگشت بجنبید، پس انگشتری بجنبید»؛ و نگویی که: «انگشتری بجنبید، پس انگشت»، زیرا که حرکت انگشتری از حرکت انگشت است، نه حرکت انگشت از حرکت انگشتری. و چون حرکت انگشتری زایل شود، باید که پیش از آن حرکت انگشت زایل شده باشد؛ پس، حرکت انگشت در عقل متقدّم است بر حرکت انگشتری؛ و اگر چه[۲۷] بزمان متقدّم نیست. پس، علّت را بر معلول، تقدّم بذات باشد نه بزمان، اگر چه دائم باشد. هم چو تقدّم کسر بر انکسار. ووجود معلول از علّت باشد، نه وجود علّت از معلول.

[۴۹] و بدانکه تعلّق مفعولِ، اصطلاحاً[۲۸] حادث بفاعل، نه از بهر عدم سابق باشد؛ که عدم سابق مر حادث را از فاعل نیست؛ بلکه تعلّق بفاعلش از آن روست که وجود ممکنش بدو واجب می شود. اگر وجودش بدو دائم بُوَد، مفعول دائم او بُوَد. و چون ممکن در همهٔ اوقات ممکن است، و هرگز بذات خویش واجب نشود، پس باید که مادام که موجود باشد پیوسته بدوام علّت موجود و دائم باشد، که اگر مرجّح نماند او نیز نماند. بلی، شاید که چیزی را علّت وجود چیزی باشد و علّت ثبات دیگری؛ هم چو صورت بُت، که علّت وجودش بُتگر است، و علّت ثباتش خشکی آن

[۲۷] N: واگر هم؛ S: واگر چه

[۲۸] N: اصلاح؛ S: اصطلاحا

the substance of the statue. It is also possible that the cause of its existence and permanence be the same—for example, a vessel holding water, because the water takes its form from it and keeps its form because of it also. The cause of existence and permanence of all possible beings is nothing other than the Necessary Being. The existence and permanence of all things is because of It; in the mind, It is prior to the potentiality of existence, because potentiality itself is caused by It. And should the possible being exist forever, it does not have potential existence by itself, but rather by something else. And the nonpotentiality of existence which it has in itself is prior in the mind to potentiality of existence, which depends on something else. Its existence comes after because of something else's essence; for, if a possible being would itself have potential existence in its own essence, then it would not require something else to exist. Therefore in every possible being there is a prior nonpotentiality of existence which is a mental, ideal priority and not a temporal one. This type of generation of existence we name "essential generation." It is possible to say that a possible being has non-potential existence in itself, but not that it has potential existence in itself—for this would mean that it be an impossible existence. And here we shall present a point:

[50] Know that when a lower possible being comes into existence, a more noble one must have existed before it. This is because, if a lower possible being is obtained from the mode uniqueness of the Necessary Being, and if we may suppose the existence of a more

گوهر است که صورت و شکل بُت را نگاه می دارد. و باشد که علّت وجودش و ثبات یکی باشد؛ هم چو قالبی که آب درو باشد، که آب بشکل او گردد و به او شکلش بماند. و جمله ممکنات را علّت وجود و ثبات هیچ چیز دیگر نیست، إلاّ واجب الوجود؛ که، همه را وجود و دوام وجود – که او را از خودست – بدوست، و مقدّم است در عقل بر استحقاق وجود، که استحقاق بدوست. و ممکن، اگر نیز دائم الوجود باشد در نفس خویش استحقاق وجود ندارد، بلکه بغیری دارد. و نا استحقاق وجود، که او را از خودست، متقدّم است در عقل بر استحقاق وجود، که استحقاق وجود او از غیرست، و بعدِ از نا استحقاق وجود باشد در ذات چیزی. که، اگر چیز در نفس خویش استحقاق وجود داشتی، بچیزی دیگرش حاجت نبودی. پس هر ممکنی را، نا استحقاق وجود پیش از استحقاق وجودست – تقدّمی عقلی نه زمانی. و این را «حدوث ذاتی» گوییم. و ممکن را توان گفت که: نا استحقاق وجود دارد بنفس خود؛ أمّا، نتوان گفت که: استحقاق نا وجود دارد بنفس خویش، که آنگاه ممتنع شود. و از اینجا نکته‌ای یاد کنیم:

[۵۰] بدانکه، چون «ممکن خسیس» موجود شود، باید که «ممکن شریف» پیش از آن موجود باشد. که، اگر از واجب الوجود، بجهت وحدانی، ممکن خسیس حاصل شود – و ممکن

noble possible being, then the latter could not have been obtained from the Necessary Being. This is because the Necessary Being is one in every way, so should It depend on a less noble being, then no other being—more noble or not—could have been obtained from It. This would mean then, that, for the supposed more noble being, a more noble cause than the Necessary Being must exist—which is impossible, since neither in the mind nor in outer reality is something nobler than the Necessary Being. This means, we conclude, that the more noble possible being must be obtained prior to the less noble one. Furthermore, since we know bodies, accidents, and rational souls to exist, and we also know that a noncorporal substance, free in every way from matter, is more noble than a substance that is corporeal and not free from matter, then such a noncorporal substance must exist prior to the existent substances we mentioned, and it is not impossible for a substance to exist not in matter. How is this? We demonstrated before that the soul is not in matter, and it may be a substance free from matter. Therefore, the first thing obtained from the Necessary Being is a substance, and this is the "intellect." And, from this law, it also follows that existence of the worlds cannot be more noble than they are.

شریف را فرض وجود توان کرد – چون فرض وجودش کنیم، از واجب الوجود حاصل نشود، زیرا که او یکیست از جملهٔ وجوه؛ و اگر اقتضای ممکن خسیس کرد، جهتی دیگر درونیست تا اقتضای ممکن شریف کند. پس آن[۲۹] ممکن شریف را علّتی باید شریفتر از واجب الوجود؛ و محالست که چیزی بُوَد، در عقل یا در خارج، شریفتر از واجب الوجود. پس باید که ممکن شریف ازو بیشتر از ممکن خسیس حاصل شود. و چون اجسام و اعراض ونفوس ناطقه را می دانیم که موجودند، و جوهری مجرّد از مادّت از جملهٔ وجوه بری از تغییر شریفتر باشد از جوهری که مجرّد نیست از مادّت، و از مجرّدی از مادّت که از علایق مادّت مجرّد نیست، و اینها موجوداند. پس او باید که پیش ازینها موجود باشد، و جوهری را نه در مادّت وجود محال نیست. فَکَیْفَ؟ که برهان بگفتیم که: نفس در مادّت نیست، و شاید که مجرّدی باشد که هیچ علاقه ندارد با مواد. پس، باید که أوّل چیزی که از واجب الوجودحاصل آید، این جوهر باشد، و این «عقل» است. و نیز ازین قاعده معلوم شد که: وجود و عوالم شریفتر ازین که هستند نتواند بود.

[۲۹] N: این؛ S: آن

❖ Chapter Seven ❖

On the Upper Limits and Order of Being

[51] Know that the "rich" in reality is that which requires nothing in its essence and attributes. Whatever requires something else in essence or attributes is "poor." The true "King" is He who possesses the essence of all things but whose own essence does not belong to anything else. Thus, Kingdom and absolute "richness" belong to the Necessary Being, whom everyone needs in terms of existence and perfection, while He does not require anything. He is the absolute magnanimous, and God's bounty is that He bestoweth whatever is needed without requiring any recompense. Whoever gives in order that he be praised or eulogized, or that he not be blamed, or that he be thanked, is not an absolute munificent, rather he is bartering: he gives something and takes something back. Whoever does something for a reason, then the reason's existence must be prior than its nonexistence for him. For if it is not prior, then it is not a reason in itself. For whomever doing something is better than not doing it, with the priority here indicated being part of his perfection—if he does not do it, he will not obtain the better thing, and thus he will not obtain perfection. Therefore, his perfection depends on his action; therefore, he is "poor" by doing it yet receives perfection from his own actions; thus he is "poor" in himself. The Necessary Being, however, is absolutely rich; therefore, His action is not for a

❖ فصل هفتم ❖

در غایت و ترتیب وجود

[۵۱] بدانکه، «غنیّ» بحقیقت آنست که او را در ذات و صفات خویش بهیچ چیز حاجت نیفتد. و هر چه او را، در ذات یا در صفات، بغیری حاجت افتد «فقیر» باشد. و ملِك بحقّ آنست که ذات همهٔ چیزها او را باشد، و ذات او هیچ چیز را نباشد. پس ملك و غنیّ مطلق، واجب الوجودست؛ که همه در وجود و کمال محتاجند بدو، و او را حاجت نیست بچیزی. و«جواد مطلق» اوست؛ وجواد حقّ آنست که ببخشد آنچه بباید بخشیدن بی عوض. و هر که ببخشد، تا او را مدح یا ثنا گویند، یا مذمّتش نکنند، و حمد و شکرش بجای آرند، جواد مطلق نیست، بلکه معاملت می کند: چیزی می دهد، و چیزی می ستاند. و هر که فعلی کند از بهر غرضی، باید که آن غرض را وجود پیش او اُولیتر باشد از عدم. که، اگر اُولیتر نباشد، پیش او فی نفسه غرض نباشد. و هر که پیش او، کردن چیزی از نا کردن اُولیتر باشد، و اُولیتر بجزو کمال او باشد – که اگر نکند آنچه اُولیترست او را حاضل نشود – پس کمالش موجود نگردد. پس کمالش بر فعلش موقوفست. پس او فقیرست بکردن آن چیز، و از فعلِ خویش کمال می پذیرد. پس فی نفسه ناقص باشد. وواجب الوجود غنیّ مطلق است. پس، فعل او بغرض نباشد، بلکه فعلش خود «خیر

reason, but rather His action itself is pure good.

[52] It is not possible that the Necessary Being create things by will. This is because when a thing brings something else into existence by will in such a way that it not be enhanced [through temporal change], then it will not be obtained by and it would not have had the "will" prior to the act of willing. This is not the same as when the multitude aver that the quality of "will" is such that being is specified from nonbeing and from the mode possibility. [Such beliefs are incorrect] because, given that all things must be equal before the one who bestows his will [to his Master], there will be no difference between doing something and not doing it. For whichever mode is chosen then *it has to* be qualified as something specifically determined [while there is no specificity in causation]. Therefore, we conclude that the Necessary Being, as well as the principle of noncorporal entities, act neither by will nor for a specified objective reason. Neither is [causation and giving existence by nature, because whatever acts by nature is not a cognizant being; while, on the contrary, we have demonstrated that the Necessary Being is a knowing subject; and so are the [separate] Intellects. Therefore, their acts are not by nature; only bodies act by nature.

[53] Know that celestial motion is not natural motion, because any corporeal body that moves by nature must have an objective that is more worthy than the bodily thing, for the body would not seek an objective, the existence or nonexistence of which is equal

محض» باشد.

[۵۲] و نشاید که او چیزها را به ارادت کند. که هر که چیزها را به ارادت کند، تا اُولیتر نشود وجود آن [چیز] پیشِ او،[۳۰] ارادتش بوجود او حاصل نشود، و ارادتش نباشد. و آن بس نباشد که عوام گویند که: خاصیّت ارادت تخصیص یك طرفست از بود و نابود و جهات امکان. زیرا که اگر این جمله نسبت به ارادت مرید یکی باشد، کردن از نا کردن اُولیتر نباشد. و هرکدام که تقدیر کنند، که اختیار کند، این سخن باز آید. و هر جانب که اختیار کند این خاصیّت حاصل باشد، که تخصیص یك طرف کرده بُوَد. پس واجب الوجود را، و مبادیِ مجرّدات را، فعل به ارادت و از بهر غرض نباشد. و نیز بطبع نباشد، که چیزی که فعل بطبع کند داننده نَبُوَد؛ و برهان گفتیم که واجب الوجود داننده‌ٔ چیزهاست، و عقول نیز، پس فعلشان بطبع نباشد. و فعل بطبع جسمانیّات را باشد.

[۵۳] و بدانکه حرکت فلك طبیعی نیست. زیرا که هر جسمی[۳۱] که حرکتی بطبع کند او را مطلوبی باشد، که وجود او بدان جسم لایق تر بُوَد؛ که اگر وجود و عدم آن پیش او برابر بودی، طلب نکردی بطبع. و چون جسم را، هر چه لایق اوست،

۳۰ N: از؛ S: از

۳۱ N: جسم؛ S: جسمی

before it; moreover, when everything the body requires is present before it, it would cease to move anymore by nature. Whatever moves does so in order to seek its restplace and will no longer move when this is obtained. This is because a body does not naturally move away from a desired objective; while, on the contrary, celestial motion is such that whenever a sphere reaches an objective point [such as an apogee on an orbit], it will continue its motion by moving away from it. But, should we assume that the celestial spheres' motion is natural, it can be so only in one of two ways: (1) either the point is its objective end, and then the sphere in motion should cease once it reaches it—for we have established that things do not move naturally away from their desired objective ends once achieved; or (2) it is moving toward its objective, and then it should not return to it [for once it has passed it to eventually find a restplace it no longer moves]. Otherwise, if the objective is not reached, such will not be its orbit. [Since neither of the cases is observed] it follows that the spheres' motion, as they traverse and return, is not natural and must, therefore, be voluntary. And we know that everything that moves voluntarily is alive.

[54] Intellect is not the mover of celestial motion. This is because intellect is free from matter and form corporeal attributes; how can it then make bodies move? Furthermore, the mover, must possess the estimative faculty of creative imagination in order to gauge distances and learn, for example, that motion from *A* to *B* is not the same as motion from *B* to *C*. Therefore the mover must be able to imagine the place where something must be moved to; and the time when it is moved. Hence it [the mover] must be a soul.

حاصل باشد حرکت نکند. و هر چه حرکت کند بطبع[۳۲] طلب مکانی را، چون بدو رسد حرکت نکند، زیرا که از مطلوب بطبع نگریزد. و فلك، هر نقطه ای را که قصد آن می کند، از آن نقطه دیگر بار می گریزد. و اگر بطبع جنبد و قصد نقطه کند از دو حال بیرون نیست: یا آن نقطه مقصد اوست؛ و یا راه مقصد او. ۱– اگر چنانکه مقصد اوست، باید که چون بدو رسید نگذرد، که از مقصد نگریزد چیزی. ۲– و اگر بر راه مقصد اوست، دیگر باره باز نگردد باز آنجا. که، اگر مقصد یافت بایستد؛ و اگر نیابد،[۳۳] باید که آن[۳۴] نقطه طریق مقصد او نباشد. پس، چون می رود و باز می آید، حرکتش طبیعی نیست، پس ارادی باشد. و هر چه حرکت به ارادت کند زنده باشد.

[۵٤] و جنباننده فلك عقل نباشد؛ که عقل مجرّد است از[۳۵] اجرام و تصرّفات اجرام، پس جسم را چون جنباند؟ و نیز جنباننده ای باید که تخیّل حدود کند، که حرکت از «ج» تا به «ب» نه حرکتست از «ب» تا به «د». پس او را باید که تخیّل کند. که از کجاش می باید که جنبانید هر وقتی، پس نفس باشد.

[۳۲] N: کند – بطبع؛ T:S: کند + بطبع

[۳۳] N: نباید؛ S: نیابد

[۳٤] N: این؛ S: آن

[۳۵] N: است – از؛ S: است + از

[55] The intention of whatever moves by volition is not the same as the motion itself. This is because motion is defined as "seeking something." But the celestial spheres do not seek anything lustfully or out of anger. This is because in the spheres, there are no additional parts pertaining to growth nor things that cause disruption nor anything requiring linear motion. Nor do they have things [additional] that impede their motion in space, nor things that may destroy them on their paths. Therefore, the spheres have neither lust nor fury [attributes that cause motion in animals]. The motions of the spheres, furthermore, is not for the sake of anything obtained instantaneously. Otherwise, the spheres would cease to move; for if something is potentially existent or not, it would impede them in any case—which is not the case, since the spheres move continually and not for the benefit of a lower entity; because a lower entity is less worthy before it, for it moves continually for its sake.

It has been demonstrated in the sciences that the smallest star in the sphere of the fixed stars observed by humans is many times larger than the Earth, and that the sun is more than 160 times larger than the Earth. Imagine how enormous is the sphere that contains the sun—and the spheres beyond it, which are even larger! It has also been proven that the spheres cause the generation of motion; it is therefore clear that the spheres do not reach perfection by means of their effects. It is also clear that the spheres do not move due to mutual love and the harmony of their bodies and souls. For if it were so, the motions of all the spheres would be in accordance with just one orbit, which is not observed to be the case. Rather, the directions of their motions and their speeds are

[۵۵] و هر که حرکت کند به ارادت، غرضش «عین» حرکت نباشد، که «حرکت» طلب چیزیست. و نیز فلك طالب چیز شهوانی نیست، و یا غضبی؛ زیرا که در فلك زیادت اجزا و نموّ چیزهایی که موجب خرق و حرکت مستقیم باشد نیست، و نیز مزاحمی در مکان یا تباه کنندهای او را نیست؛ پس نه شهوت است او را و نه غضب. و حرکتش از بهر چیزی نیست که بیك دفعه حاصل شود. که اگر حاصل شدنی باشد و اگر حاصل ناشدنی – بر هر دو تقدیر – بایستادی از بهر یافت، یا از بهر نومیدی، و نه چنین است، که پیوسته می جنبد. و حرکتش از بهر منفعت سافل نیست، که سافل را پیش او آن قدر نباشد که دائم از بهر او جنبد. و برهان گفته آمد در علوم که: کوچك ترین کوکبی در «فلك ثوابت»، که در ضبط مردم آمده است، بارها چند زمین است؛ و خورشید بیش از صد و شصت بار چند زمین است تا آن فلك که خورشید دروست، با فلکهایی که بالای آن و بزرگتر از آنند، چون باشد! و نیز بیان کرده آمد که: علل حدوثِ حرکت،[۳۶] افلاکست. پس افلاك بمعلولات خویش کامل نشوند. و نیز افلاك از بهر عشق و موافقت اجرام و نفوس یکدیگر نمی جنبند؛ که اگر چنین بودی، حرکات جمله بر یك نَسَق بودی، و نه چنین است. و جهات حرکات، و سرعت، و بطوء،

[۳۶] N: حرکات؛ S: حرکت

different. Also, that the multitudes claim "a smaller thing moves faster" is wrong; because the greatest sphere, which causes all other spheres to move continuously day and night from one point to another, is the largest and fastest of all.

[56] Therefore, celestial motion occurs because of an objective that is neither body nor soul. This [object called] "beloved," is the intellect. The spheres' motion is not such that they obtain the intellect's essence, nor attribute as-it-is—because a thing's essence as-it-is cannot be gained by another. It is possible, however, that a thing obtain an attribute similar to that of another. Therefore, the soul moves the celestial spheres because of love for the intellect, whose infinite/limitless continuous lights, loves, desires, and pleasures will be gained by the soul. And the soul will bring about limitless motion because of the infinite light of its love. This is similar to when you sense pleasure or think about intelligibles; your fancy will imitate it and cause action worthy of it in your body. In a similar manner, the souls of the spheres sense pleasure and become immersed in the light of the realm of intellect, causing actions to follow.

مختلفست. نه چنانکه[۳۷] عوام گویند که: «هر چه کوچکتر است تیزتر جنبد»؛ که «فلك اعلی» که شبان روزی[۳۸] همهٔ افلاك را تحریك می کند، از نقطه ای باز بنقطه ای، بزرگتر از همه است و حرکتش تیزتر از همه است.

[۵۶] پس حرکات افلاك از بهر معشوقی و مطلوبیست که نه جسم است و نه نفس، و آن «عقل» است؛ و حرکتش نه از بهر آنست که ذات او، یا صفتی از آن او، بعینه او را حاصل شود؛ که ذات چیزی و صفات چیزی بعینه، دیگری را نشود. ولکن شبه صفت چیزی دیگری را شاید که حاصل شود.[۳۹] پس، آن نفس که فلك را می جنباند، از بهر عشق عقل می جنباند، و ازو نورها متّصل، و عشقها، و شوقها، و لذّتهای بی نهایت، بی پایان پیاپی بدو می رسد. و از نور عشق بی نهایت، حرکات بی نهایت منبعث می شود. و هم چنانکه ترا، چون لذّتی رسد، و یا در معقولات فکری کنی، خیال تو محاکات آن کند، و حرکاتی از بدن لایق آن حاصل شود. ایشان را نیز نفس لذّت می یابد، و در نور عالم عقل مستغرق می شود، و حرکات تابع آن می افتد.

[۳۷] N: نه چنانست که؛ S: نه چنانکه

[۳۸] N: شبانروز؛ S: شبان روزی

[۳۹] N: باشد؛ S: شود

[57] Also, if celestial matter remains in the same position, a potential future position will never become actualized. And if future possibility never enter a being, that being will be imperfect. Then observe that the Intellects are in an actualized state [from every perspective], and the spheres do not have potentiality in regard to their position. However, all potential positions together cannot become actualized at once. Thus, the intellect causes their positions one after another in order; this is because no one can behold [or stop from moving] simply the individuals of something but will learn of the species one by one, and in order, from the individuals.

[58] The object, or the "beloved," of all of the celestial spheres is not the same, single intellect. Otherwise, all celestial motion would be the same, which is not the case. Further, what some have said, that "the beloved of all celestial spheres is the same, single intellect, and differences in the directions of motions have been so chosen by it for the benefit of the lowest, for whom all directions are the same" is wrong. Such a statement, were it justified in that the intellect choose the direction of motion to benefit the lowest, then it would be equally justified that it move for the benefit of the lowest or that it move without direction. But the lowest does not have the rank that would necessitate motion of the intellect in this direction instead of another. Rather, just as all spheres share circular motion [although different in orbital dimension and direction], they all have the same, one "beloved," which is the Necessary Being. But, inasmuch as their motion does differ [in orbital attributes], each has a specific beloved who is in the realm of the intellect, through whose intermediation it receives the light of the Necessary Being. And, since there are multiple spheres with multiple motions, thus the

[۵۷] و نیز جرم فلك اگر بر یك وضع بماندی، آن دیگر وضع[ها] همیشه بر امکان بماندی، و امکان که در وجود نیاید ناقص است. و چون عقول، از جمله وجوه بفعل اند، و فلك نیز هیچ درو بقوّت نیست، إلاّ اوضاع و در یك حال جمع نتوانست کردن، پس بر سبیل تعاقب یکیك را بفعل می آرد. که: کسی که شخص چیزی را نگاه نتواند داشت، بتعاقب اشخاص نوعش را نگاه می دارد.

[۵۸] و معشوق جمله افلاك یك عقل نیست. که، اگر یك عقل بودی، حرکات همه مانندهٔ یکدیگر بودی، و نه چنین است. و آنچه بعضی گفته اند که: «معشوق همه یك عقلست»، و جهات حرکات از بهر نفع سافل اختیار کرد که: «او را همهٔ جهات یکی بُوَد»، خطاست. که، اگر شایستی که بجهت حرکت نفع سافل جوید، شایستی که بنفس حرکت نیز نفع سافل جستی. و سافل را آن وقعی[۴۰] نیست نزد او، که از بهر او بجنبد یا بجهتی بجنبد دون جهتی؛ بلکه، هم چنانکه همه مشارکند در حرکت دوری، همه را یك معشوق است، و آن واجب الوجود است. و هم چنانکه حرکتشان مختلفست، هر یك را معشوقی خاصّ است از عالم عقلی که نور واجب الوجود بواسطه او بستاند؛ و چنانکه افلاك و حرکات بسیارند پس عقول بسیارند. و معلوم شد که

[۴۰] N: وفع؛ S: وقعی

Intellects, too, are multiple. It has therefore been made clear that the celestial spheres have souls that have cognizance of the realm of the separate Intellects and know the universals. Therefore, their souls are free from corporeal matter and know the intelligibles. And the soul has a beloved from the noetic realm of the separate Intellects. Thus, benefit upon the lowest things, and good is continuously spread around; and grace does come down to this world as they move. So until there is light and beauty, and love and desire exist, and motion exists, the emanation of the good will last as well.

[59] Now that you have learned that "body" is not obtained from the Necessary Being, then what is obtained from it first is "intellect," just as we have said. Now, it would not be proper if only body were to be obtained from this intellect, because then the universe would be limited to that one body. But body cannot be the cause of bodies, because the thing included in a set cannot be itself the cause of the [same] set. This is because it is not possible that something cause another thing greater and more noble than itself. Furthermore, the thing included cannot itself be the cause of others also included [in the set], because this would require the included to be caused after the including. Nor that the necessity of the including thing's existence be the possibility of the existence of the included and the possibility of existence be equal to the possibility of its nonexistence, which is absurd. Even more absurd is this: from the possibility of the nonexistence of the included, the necessity of the existence of void would follow. But we have proven the impossibility of void in essence. Therefore, the including cannot be the cause of the included, nor can its existence be prior. Note that the existence of void will be

فلك «نفس» دارد، و نفس او ادراك عالم عقلی می کند و کلّیّات را می داند. پس نفسش مجرّد باشد از مادّت و مُدرِك معقولات بُوَد. و نفسش را معشوقیست از عالم عقل. و نفع سافل، و رشح خیر دائم، و نزول برکات، بر عالم تابع می افتد حرکات ایشان را، و تا این جمال و نور هست، این عشق و شوق هست، و این حرکت هست، و این فیض خیرات هست.

[٥٩] و چون بدانستی که از واجب الوجود جسم حاصل نشود، پس آنچه أوّل ازو در وجود آید عقلست، چنانکه گفتیم. و اگر ازین عقل جسم حاصل شود و بس، نشاید؛ زیرا که عالم بر آن یك جسم مقصور بماند.[٤١] و جسم نشاید که علّت جسم باشد، زیرا که محوی علّت حاوی نتواند بود، که نشاید که چیزی چیزی را ایجاد کند بزرگتر و شریفتر از خویش. و حاوی[٤٢] علّت محوی نشاید، که وجوب معلول بعد از وجوب علّت باشد. و چون حاوی علّت محوی بُوَد، وجوب محوی بعد از وجوب حاوی باشد؛ و با وجوب حاوی امکان بودن محوی بُوَد؛ و امکان بودن محوی، با امکان نابودنش بهم است. و از امکان نابودن محوی امکان خلاء لازم آید، و ما گفتیم که خلاء محالست لذاته. پس نشاید که حاوی علّت محوی باشد، و وجوبش متقدّم بُوَد بر

[٤١] N: ماند؛ S: بماند

[٤٢] N: حاوی + نیز؛ S: حاوی – نیز

necessitated if it is assumed that the including can exist with the included. Because if there is no including nor included then there will be pure, unrestricted nonexistence, and such would not be a void. Further, the soul of the including also cannot be the cause of the included, because whatever the soul does, it does so through its own body, which would require the priority of its own body over soul. But we did prove that a body cannot be the cause of bodies; therefore it follows that the soul of the included body cannot be the cause of the including body.

[**60**] It is also not possible that from the first "caused thing" the intellect appear, and after that intellect another one; such that the increasing sequence not reach bodies [i.e., that bodies not be caused]. This is because bodies are real, while the sequence of Intellects cannot have a lowerbound, in such a way that bodies be obtained from the last member of the sequence of Intellects. This is because we have proven that every celestial sphere has a beloved that is its only cause. So the situation is this: The first caused thing is (1) necessary by virtue of its own cause and (2) possible in itself. As it ponders its own necessity and its relation to its own cause, a noble thing will be obtained from it, which is another intellect. But as it ponders its own possibility and its own what-ness (quiddity), a sphere—and from it a soul—will be obtained, which is the uppermost sphere. The intellect, due to its own more noble mode, will require something noble; and the one due to its less noble mode will require something less noble. Therefore, in like manner, another intellect will be obtained from the "Second Intellect" as it ponders its own necessity; while, as it ponders its essence and possibility, the fixed

وجوب محوی. و خلاء آنگاه لازم آید، که فرض وجود حاوی کنند بی محوی؛ که اگر نه، حاوی باشد و نه محوی، و عدم بَحت بود، خلاء نباشد. و نفس حاوی نیز علّت محوی نشاید که نفس هر چه کند بتوسّط جسم خویش کند، پس تقدّم جسمش هم لازم آید. و چون بیان کرده شد که: جسم علّت جسم نباشد، لازم آید که نفس جسم حاوی علّت جسم محوی نباشد.

[۶۰] و نشاید که از معلول أوّل عقل[۴۳] پدید آید، و پس از آن عقل عقلی دیگر، چنانکه وجود به اجسام نرسد؛ که اجسام واقع اند، و نشاید که سلسلهٔ عقول تمام شود. و از «عقل بازپسین» جملهٔ اجسام حاصل شوند. که، بگفتیم که هر فلکی را معشوقی است، و نباشد إلاّ علّت او. پس صورت حال چنانست که: معلول أوّل را وجوبست بعلّت خویش، و امکان است در ذات خویش. از آن روی که تعقّل وجوب کند و نسبت خویش بعلّتش، چیزی شریف ازو حاصل شود، و آن عقلی دیگرست. و از آن روی که عقل امکان خود کند، و تعقّل ماهیّت خود، «فلکی» و «نفسی» از آن فلك حاصل شود ازو، و این «فلك اعلی» است. و عقل بجهت شریفتر اقتضای شریفتر کند، و بجهت خسیس تر اقتضای خسیس تر. و از «عقل دوم» هم چنین، به اعتبار تعقّل وجوبش بعلّت، عقلی حاصل شود، و به

[۴۳] N: عقلی؛ S: عقل

stars, together with its soul [will come into existence]. Likewise from the "Third Intellect" another intellect will be obtained as it ponders causal necessity. Likewise, from every intellect another intellect and a sphere and a soul will be obtained until the "Ninth Intellect" is reached, from which the "sphere of the moon" and its soul are obtained as the Ninth Intellect ponders self-causal possibility. As the Ninth Intellect ponders the necessity of its own cause, the "Tenth Intellect" will be achieved, which is the "Active Intellect." This Intellect is the Lord and Manager of the elemental world. Prime Matter and its forms, and our souls, are all due to it; and all the knowledge that we may obtain in ourselves are through it; and thus [our] being, is also due to this [Tenth] Intellect. It is this Intellect that brings us from potentiality to actuality. Its relation to our souls is like that of the sun to the eye.

[**61**] This Active Intellect has many effects, because celestial motion aids it. And since there are multiple "receivers" from one cause, then it is possible that there be obtained different acts [in our world]; because, for example, while the sun is one, there are various different colors that differ because of their own degree of receptiveness. This [Active] Intellect and the Intellects themselves are not given to change; because if they do change, it would be required that the Necessary Being also change, which is impossible. The knowledge of the Intellects and of the Necessary Being is not temporal. Because anything whose knowledge is temporal knows

اعتبار تعقّل ذاتش و امکانش، «فلك ثوابت» و نفس او. و از «عقل سوم» هم چنین، به اعتبار تعقّل وجوب بعلّت، عقلی حاصل شود، و به اعتبار تعقّل ذات خود و امکان او، «فلك سیّم». و هم چنین از هر عقلی، عقلی و نفسی و فلکی، حاصل شود، تا بـ «عقل نهم» رسد؛ که «فلك قمر» و نفسش ازو بحهت تعقّل امکان و ذات خویش، حاصل شود. و به اعتبار تعقّل وجوب بعلّت خود، «عقل دهم» موجود گردد، و این «عقل فعّال» است؛ که کدخدای عالم عنصریست، و «هیولای مشترك» و «صُوَر» آن و نفوس ما، جمله ازین عقل است؛ و علوم ما، که در خویشتن بدو حاصل توانیم کرد، پس وجود آن هم ازین عقلست. و او ما را از قوّت بفعل می آرد – و نسبت او با نفوس ما هم چون نسبت آفتابست با بصر.

[۶۱] و این [عقل أوّل] را معلولات بسیارست، زیرا که حرکات افلاك معاون اوست. و چون قوابل مختلف باشند، از یك فاعل شاید که فعلهای متعدّد و مختلف حاصل شود. که، آفتاب اگر چه یکیست، ازو به اختلاف قوابل، الوان متعدّد و مختلف حاصل می شود. و این عقل، و دیگر عقول متغیّر نشوند. که اگر متغیّر شوند، تغیّر ایشان مستدعی تغیّر واجب الوجود باشد، و این محالست. و علوم ایشان، و علم واجب الوجود، زمانی نَبُوَد.[۴۴]

[۴۴] N: نباشد؛ S: نبود

that it will be "something" when it is realized. So [when realized] as it *remains* pondering whether it is "knowledge," then that is the same as ignorance; and if it does *not remain* [in the state of pondering], then it will be given to change. Neither case [ignorance and change] befits the Intellects nor the Necessary Being [thus their knowledge is atemporal and unchanging]. The number [ten] is the least number of Intellects upon which [the realms] are constituted. However, there is no reason that their number not be more—and in much greater multiplicity. But their number cannot be less than ten. However, elsewhere in our books we have mentioned that their numbers are indeed very numerous. And God is the Most Knowing.

که، هر چه علم او زمانی بود، چون داند که: چیزی خواهد بود آنگه که واقع شود؛ اگر «علم» خواهد بود؛ بماند «جهل باشد»؛ و اگر نماند «متغیّر» شود – و در حقّ واجب الوجود، و عقول این محالست. و این اقلّ عددست مر عقول را، که بر آن [عقول] بر همان [افلاك و نفوس] قائم می شود. و مانعی نیست که [عقول] بیشتر ازین باشند ب«بسیاری».[۴۵] ولکن کم ازین نشاید که باشد. و یاد کردیم، در دیگر کتابها،[۴۶] که عدد ایشان سخت بسیارست. وَاللّهُ أعْلَمُ.

[۴۵] مسأله کثرت عقول از اصول أوّلیه فلسفه اشراق است؛ اکثر حکمای ایرانی آنرا برهانی دانسته و ساختار فلسفه را استوار بر کثرت می دانند. م.

[۴۶] ر.ك. کتب: «التلویحات» و«المشارع والمطارحات» و«حکمة الاشراق».

❖ Chapter Eight ❖

On the Causes of Generation ,the Good and Bad; and on Predestination and Fate

[62] Know that it is not possible that the cause of anything generated exists together with it totally [i.e., undifferentiated]. For if this were so, then the effect would always exist together with the cause [at the same time], which is not the case. Therefore, an effect must have a cause that is itself generated as a whole or as parts. This same principle applies to a generated cause, or parts of it, which itself needs a cause for its own generation. This applies to all things generated which are causes, or parts of them, and never ceases to be valid. Otherwise, for every generated entity there must be unlimited causes. But limitless numbers cannot come together all at once, because we have proven elsewhere that any ordered sequence [i.e., that has an *n*th terms] of numbers whose individuals are countable must have an upperbound. Therefore, the members of the sequence of the causes of generated entities cannot all come together at one time. And hence the observed [sequence of] causes must necessarily be continually renewed and never end at a point specified "first member." Because whatever may be termed "first" [at some given time] may later require a cause for its own generation, leading to a circular sequence [without upper and lower bounds], which is absurd.

[63] The thing that is necessarily renewed and can continue to exist is "motion." Every motion may cease, with the exception of the circular motion of celestial spheres. Also, these [observed] generated entities are not specified by a place in the cosmos [i.e., are not coordinated in space]; therefore, their causes must be motions

❖ فصل هشتم ❖

در اسباب حوادث و خیر و شرّ و قضا و قدر

[۶۲] بدان که هر چیزی که[۴۷] حادث شود علّت او نشاید که بجملگی پیوسته بوده باشد. که اگر چنین بودی، معلول نیز موجود بودی با او پیوسته، و نه چنین است. پس، او را علّتی باید حادث بجمله اجزایش، یا ببعضی. و این سخن در آن حادث که علّتست، یا جزو علّت، باز آید، و او را علّتی دیگر باید حادث. و سخن در آن علّت، و جزو علّت، هم چنین متوجّه می گردد، و هرگز منقطع نشود. پس، هر حادثی را علل لایتناهی باید، و نشاید که همه بهم جمع شوند، که ما بیان کردیم که هر [سلسلهٔ ا]عدادی مرتّب، که آحادش جمع شوند نهایتش واجب آید. پس سلسلهٔ علل حوادث بهم جمع نشوند؛ پس این علل البته مُتحدّد باشند، و هیچ منقطع نشوند ب«ابتدائی»، زیرا که آن ابتدا را دیگر بار علّت حدوث باید، و آن سخن باز آید.

[۶۳] و چیزی که تجدّد درو واجب است، و مستمرّ تواند بود، «حرکتست». و هر حرکتی منقطع شود، إلاّ دوری افلاك. و نیز این حوادث متخصّص نیست بجایی از عالم، پس علّتش حرکتی باشد مشتمل بر عالم، و آن حرکت دوریست افلاك را. و افلاك را

[۴۷] N: که + او؛ S: که – او

included in the cosmos, which are circular motions of celestial spheres. Then, when it reaches a point—Universal Will—as well as the entity's having reached the point—will serve as cause for its particular motion from that point to another. And next time the entity will reach the point because the Universal Will caused another particular will, causing it to move from that point, to yet another. Therefore Universal Will, together with the entity's reaching a point always act as causes for motion from the mentioned point and from that one to another, and so on. Here, however, there is no impossible circularity, because every particular will of an entity to reach a point depends on reaching it; [such an entity's] getting there is nevertheless not equal to the particular will but is dependent on something else similar to it. Impossible circularity occurs when a thing is dependent for its motion only on the very thing that depends on it. On the other hand, these observed motions of individual entities are causes for the generation of multiple things, as well as for aid's permanence to renew the number of individuals for a while. Here the cause for the stability is the relation of the cause with the cause of its stability. Do you not see that the duration in which the sun is over the Earth, for example, is the cause for the permanence of "day"? Gradually, and in succession, the individual, moving thing will bring you closer to the corruption of the day's cause to its generation until it is corrupted.

[**64**] Hence, individual entities are causes for the stability of the relation between generated things and their causes; and the stability of the renewal of individuals itself depends on the stable ordered succession. Therefore, individual motions move within the duration

ارادتی کلّیست مر حرکت را. و چون بنقطه ای برسد، ارادت کلّی ووصول به آن نقطه علّت شود ارادت جزوی حرکت را از آن نقطه بدیگری. و دیگر بار، وصول بدان نقطه به ارادت کلّی، علّت ارادت جزوی دیگر باشد حرکتی دیگر را از آن نقطه بدیگری. پس، ارادت کلّی پیوسته با وصول نقطه ای علّت حرکتی باشد از آن نقطه؛ و حرکت از آن نقطه علّت وصول بنقطه ای دیگر و وصول بنقطه ای دیگر، بار دیگر به ارادتی کلّی علّت ارادتی دیگر جزوی بُوَد. و این دور محال نیست، زیرا که هر ارادتی جزوی موقوفست بر وصول نقطه ای که وصول آن نقطه بعینیه موقوف نیست بر عینِ آن ارادت جزوی، بل بر غیری از امثال او. و «دور محال» آن باشد که چیزی موقوف باشد بر آنچه موقوفست برو. و این حرکات اشخاص علّت حدوث چیزهاست؛ و ثبات استمرار تجدّد اعداد مدّتی علّت ثبات نسبت حادثی باشد با علّت ثباتش. نبینی که مدّت آفتاب بر بالای زمین، ضرباً للمثل، علّت ثبات روزست؟ نرمك نرمك بتوالی اشخاص حرکات را[۴۸] از نقطه ای بنقطه ای نزدیکت می گرداند زوال علّت روزرا، تا آن وقت که زایل شود.

[۱۴] پس، آنچه علّت ثبات نسبت حادث با نسبت با علل ثبات آن اشخاص باشد، ثبات تجدّد اشخاص بر توالی ثابت بُوَد. پس،

[۴۸] N: حرکات – را؛ S: حرکات + را

of a thing's existence. Since this is the case, no one can claim that there must exist a permanent cause for a stable, generated entity—or that a generated entity is by itself related both to the cause of stability as well as to the cause of generation or that the cause of generation and stability must remain. This would require that the cause of the relation between the generated entity and the cause of its stability must also have a stable cause, and so on ad infinitum, which would mean that the multiple causes of all generated entities come together as an actual infinity [i.e., that all exist at the same time]. This is impossible because, as we have said the causes of the stability of the relation between generated entities and the causes of their stability are the time periods of celestial motion, whose individual members [such as particular members of sets] are neither stable nor permanent such that they permanently be causes for the stability of other things. This implies that a stability without duration become the cause of the durational relation between generated entities and the causes of their stability with duration. Otherwise, the observed multiple motions will not occur prior to their effects, generated in time, because motion does not remain permanently at a single point and cannot affect something after it has passed away. Rather, the priority [we are here discussing is not temporal, nor does causation accept temporal duration but] is an ideal priority in the mind. [Cause and effect] are temporally together, just as when a person holding a lamp moves and the rays of light move with him.

[**65**] Therefore, we conclude that motions are causes for generation. A thing is generated from a separate intellect in accordance with its inherent capacity. The intellect bestows entities such as accidents, forms, and individual souls upon existent generated things. Not

اشخاص حرکات در مدّت بقای چیزی آن مدّت را سیر می کنند. و چون حال چنین است، کسی نتواند گفت که: حادث ثابت را علّتِ ثابت باید. و حادث را نسبت با علّت ثبات وهم حدوث باشد، و علّت حدوث و ثباتش بباید. پس علّت ثبات نسبت حادث را با علّت ثباتش، علّت ثباتی بباید، و هم چنین [الی] بی نهایت. پس، علل ثابت بی نهابت جمع شوند، و این محالست. زیرا که ما گفتیم: علل ثبات حادثات با علل ثباتشان مدّتهای حرکات افلاکست، و اشخاص ایشان ثابت نیست تا علّت ثبات دیگر بخواهد. و ثبات بی ثباتی مدّتی علّت ثبات نسبتهای حادثات می شود با علل ثباتِشان. و این حرکات واقع نشوند پیش از آثارشان بزمان، که حرکت را بقا نیست و اثر بعد از عدم نکند؛ بلکه تقدّم دارد در عقل، و بزمان بهم باشند. هم چون کسی که می رود، و چراغی می برد، و شعاع با او می رود.

[۶۵] پس، حرکات علل حدوث اند. و بحسب هر استعدادی از «عقل مفارق» حادثی که لایق او باشد حاصل گردد، و او حوادث را وجود بخشد از اعراض و صُور و نفوس. نه از آنکه او متغیّر

that the intellect changes, but the capacities change and are different due to celestial motion. It is also possible that similar causes produce different, dissimilar effects due to the differences among the receivers. Some scholars have claimed that the generated entities cannot continue indefinitely, that infinite generation is impossible because if one thing is here and generated now, then all things are generated. This is false, because one cannot make a judgment concerning "every one" [member of a set] and apply it to "all" in all cases [at the same time]. Because, for example, we can correctly say "every human fits in a house," but we cannot say "all humans fit in a house," [if we mean by "all" the sum total of individuals, together at the same time]. Other scholars have claimed that when [at some time] each and every one of all generated things become existent, then "all" are existent, [which would lead to the impossibility of actual infinity]. But this is also a mistake because it confuses "every" with "all"; the latter taken as an actual, real collectivity; and , as we said, such objections are unnecessary. Motions do not come together to form a real, collective whole; rather, one continually becomes nonexistent at a point, while another is generated at another point. Therefore they do not have an "all" which is actual and real.

These same scholars have further claimed thus: Today is the last day of all bygone days; therefore, there is an end to the sequence of past days, and so there is also a beginning. This too is false, because today is the last day not in the sense that it is *the* last after which no other one will come; but it is *a* last after which there will be an infinite [number] to come. Just as today is the first of "post-eternity" and "past-eternity," forever has no end; it is also the last of "pre-eternity," which has no beginning. They have even further claimed

شود، بلکه قوابل و استعدادات متغیّر شوند بحرکات افلاك. و شاید که فاعل متشابه الاحوال چیزهایی کند، مختلف و نامتشابه، از بهر اختلاف قوابل. و گروهی گفتند که: «رفتن حوادث بی نهایت متصوّر نیست، از آنکه یکیك حادث شد[۴۹] پس همه حادثات باشند»، و این خطاست. زیرا که حُکم هر یك بر همه، در جمله جایها، راست نباشد. که. توانیم گفتن که: «هر یك از مردم در سرایی بگنجند»؛ [أمّا] نتوانیم گفتن که: «همهٔ مردم در سرایی گنجد». و دیگر[ان]گفتند که: «چون یکیك موجود شدند، از حرکات و حوادث، پس همه موجود شده باشند». و این نیز حُکم هر یك است بر همه، و گفتیم که لازم نیست. و حرکات با یکدیگر جمع نمی شوند، بلکه علی الولا معدوم می شوند، پس او را همه ای نیست. و نیز گفتند که: «امروز آخر همهٔ روزهای رفته است، پس روزهای گذشته را چون آخر باشد أوّل باشد»، و این خطاست. زیرا که: «امروز» آخر روزهاست، نه بدان معنی که «آخریست» که بعد ازو چیزی دیگر نباشد، بلکه آخریست که بعد ازو مالایتناهی خواهد بود. و هم چنانکه امروز أوّل اَبَدست، و اَبَد آخر ندارد، آخر اَزَلست، و اَزَل أوّل ندارد. و نیز گفتند که: «اگر حوادث أوّل ندارد، هر حادثی

[۴۹] N: حادثند؛ S: حادث شد

that if there is no "first" in the sequence of generated entities, then every generated entity depends/ends on the infinite, and whatever depends on the infinite never becomes real. This, too, is without basis, because when they say, "*x* depends on *y*," they mean that both *x* and *y* will come to exist in the future, and that one will be obtained only if the other is. But for whatever you assume as a future contingent, there will have to be a finite number of things between you and it; but nothing can end [as an upper limit] by the conceived future contingent. And should they mean by the "end" that every past event cannot exist without infinite past events, then this is absurd, not even worthy of proof.

[**66**] And that they say: We shall consider all past motions taken at once as a finite number, and once as an infinite sequence; then we will compare the two and observe that one remains incomplete, while the "added" shall increase the infinite sequence and that what is added to the finite shall remain finite. This is a false proof, because the supposition that all past ordered motions can form a set all at the same time is impossible. Whatever is argued based on an impossible supposition is itself absurd [i.e., all past events cannot exist at one time to form an actual infinity]. The proof we previously offered concerning finitude is correct when the set of numbers is ordered. However, if there be order but *not* a set, such as celestial motion, and so on; or that there be a set *without* order, such as the set of all past rational souls, then the infinite may exist [i.e., potential infinity]. This proof, however, is not applicable here because all

موقوف باشد بر مالایتناهی، و هر چه بر ما لایتناهی موقوف باشد،[N°] هرگز واقع نشود». و این نیز وجهی ندارد، که چون گویند: فلان بر بهمان موقوفست، آن خواهند که هر دو در مستقبل خواهند بود، و یکی آنگه حاصل شود که دیگری حاصل شده باشد. و هر چه تو او را در مستقبل فرض کنی، میان تو و او عددی متناهی باشد، و چیزی بر مالایتناهی، که در مستقبل خواهد بود، موقوف نشود. و اگر بدین «توقّف» آن خواهند که: هر یکی از حوادث ماضی نتواند بود، إلاّ از پس حوادثِ ما لایتناهی در ماضی؛ این محلّ‌نزاع است، حجّت را نشاید.

[۶۶] و آنچه گویند که: ما حرکات ماضی را: ۱- یکبار بی عددی متناهی بگیریم؛ و ۲- یکبار با آن عدد متناهی؛ و هر دو سلسله را بهم تطبیق کنیم، ناقص بایستد و زائد بمتناهی بیفزاید و زائد بر متناهی باشد؛ حجّتی باطلست. زیرا که: اجتماع حرکات ماضیهٔ مترتّبه و استعادت آن، فرضی محالست؛ و هر چه بر محالی بنا کنند - از آن وجه که محالست - محال باشد. و برهان نهایت که: گفتیم [نهایت] در جایی راست آید که اجتماعِ [سلسلهٔ] اعداد [دارای] ترتیب باشد. أمّا اگر ترتیب بی اجتماع بُوَد - هم چو حرکات فلك و غیر آن - یا اجتماع بی ترتیب بود - هم چون نفوس ناطقهٔ گذشتگان - بی نهایت شاید که باشد. و این برهان

[N°]: شود؛ S: باشد

motions cannot be brought together in a set, and thus there is no ordered sequence of them; souls also have no order, and thus there is no [unique] set of them.

[67] Predestination is God's unique knowledge, Praised and Exalted is He. Divine providence is the detailed elaboration of primary predestination and is the containment of individual, generated entities by the movers; and is the determination of all their states and temporal extensions, as we shall see. Evil is not something existent, but neither is the nonexistence of something nor the lack of some [other] thing's perfection. When a sixth finger is taken as an evil sign, it is because it takes away the hand's beautiful form. Because a thing that does not harm something else also does not harm itself, it thus cannot be "evil." Other things, such as snakes and scorpions, are considered evil because they cause death; for if they were not lethal they would not be called evil. Since the Necessary Being is pure good, and Its essence is the most perfect of existent entities and of the intelligibles, then only pure good is generated from It. And if there are real existent entities in which there is a degree of evil, the evil is less than the good, which, nevertheless, has caused the former's existence. The "Pure Good" is the most noble realm, which is the realm of Intellects and similar [separate, noncorporal] things. As for water and fire, it is clear that their benefit is greater than their harm, even though fire may at times burn a dervish's garment. To let go of abundant good to ward off a

در آنجا راست نیاید، زیرا که «حرکات» را اجتماع نیست، پس سلسلهٔ آن موجود نشود، و «نفوس» را ترتیب نیست، پس سلسله ندارد.

[۶۷] و «قضاء» علم وحدانی حقّ است، سبحانه و تعالی؛ و «قَدَر» تفضیل قضاء أوّلست، و احاطت محرّکات به آحاد کائنات، و ضبط جملهٔ احوال و اوقات آن بر تفضیل جزویات؛ چنانکه بگوییم. و «شرّ» چیزی نیست موجود، بلکه: یا عدمِ چیزیست؛ یا عدمِ کمال چیزی. و انگشت زائد، که شرّ گیرند، از بهر آن گیرند که هیأت حسن از دست می ببرد؛ که چیزی که غیری را زیان ندارد، خودِ را هم زیان ندارد، پس شرّ نباشد. و بعضی چیزها را که شرّ گیرند، هم چون مار و کژدم، هم به اعتبار آن گیرند که اتلاف چیزها میکنند، و اگر تفویت نکردندی شرّش نگفتندی. و چون واجب الوجود «خیر محض» است. و ذات او کاملترین موجودات و معقولاتست؛ پس ازو خیر محض موجود شود. و اگر در وجود چیزی واقع باشد که درو شرّی باشد، خیرش بیش از شرّ بُوَد، و این قسم بواسطهٔ قسم پیشین موجود شود. و [این] خیر محض «عالم اشرف» است و آن «عالم عقلست»، و مثل آن. و أمّا مانند آب و آتش، ظاهرست که نفع ایشان بیشتر از ضرّشانست. و نفع آتش را لازم افتد که گاه گاه جامه درویشی را بسوزاند. و خیر بسیار را، از بهر شرّ کوچك – بجا رها کردن،

minor evil is nothing but excessive evil. In existence, evil is not dominant. And if someone should ask, "Why did He not create this world in such a way that there be no evil?" We respond by saying that this is a false question. Such a question would be like someone asking, "Why did He not create fire and water other than the way they are?" If all of existence were pure good, then only [the noncorporal idea] would exist, and the real world would not. It is not possible that the world be more perfect than how it actually exists now.

[**68**] If someone should ask, "Since generated events are due to predestination and divine will, then why are sinners punished?" the reply would be that punishment is because of some external fault, and it is not an act of vengeance out of anger. Rather, the soul itself carries its own torment. Just as when someone is afflicted with a disease because of a prior wrong. If someone should claim that since it has been made clear that there is more good than evil, then how is it that more people give in to lust, anger, and ignorance, and are oblivious of the hereafter, and more are given to evil? [we respond thus:] Know that the ranks of people in this world are three: the highest are those possessing earthly happiness; the middle consisting of many ranks itself; and the lowest, who are afflicted with financial and bodily hardship. The former two ranks consist of more [people] than the latter, while the middle rank alone comprises the greatest number in the hereafter. There is more happiness and good than evil and hardship; and happiness is not merely one kind.

[**69**] Know that God's grace has been bestowed upon the species in accordance with the individual's capacity, and this has made possible its perfection, and has made it possible for it to [find] the

شرّی بسیار باشد. و شرّ غالب در وجود نیست. اگر کسی گوید که: «این قسم را چرا چنان نیافرید که شرّ درو نباشد؟». این سؤال او فاسد باشد، و هم چنان بُوَد که کسی گوید: «آب را چرا غیر آب نکردندی، و آتش را غیر آتش». و اگر همه خیر محض بودی، قسم أوّل شدی و قسم دوم نبودی. و وجود عالم ممکن نباشد کاملتر از آنکه حاصلست.

[٦٨] اگر کسی گوید که: «چون حوادث بقضا و قَدَرست، گناه کار را چرا عقاب کنند؟». [جواب] گویند که: «عقاب بر خطیئه، نه منتقمی، بیرونی کند از سر غضب، بلکه نفس حامل عذاب خویش است با خود. هم چنانکه کسی مبتلا شود ببیماری از بهر تهمتی سابق». اگر گویی که: «چون بیان کرده شد که خیر بیش از شرّست، چونست که بر مردم طاعت شهوات، و غضب، و جهل، و انصراف از آخرت غالبست و بیشتر شقیّ اند؟». بدانکه مراتب مردم در این عالم سه است: طرف اقصی در سعادت دنیاوی؛ و متوسّط بر مراتب بسیار؛ و سافل، که عرصه مصائب مالی و بدنی باشد. و مجموع آن هر دو قسم بیش ازین قسم است، بلکه وسط تنها بیشتر اقسامست در آخرت، حال هم چنین است. و سعادت یك نوع نیست.

[٦٩] و بدانکه عنایت الهی، هر نوعی را، وجود بر آن صفت که لایق اوست داده است، و کمال او و طریق کمال او را میّسر کرده.

path to perfection. Now that you have learned that generated events in this world come about because of the *Dator Formarum,* and it does not change, then emanation gushes forth because of the "capacity" [potentiality] of the receptacle. It is not possible that a thing generated be without capacity or be a thing that will act in its stead. An example is body in relation to soul; [body] is not a [worthy] receptacle for [soul], but in actuality it does receive it, because soul is the body's perfection, and its existence also depends on it. Furthermore, should Prime Matter be generated, then its cause would have become subject to change, and this is impossible. As we said before, a separate entity is not subject to change with respect to all modalities, otherwise its change will lead to change in the Necessary Being, which is proven an impossibility. Therefore, Prime Matter is eternal. And since it is not possible that all existent entities exist all at once—because bodies and corporeal things are finite, as demonstrated by the necessity of finitude—and since the perfections of possible things, their forms, souls and so on, are infinite; and also since should these entities be assumed to be infinite all together at once—while such is an impossible predication made of a possible thing—they would remain infinite but as nonbeing. Therefore just as the principles have infinite potentiality, created Prime Matter also has infinite potentiality. Bodies are thus generated by the Benevolence of God, Praised and Exalted be He, which forever move directed towards celestial objectives. Then infinite capacities

و چون بدانستی که درین عالم حوادث از «واهب صُوَر» حاصل می شود و او متغیّر نمی گردد، بلکه فیض از بهر استعداد قابل حاصل می شود، نتواند بود که حادثی باشد که «قابل» ندارد، و یا چیزی که در حُکم قابلی باشد. همچو بدن نفس را که قابل او نیست ولیکن در حُکم قابل است. که، نفس کمال بدن است و وجودش بر او موقوفست. پس «هیولی» حادث نشود، زیرا که او را قابلی نیست تا از بهر حدوث استعداد او، حادث گردد. اگر حادث شود، فاعلش متغیّر شده باشد، و این محالست. زیرا که گفتیم که [عقل و نفس] مفارق از جملهٔ وجوه متغیّر نشود؛ که تغیّر او برسد بتغیّر واجب الوجود، و امتناع آن بیان کرده شد. پس هیولی دائمست. و چون وجود ممکنات جمله دفعةً بیکبار محال بُوَد، زیرا که اجسام و هیولیّات متناهی اند از بهر برهان وجوب نهایت، و ممکنات را کمالات از صُوَر و نفوس و غیر آن بی نهایتست. و اگر نیز تقدیر کردندی که عدد لایتناهی واقع شدی ازینها، دفعةً، با آنکه ممتنع است بر امکان، هنوز ما لایتناهی نا موجود شده بماندی. پس هم چنانکه مبادی را قوّت فعل بی نهایت است، هیولی آفریده شد که‌قوّت انفعالی بی نهایت دارد. و اجسامی موجود گشتند از جود حقّ، سبحانه و تعالی، که از بهر غرض علوی حرکات بی نهایت می کنند، ازلاً و ابداً. و از آن استعدادات بی نهایت حاصل می شود؛ و حوادث لا یتناهی از

are obtained from the *Dator Formarum,* as are infinite generated entities. The result is that rational souls are forever obtained, century upon century. These that are perfected return to God Almighty, for if it were not for this continuous motion, nothing would be generated to begin with. For a while, souls fulfill their vicegerency on Earth, each in their turn, and absolve themselves of Prime Matter, so that others will come to exist, and they in turn will fulfill their destiny for the hereafter.

[70] Know that if even a fly's body had the capacity to receive the Rational Soul, it would obtain it from the *Dator Formarum.* Because the principles of being are not lacking in generosity; and wherever you look you will behold signs of God's Mercy and Grace. Ponder this: Were all celestial things luminous, their rays would burn the Earth, and temperate climate would cease; and were they all deprived of light, then this world would remain in darkness without life and growth. And were celestial bodies stationary, then parts of the Earth on which rays of the stars shine continuously would be destroyed, while the rest would remain deprived of light. Further, if the celestial things were always moving in one circular orbit, then the Earth would be deprived of light whenever some spheres would prevent the light of others; and thus there would be no seasons, such as summer or winter, and so on. Do you not observe that God, be He exalted, has determined specific, fast, daily motion for each celestial body, as a function of the uppermost [sphere]; which each celestial body itself moves slower in other directions, and inclines towards the south and north to bring light everywhere? Were the Earth near

واهب صُوَر پدید می آید؛ و نفوس ناطقه قرناً بعد قرن موجود می شوند. و آنچه کامل می گردد، بجناب حقّ باز می گردد. که، اگر این حرکت نبودی، هیچ حادثی نتوانستی بود. مدّتی، بعضی از نفوس، خلافت زمین بجای می آرند، و نوبت خود می دارند، و هیولی را از تصرّف خود می بردارند، تا دیگران موجود شوند وزاد آخرت خود بسازند.

[۲۰] و بدانکه اگر بدن پشه را استعداد قبول نفس ناطقه بودی، از «واهب صُوَر» او را حاصل شدی. زیرا که مبادی بخیل نیستند، و در هر چه نگاه کنی آثار رحمت و عنایت حقّ بینی. بنگر! که اگر افلاك جملهِ نورانی بودندی شعاع ایشان زمین را خرق کردی، و اعتدال باطل شدی؛ و اگر بی مورد بودندی این عالم در ظلمت بماندی، و نشو حیات درو نبودی. و اگر افلاك ثابت بودندی، بعضی از زمین، که شعاع کواکب برو[دائماً] بودی، [پس] تباه شدی و باقی بی نور بماندی. و اگر پیوسته بر یك دایره می جنبیدندی، افلاكِ ماورای آنچه در مقابله آن بودی از زمین از نور محروم ماندی، و فصول نبودی؛ هم چو تابستان و زمستان و مانند آن. و نبینی که عنایت حقّ تعالی هر یکی را از افلاك حرکتی سریع یومی، تابع حرکت جرم اعلی، تقدیر کرده است. و هر یکی از افلاك بخود حرکتی بطیء تر می کند، و میل می کند بجنوب و شمال، تا نور بجوانب برساند. و اگر زمین

the celestial sphere, it would be destroyed by its motion and the intensity of its heat. Were any element, other than fire—it being elsewhere—in the proximity of spheres, it would burn due to celestial motion, and the element would melt amid the fire.

[71] Animals require a dry substance to preserve their shapes and limbs and to control what they perceive. Therefore, they were situated in the middle [realm of being] near the dry substance. And below fire, they placed an element befitting it, such as air; and coldness, which befits them near Earth, is like water. There is a relation between water and air with regard to humidity; and water, since it inclines towards the center of Earth, will not rise above from it. To animals, who need to breathe, the Grace of God is complete [because of the element air]. Ponder how God has bestowed elemental, harmonious and moving heat, and binding cold, and harmonious humidity capable of taking form, and dryness that preserves their form and longevity, so that through them the elemental existence is completed. "The work of God who perfecteth all things."[3] The marvels of Heaven and Earth are more than can be mentioned [i.e., enumerated].

[72] Know that there are three Realms of existence: (1) The Realm of Intellect; which consists of noncorporal essences free from matter and extension in every way—this realm is also called the "Realm of Power" and the "Great Heaven"; (2) the Realm of Soul which

[3] al-Qur'an: xxvii, 88.

نزدیك فلك بودی، از حركت فلك و شدّت حرارت تباه شدی. و اگر جز از آتش بنزدیك فلك بودی و آتش جای دیگر، حركت فلك او را آتش كردی، و در میان دو آتش عناصر بجوشیدندی.

[۷۱] و چون حیوانات را بگوهرِ یابس حاجت بُوَد – از بهر حفظ شكل و هیأت اعضا و ظبط صور و ادراكات – ایشان را در وسط، نزدیك گوهر یابس ایجاد كردند، و در زیر آتش چیزی نهادند كه مناسب او بُوَد در حرارت، چون «هوا»؛ و نزدیك زمین چیزی كه مناسب او بُوَد در برودت، هم چو «آب». و آب و هوا را مناسبت است در رطوبت. و آب، چون موجب مركز بُوَد در زمین، از گرد زمین در نیاید. و عنایت حقّ تعالی تمام شد در حقّ حیواناتی كه بدم زدن محتاج بودند. و بنگر كه عنصریات را؛ چون حرارت، محلّلِ ملّطف و[۵۱] محرّك بداد، و برودتی مسكّن [و] عاقد، و رطوبتی مرافق – قابل تشكّل – و یبوستی حافظ شكل و تقویم، تا بدان وجود «موالید» تمام شد. «صُنعَ اللّهُ الّذی أتْقَنَ كلَّ شَیءٍ».[۵۲] و عجایب مُلك و مَلكوت بیش از آنست كه بتوان گفت.

[۷۲] و بدانكه عوالم سه است: ۱– عالم عقل؛ و آن ذواتی اند مجرّد از مادّت و جهت از جمله وجوه، و آن را «عالم جبروت»

[۵۱] N: ملطف – و؛ S: ملطف + و

[۵۲] القران المجید: سورة النمل (۲۷)، الآیة ۹۰

comprises essences free from matter but take matter upon themselves—this realm is called the "Lesser Heaven"; and (3) the Realm of Matter, which is called the "Realm of Earthly Dominion." The latter is itself divided in two: the aetherial realm, which consists of the celestial beings; and the elemental realm. The elemental realm cannot be measured against the celestial heavens. Celestial beings are under the control of the souls, who are controlled by the Intellects, who are controlled by the First-Caused Thing, which in turn is controlled by Light and Glory of God, Exalted be His Power.

خوانند و «ملکوت بزرگ»؛ و ۲- عالم نفس؛ وآن ذواتی اند مجرّد از مادّت. ولیکن متصرّف باشند در مادّت، و آن را «ملکوت کوچك» خوانند؛ و ۳- عالم جرم است؛ و آن را «عالم مُلك» خوانند. و آن نیز بر دو قسم است: ۱- عالم اثیرست؛ و آن افلاکند. و ۲- عالم عنصریاتست. و عالم عنصریات در جنب افلاك قدری ندارد. و افلاك در قهر نفوس منطوی اند، و نفوس در قهر عقل، و عقول در قهر معلول أوّل، و معلول أوّل در قهر نور و عزّت بار[ی]، خدای عزّ سلطانه.

❖ Chapter Nine ❖

On the Immortality of the Soul; Happiness and Insolence, and Similar Things

[73] Know that the soul is immortal; it cannot be conceived annihilated. This is because its cause, the Active Intellect, is eternal; therefore what is caused by it will be permanent, too. The soul is not something naturally imprinted in a place, such that if the place takes a different shape this would destroy it; then the capacity of existence would be nullified in the soul, too. An example is the heating of water: when it becomes very hot it is transformed into air. And since the soul does not have a place, but is a substance by which bodies are distinguished, then its nonexistence does not come about by the annihilation of another bodily substance. In short, what distinguishes life from death is the ceasing of attachment [between substance and its body]. "Attachment" is a relative added accident, and the abolishing of relations [and added attributes] does not necessitate the abolishing of substance. Thus, substance continues as [long as] its cause continues. Although the body's potential is such that it requires the soul [in order to exist], the soul is not aborted once the body is aborted. Take, for example, a carpenter, who is only a distinguishing substance for the table [he makes], then although he may die, that table still remains. The Intellects never cease to exist, because they do not have a carrier, nor are they [essentially] attached to a carrier other than their own cause, which emanated them: the Necessary Being, which is eternal. Therefore, the Realm of Intellect is eternal with It and depends only on It. The separate entities never die. This is because their

❖ فصل نهم ❖

در بقای نفس و سعادت و شقاوت و مانند آن

[۷۳] بدانکه نفس باقیست، برو فنا متصوّر نشود، زیرا که علّت او، که «عقل فعّال» است، دائمست؛ پس معلول بدوام او دائم ماند. و چیزی نیست منطبع در محلّی، تا آن محلّ‌را هیأتی دیگر حاصل شود که او را باطل کند، تا استعداد بودن آن درو زایل گردد. هم چو گرم شدن آب، که چون سخت گرم شود، صورت آبی را باطل گرداند و استدعای حصول صورت هوایی کند. و چون نفس محلّ ندارد، و جوهری مباین است اجسام را، از بطلان جوهری دیگر، [آن هم] مباین، عدم او لازم نیاید. و فی الجمله، بمیان مرگ و زندگانی فرق کننده قطع علاقه است. و «علاقه» عَرَضیست اضافی، و از بطلان اضافات بطلان جوهری لازم نیاید، پس ببقای علّت دائم ماند. و استعداد، بدن اگر چه مستدعی نفس است، واجب نگردد ببطلانش بطلان نفس. که، درودگر[۳°] چون جوهری مباین است کرسی را، از عدم او عدم کرسی لازم نیاید. و عقول هرگز باطل نشوند؛ زیرا که ایشان را حاملی، و تعلّقی با حاملی نیست، و بجز بر علّت فیّاض خویش موقوف نیستند. و واجب الوجود دائمست، پس عالم عقلی بوجود او دائم باشد، که بر غیر او موقوف نیست. و مفارق نمیرد، که حیات مفارقات از بهر سببی

[۳°] N: درودگر؛ S: دروگر

existence does not depend on an external cause, that they may be corrupted and perish. Rather, the Intellects are self-conscious because they are absolved of matter. Their self-consciousness is their life and essential to them; therefore, they do not perish [i.e., become nonexistent]. The master Plato has said the same thing concerning the soul—that it gives life to things. And whatever is attributed as "giver of life," its own life is self-constituted by its own essence. Thus, the soul will never accept anything that is contrary to its essential existence and necessary to its whatness [i.e., quiddity].

[74] Know that a group from among the multitude think that happiness and pleasure are nothing but copulation, eating, drinking, and the like. Such people regard the angels and the cherubim as villainous; and they think that the state of the four-legged animals, who possess the pleasures mentioned, are better than the angels and that of the Heavenly beings.

[75] Know that "pleasure" is attaining perfection and good of something and cognizance of it—when no obstacle bars the cognizance. "Pain" is the appearance of evil and malady by something of which one is cognizant—when no obstacle bars the cognizance. It is possible that something pleasurable appear but no pleasure be obtained, due to an obstacle—as when someone whose stomach is diseased or full is repulsed by delicious food; but once the obstacle is removed, the pleasure is attained. It is likewise possible that something painful arrive without resulting in pain due to an obstacle.

بیرونی نیست تا زایل شود،؛ بلکه ادراك ذات خویش از بهر تجرّد از مادّت کنند، که حیات ایشانست و بذات ایشان واجب است ایشان را، پس زایل نشود. هم چنانکه خواجهٔ حکمت، افلاطون گفت در [بارهٔ] نفس که: «او دهندهٔ حیاتست چیزها را». و هر چه خاصیّت او «دادن زندگی» باشد، زندگی او بذات خویش باشد، پس هرگز ضدّ آنچه، مقتضی ذات و لازم ماهیّت اوست، قبول نکند.

[۷٤] و بدانکه جماعتی از عوام پندارند که: سعادت و لذّت جز وِقاع، واکْل، و شُرب، و مثل آن نیست. و پیش ایشان فریشتگان و کرّوبیان شقیّ اند؛ و حالِ چهار پایان، که این جمله لذّت دارند، بهتر از حال فرشتگان و مقرّبان ملای اعلی است.

[۷۵] و بدانکه «لذّت» رسیدن کمال و خیر چیزیست بدو، و ادراك کردن آن از آن روی که چنین است، چون مانعی و عایقی نباشد. و «الم» رسیدن شرّ و آفت چیزیست بدو، و ادراك کردن آن از آن روی که چنین است، چون مانعی و عایقی نباشد. و چیز لذیذ باشد که برسد و از آن لذّتی حاصل نشود، از بهر مانعی. هم چون کسی که معدهٔ او علیل[٥٤] باشد یا ممتلی بُوَد از طعام لذیذ متنفر شود، و چون این مانع برخیزد از آن چیز لذیذ لذّت یابد. و چیز الم کننده باشد که برسد و از آن المی حاصل نشود، از بهر

[٥٤] N: معلول؛ S: علیل

Just as when someone who suffers from numbness will not feel pain when struck; but when the numbness goes away, he will then feel pain.

[76] There are pains and pleasures for each of the human faculties. Sight feels pleasure by seeing things soft and is pained by seeing things coarse. Smell finds pleasure by smelling things that have good scent, and is pained by smelling foul odors. Hearing feels pleasure by the sound of beautiful voices and is pained by course sounds. The faculty of desire finds pleasure in the fulfillment of passion; anger is fulfilled by revenge that causes pain to the person with whom one is angry. The pleasure and pain of each faculty are not known to the other faculties: for instance, smell does not find pleasure in good-tasting food and is not pained by foul stuff. The perfection and pleasure of the soul is in receiving being from the cause of causes of things and is also known from the Intellects, souls, celestial beings and the elemental—in that order. When the soul, after separation from the body, is imprinted with the intelligibles, it then will partake of the intellectual realm and become actualized as an intellect in every way.

[77] The perfection of the practical intellect is that it controls the body and its acts—not its potentialities—and obtains the nature of justice. Justice is virtue, bravery and, wisdom. Virtue provides sound

مانعی. هم چو کسی را که خَدری بُوَد و او را زنند خبر ندارد و دردش نکند، و چون آن خَدر زایل شود آن را در یابد و دردش کند.

[۷۶] و هر قوّتی را از قوای مردم لذّتیست و المی. لذّت بصر در دیدن چیزهای ملایمست. و المش در دیدن چیزهای ناملایم؛ و لذّت شمّ در بوییدن چیزهای خوش بویست، و المش در بوییدن چیزهای گزنده؛ و لذّت سمع در شنیدن آوازهای خوش است، و المش در شنیدن آوازهای نا ملایم؛ و لذّت قوّت شهوانی در قضای شهوت است؛ و لذّت قوّت غضبی انتقام است، تا رنجها بکسی رسد که برو خشم دارد. لذّتِ والمِ هر یکی ازین قوی دیگری ازو غافل باشد؛ چنانکه شمّ نه از طعم خوش لذّت یابد و نه از طعم ناخوش، از آن روی که طعمی نا خوشست، متألم شود. و کمال و لذّت روان دریافت وجودست از مُسبّبُ الاسباب و عقول و نفوس و سماویّات و عنصریّات بر ترتیب، تا چون منتقش شود بمعقولات، بعد از مفارقت، عالم عقلی گردد بفعل، از جمله وجوه.

[۷۷] و از جهت عقل عملی، کمالش آنست که او را بر بدن هیأت استعلائی باشد نه هیأت انفعالی از بدن، و خُلق عدالت او را حاصل شود. و «عدالت»: «عفّت» است و «شجاعت» و «حکمت». و عفّت توسّط قوای شهوانیست، در آنچه مشتهی

opinion to distinguish the good from the bad. Virtue is despised by two things: numbness/torpor and lust. Bravery is due to the faculty of anger, when sound opinion distinguishes between things that make one angry and those that do not. It is disdained by two natures: impetuosity and cowardice. Wisdom is the activity of the practical intellect, when sound opinion distinguishes between what is the nature of good and bad management in life, and it is disdained in two natures: cowardice and foolishness. This type of wisdom is not that in which [the mind] is imprinted with truths and with intelligibles; [the former] is the speculative, and it is best that one have it [the truths] more than the latter.

[78] And when these three faculties are harmonious, the individual obtains full virtue. All virtuous acts—as well as base ones—and goodness and evil, are results of these faculties. In short, human perfection free from matter to the greatest extent possible. And when the good natures and sciences are obtained by the soul, it will obtain pleasure upon separation from body such that cannot be described. Just as the Messenger of God, peace be upon him, has said of God, be He exalted: "I shall aid my righteous servants in a way no eye has seen, nor ear has heard, nor has been perceived by any human heart."[4]

[79] Now that you know that the pleasure associated with each faculty depends on the degree of the faculty's perfection and experience, [you should further know that] the relations of intellectual pleasures to the pleasures of the senses is like the relation

[4] Prophetic Tradition, in al-Bukhāri, *al-Ṣaḥīḥ: Bad' al-Khalq:* viii.

باشد و نا مشتهی، بحسب رأی صحیح. و عفّت در میان دو چیز مذمومست: و آن «خمود» است و «شبق». و شجاعت توسّط قوّت غضبی است، در آنچه ازو خشم گیرند و نگیرند، بر نسق رأی درست؛ و آن در میان دو خُلق مذموم است چون «تهوّر» و «بددلی». و حکمت توسّط استعمال علم و عقل عملی است، در آنچه تدبیر زندگانی کنند و نکنند، بحسب رأی درست؛ و آن در میان دو حالت مذمومست: چون «گربزی» و «بلاهت». و این حکمت، نه آن حکمتست که انتقاش باشد بحقایق و معقولات، که آن چندانکه زیادت بُوَد بهتر باشد.

[۷۸] و چون این سه قوّت متوسّط شدند، ملکهٔ فاضله حاصل شد، و جمله فضائل و رذایل از اصلاح و افساد این قوّت می خیزد. و فی الجمله کمال مردمی در تجرّدست از مادّت، بقدر طاقت و تشبّه بمبادی. وچون این ملکاتِ اخلاق و علوم او را حاصل شود، بعد از مفارقت لذّتی یابد که آن را وصف نتوان کرد، چنانکه رسول، ﷺ، گفت که از حقّ تعالی خبر دهد: «أعْدَدْتُ لِعبادِی الصّالحینَ مَا لا عَیْنٌ رَأَتْ وَ لا أُذْنٌ سَمِعَتْ وَ لا خَطرَ عَلی قَلْبِ بَشَرٍ».[۵۵]

[۷۹] و چون بدانستی که لذّت هر قوّتی بر قدر کمال و دریافت اوست، پس نسبت لذّات عقلی با لذّات حسّی هم چو نسبت

[۵۵] حدیث منقول در «صحیح بخاری»، بدءالخلق: الباب الثامن

of mental experience [to that of sensation]. That is, mental experience of the Necessary Being and of the realm of intellect and souls, and so on, [cannot be compared to] the experience of eating, for example, and all other base experiences [of the senses]. Mental perception is much stronger than senseperception, because the senses only experience the external dimensions of things, while the mind experiences the external as well as the inner [dimension] of things, and more. This is because there are infinite objects for mental cognition, while the senses only perceive a limited number of things. Further, mental experience is more noble relative to what is the "nearest" [entity] and is more necessary; because the senses do perish, but the soul does not. Therefore, there are relative degrees of experience in terms of the mind's experience, as subject, of the object and of experience per se in relation to senseperception; and the pleasures of the mind are much [more noble] than those related to sensation.

[80] If in this world we do not find pleasure from the Realm of Intellects and do not become pained by experiencing ignorance and base things, it is because we are intoxicated by the realm of nature and unaware of our realm of "self." But when the obstacles [of the preoccupation with the senses] are removed, then the subject who does possess a degree of perfection will experience infinite pleasure as he beholds the Necessary Being, the High Heavens, and the amazing things of the Realm of Lights. [Upon obtaining] such an experience, the subject will forever remain with that experienced pleasure: "Firmly established in favor of a Mighty Being."[5] Then the subject will become a luminous intellect, will join the routes of

[5] al-Qur'an: liv, 55

دریافته عقلست – چون واجب الوجود، و عالم عقل، و نفس، و غیر آن – با طعوم و از آنچه خسیس است. و ادراكِ عقل قوی ترست از ادراكِ حسّ، زیرا که حسّ ظواهر چیزها را دریابد و بس، و عقل ظاهر و باطن چیزها را در یابد و بیشترست؛ زیرا که عقل را مدرِکات بی نهایت است، و حسّ [تنها] چیزهای متناهی را دریابد؛ و شریفترست بما لا یتقارب و لازم ترست، زیرا که حسّ تباه شود، و نفس تباه نشود. پس، بر قدر نسبت، «دریابنده» و «دریافته» و «دریافتن» عقلست با دریابنده و دریافته و دریافتنِ حسّ، و نسبت باشد میان لذّت این و آن.

[۸۰] و اگر ما درین عالم معقولات لذّتی نیابیم و از رذایل و جهل دردناك نشویم، از آن باشد که سُکر عالم طبیعت بر ما غالبست، و از عالم خویش مشغولیم. و چون این شواغل برخیزد، آن کس که کمال دارد لذّتی یابد بی نهایت بمشاهدت واجب الوجود، و ملای اعلی، و عجایب عالم نور، و دائم در آن لذّت بماند «فِی مَقْعَدِ صِدْقٍ عِنْدَ مَلیكٍ مُقْتَدِرٍ»،[۵۶] و عقلی شود نورانی

[۵۶] القرآن المجید: سورة القمر (٤٥)، الآیة ٥٥

the Heavenly Angels, and will no longer remember this filthy "earthly body"—disdaining to even look at it. "When thou seest, thou wilt see there bliss and high estate."[6] Then God, be He exalted, will bestow a divine, spiritual "pure drink" upon the subject, just as He said: "Their Lord will slake their thirst with a pure drink."[7] Such groups of people will be freed from the death of earthly bondage and delivered from darkness, and will join the headwaters of life and the seas of real, spiritual light, because "they have their reward and their light."[8] Elsewhere, He said: "Their light will run before them and on their right hands."[9] Thus, the evil weight of body will fall away from them. Real life is in the "other realm," just as the Speaker of Truth hath proclaimed: "Lo! The home of the Hereafter—that is life, if they but knew."[10]

[81] While this is the greatest kind of pleasure, it is not experienced by someone who does not have a "taste" for the [intuitive experiential mode]. Such a person is like an impotent man who cannot experience the pleasure of intercourse as it is. A group of enlightened philosophers and those absolved of the shackles of bodily sensation, who have power of vision, may even experience this intellectual pleasure in this world. They will become preoccupied with it, will behold clearly the light of the High Heavens, and will become immersed in it, and will experience ever greater pleasures. "Is he whose bosom God hath expanded for the Surrender [unto Him],

[6] al-Qur'an: lxxvi, 20

[7] al-Qur'an: lxxvi, 21

[8] al-Qur'an: lvii, 19

[9] al-Qur'an: lxvi, 8

[10] al-Qur'an: xxix, 64.

و از جمله فریشتگان مقرّب شود، و هرگز این خاکدان پلیدرا یاد نیارد و از نگریستن بدو ننگ دارد، «وَإِذا رَأَیتَ ثُمَّ رَأَیْتَ نَعِیماً وَ مُلْکاً کَبِیراً».[۵۷] و حقّ تعالی از انوار جلال خویش او را شربتها دهد روحانی، چنانکه گفت: «وَ سَقیهِمْ رَبُّهُمْ شَراباً طهوراً».[۵۸] و این طایفه از مرگ شواغل طبیعت برهند، و از ظلمات بیرون شوند، و بسر چشمه زندگی و دریاهای نور حقیقی روحانی پیوندند که «لَهُمْ أَجْرُهُمْ وَنُورُهُمْ».[۵۹] و جای دیگر گفت: «نُورُهم یَسْعَی بَیْنَ أَیْدیهِمْ وَبِأَیمانِهِمْ».[۶۰] و بارِ خبث بدن ازیشان فرو افتد، و زندگی حقیقی در آن عالم است. چنانکه قائل حقّ گفت: «وَ إِنّ الدّارَ الآخِرَةَ لَهِیَ الحَیَوانُ لَوْ کَانُوا یَعْلَمونَ».[۶۱]

[۸۱] و این لذّت اگر چه هر چه عظیمترست، ولکن کسی که ذوق ندارد از هم چنین که عنین باشد که لذّت جماع آنچنانکه هست در نیابد. و جماعتی از حکیمان روشن روان و مجرّدان صاحب بصیرت ازین لذّت درین عالم نصیب یابند، و بدان ازین جهان مشغول گردند و نور عالم اعلی را صریح بینند و در نور غریق شوند و در آن خوشیها یابند هر چه عظیمتر، «أَفَمَنْ شَرَحَ

[۵۷] القرآن المجید: سورة الدّهر (۷٦)، الآیة ۲۰

[۵۸] القرآن المجید: سورة، الّدهر (۷٦) الآیة ۳۱

[۵۹] القرآن المجید: سورة الحدید (۵۷) الآیة ۲۸.

[۶۰] القرآن المجید: سورة التحریم (٦٦) الآیة ۸

[۶۱] القرآن المجید: سورة العنکبوت (۲۹) الآیة ٦٤

so that he followeth a light from his Lord."[11] [Here is a] poem:

> There were those, I cannot mention
>
> Thought to be good, never asking of a "news."[12]

While the pleasure these sages experience after their souls are separated from the body cannot be measured in any way against the pleasure they experience in this world, what they do experience here is more than, or at best equal to, what others experience in the Hereafter.

[**82**] As for those people who remain in absolute ignorance, because they do not know the Truth and believe in the opposite, unto them will be the greatest torment. They will never obtain freedom because their minds and senses are blocked; they are not aware of the realm of light, and darkness has penetrated their being. "Whosoever is blind here will be blind in the Hereafter, and get further from the road."[13] Just as He said: "It will be said: Go back and seek light"[14] —when, since faculties were closed, these people remained dumb, blind, and crippled, drawn to the natural world of desiring bodily pleasures, staying away from what He said: "And a gulf is set between them and that which they desire."[15] They were barred from the Necessary Being, as He said: "Nay, but surely on that day they will be covered from the [mercy] of their Lord,"[16] and [remain] a dark

[11] al-Qur'an:xxxix, 22

[12] Poem attributed to Abdullah bin al-Mu'tazz

[13] al-Qur'an: xvii, 72

[14] al-Qur'an: lvii, 13

[15] al-Qur'an: xxxiv, 54

[16] al-Qur'an: lxxxiii, 15

اللّهُ صَدْرَهُ لِلاسْلام فَهُوَ عَلى نُورٍ مِنْ رَبّه».[۶۲] شعر:

وكان ما كانَ مِمّا لَسْتُ أَذْكُرُه وَظُنّ خَيْراً وَلا تَسْأَلْ عَنِ الخَبَرِ[۶۳]

اگر چه آن لذّت که بعد از مفارقت ایشان دریابند نسبتی ندارد با آنچه اینجا می یابند، ولکن آنچه ایشان درین عالم دریابند بیش ازآن باشد یا مساوی آن بود که دیگران در آخرت بدان رسند.

[۸۲] و أمّا آن کسانی که ایشان را جهل مرکّب باشد، و آن آنست که حقّ را ندانند و نقیض حقّ اعتقاد کنند، ایشان را عذابی باشد که از آن سخت تر نَبُوَد، و هرگز خلاص نیابند. زیرا که فکرت و حواسّ ازیشان بستدند، و با عالم نور آشنایی ندارند و ظلمات در ایشان راسخ است؛ «وَمَنْ كَانَ فِي هذِهِ أَعْمى فَهُوَ فِي الآخِرَةِ أَعْمَى وَأَضَلُّ سَبيلاً»؛[۶۴] و چنانکه گفت: «قِيلَ ارْجِعوا وَراءَكُمْ فَالْتَمِسُوا نُوراً».[۶۵] و ایشان را چون قوّتها بستدند، کر و کور و لنگ بماندند و انجذاب با عالم طبیعت و شوق با لذّات جسمانی و دوری از آن؛ چنانکه گفت: «وَحيلَ بَيْنَهُمْ وَبَيْنَ مَا يَشْتَهونَ»،[۶۶] و حجاب از واجب الوجود، چنانکه گفت: «كَلاّ أَنَّهُمْ عَنْ رَبِّهِمْ يُوْمئِذٍ لَمَحْجُوبونَ»؛[۶۷] و هیأت ظلمانی، چنانکه

[۶۲] القرآن المجید: سورة الزمر (۳۹) الآیة ۲۳

[۶۳] بیت از عبد الله بن المعتز، «دیوان»، (بیروت، ۱۳۳۱ ه.ق.)، ص ٤

[۶٤] القرآن المجید: سورة الاسراء (۱۷) الآیة ۷٤

[۶۵] القرآن المجید: سورة الحدید (۵۷) الآیة ۱۳

[۶۶] القرآن المجید: سورة سباء (۳٤) الآیة ۵۳

form, as He said:"Nay, but that which they have earned is rust upon their hearts."[17] Of all of these three, they will receive pain such that cannot be described, and "falling threefold"[18] is an indication of these three types of punishment. As for those who are "knowing" but who have not cleansed their nature, they will find a great punishment, which pulls their knowledge to the High Heavens and draws their faults to the lowest realm. They will be in pain for a while but will eventually find salvation.

[83] As for the souls of fools and the righteous who have not transgressed nor have done wrong, they will find salvation and will become attached to the celestial bodies because of the natural inclination of souls for those bodies. There they will behold beautiful forms: for them, "Therein are all that souls desire and eyes find sweet."[19] Whatever they desire will appear before them. What they sense in the Hereafter shall be more noble and better than what they find here, because what the subject is has no relation to what is there. The Lawgiver said: "Most of those who dwell in Paradise are left alone and are elevated to the threshholds of Heaven." And they shall find morsels from divine pleasure, just as it is said in the Glorious Book: "And mixed with the Water of Tasnim, a spring

[17] al-Qur'an: lxxxiii,14

[18] al-Qur'an: lxxvii, 30

[19] al-Qur'an: xliii, 71

گفت: «کلاّ بَلْ رانَ عَلی قُلوبِهِمْ مَا کَانوُا یَکْسَبوُنَ»،[۶۸] ازین هر سه رنجها رسد ایشان را که وصف نتوان کرد که: «ذِی ثَلاثِ شَعَبٍ»،[۶۹] اشارت به این سه گانه است. أمّا آن کسانی که عالم باشند، ولکن اصلاح اخلاقی نکرده باشند، ایشان عذابی سخت یابند. که، «علم» ایشان را بعالم نور و ملای اعلی می کشد؛ و «فسق» ایشان را بظلمات و اسفل السالفین، مدّتی بمانند و بعاقبت خلاص یابند.

[۸۳] أمّا نفوس ابلهان و صالحان، که بعصیان باطل و جهل مضارّ با ایشان نباشد، خلاص یابند و علاقهٔ ایشان با جسمی سماوی پدید آید بحُکم مناسبت نفوس واُلف این نفوس باجسام و غفلتش از مفارق. و در آنجا صورت های خوب بینند «وَلَهُمْ مِنْها تَشْتَهی الانْفُسُ وَتَلَذُّ الاعْیُنُ».[۷۰] و هر چه ایشان را آرزو کنند همه شان حاصل شود. و آن صُوَر محسوسات که ایشان آنجا بینند شریفتر و خوبتر از صُوَر این عالم باشد. که، حامل این در صفا و لطف نسبت ندارد با حامل آن. و شارع گفت: «اکْثَرُ اهْلِ الجَنّةِ البُلْه وَعلّیون لذَوِی الالْبابِ».[۷۰] و ایشان را از لذّت روحانی نواله هم رسد، چنانکه در مصحف مجیدست: «وَمِزاجُهُ مِنْ تَسْنیمٍ، عَیْناً

[۶۷] القرآن المجید: سورة المطففین (۸۳) الآیة ۱۵

[۶۸] القرآن المجید: سورة المطففین (۸۳) الآیة ۱۴

[۶۹] القرآن المجید: سورة المرسلات (۷۷) الآیة ۳۰

[۷۰] حدیث در *فیض القدیر* مناوی (قاهره، ۱۳۵۶)، ج ۲، ص ۹۷ آمده

whence those brought God drink."[20] This is an indication that the drink of the holy is of Tasnim, which is a spring from which those brought near God do drink, from which the souls of the happy are nourished. Every soul that is separated from the body will obtain its allotment from the Realm of Power; and from it, light will shine upon the separate souls who will find pleasure therein. And infinite lights will shine upon it, just as when mirrors are brought to face each other. The evil ones will find pain in darkness and in each other's company. The one before will find pain from the one after, and viceversa.

[**84**] Now that it has been made known that true pleasure lies in obtaining perfection and perceiving it, [you should know further] that nothing is more complete than the Necessary Being, who is the Greatest Knower, as well as the Known. Experiencing It is the greatest of all. Thus, the pleasure of experiencing It is the greatest pleasure of all and cannot be measured against anything else. "Love" is passion for conceiving an essence's presence; "Desire" is the soul's movement toward completing that passion. The desiring subject has partial experience that, when completed, will cause the desire to end. Therefore, the Necessary Being loves only Its own essence, and is the object of Its own love as well as the object of the love of others. Next in rank is the pleasure [experienced] by Intellects who, however, have no "desire," because they are free of potentiality and are permanently actualized; next in rank is the love and pleasure of souls themselves according to rank.

[20] al-Qur'an: lxxxiii, 28

يَشْرَبُ بِها الْمُقَرَّبُونَ»،[۷۱] اشارت برآنست که شراب ابرار را مزاج از تسنیم باشد، و آن چشمه ای است که مقرّبان از آن آشامند، و نفوس سُعدا بیکدیگر متلذّذ شوند. و هر نفسی که مفارق شود از بدن نصیب خویش از نور جبروت بستاند، و ازو بر نفوس مفارقات نور افتد و بدو لذّت یابند، و از نفوس نورهای بی نهایت برو منعکس شود هم چو آیینه های روشن که مقابل شوند. و اشقیا بظلمات و مجاورت یکدیگر الم یابند و سابق از لاحق دردناك شود و لاحق از سابق.

[۸٤] و چون معلوم شد که لذّت وصول کمالست و ادراك آن، پس هیچ چیز کاملتر از واجِب الوجود نیست، و او عظیمترین دریافته و دریابنده است. و دریافت او عظیمتر از همهٔ دریافتهاست، پس لذّت و بهجت او عظیمتر از همهٔ لذّتها باشد و نسبت ندارد هیچ با آن. و «عشق»، ابتهاج است بتصوُر حضور ذاتی؛ و «شوق»، حرکت نفس است بتتمیم آن بهجت. و «مشتاق»، چیزی یافته باشد و چیزی نیافته، چون تمام بیابد شوقش باطل شود. پس واجب الوجود عاشق ذات خویش است و بس، و معشوق ذات خویش و آنِ دیگران. و بعد از لذّت او لذّت عقولست، و ایشان را شوق نباشد که ایشان بفعل اند و هیچ در ایشان بقوّت نیست. پس از آن عشق و لذّت نفوس است بر

[۷۱] القرآن المجید: سورة المطففین (۸۳) الآیة ۲۷ و ۲۸

[85] Know that metempsychosis is impossible, as agreed by all of the Peripatetic philosophers. This is because when the body's natural disposition is complete, it then requires a soul; and should another soul belonging to a different animal be obtained by it at this time, then the result would be that a single animal possess two souls. But every subject experiences only one soul in its self and does not know itself more than as a single essence. Also, it is not necessary that the time of one entity's generation coincide with the time of the corruption of another so that the generated and corrupted entities correspond in number. Metempsychosis is the worst of beliefs and is absolute nonsense.

مراتب.

[۸۵] و بدانکه تناسخ محالست به اتفاق علماء مشّائین، که چون مزاج تمام شود از واهب صُوَر استدعای نفسی کند، و نفس دیگر از آنِ حیوانی اگر بدو تعلّق گیرد یك حیوان را دو نفس باشد، و هر کسی در خویش جز یك نفس نمی بیند، و خود را یك ذات بیش نمی داند. و نیز واجب نیست که وقت «کُون» یکی وقت «فساد» دیگری باشد و کائنات و فاسدات را اعداد با یکدیگر راست آید، و این بدترین مذاهب و حشو مطلق بُوَد.

❖ Chapter Ten ❖

On Prophecy, Miracles, Miraculous Powers, Dreams, and Similar Phenomena

[86] Know that since each and every human cannot accomplish all of their important affairs; and people are necessarily in need of trade, retaliation, and marriage; and some people cannot avoid [contact] with others, thus there must exist an obeyed law and codified canons. Therefore, a Lawgiver is necessary in every time for every nation—a Lawgiver who would be virtuous, aware of truths, and aided by the divine realm of light and power. Such a Lawgiver must be capable of performing acts others are incapable of; otherwise, they would not heed his words and would molest and thwart him. The [extraordinary] deeds of the Lawgiver would signify the truthfulness of his words and indicate that he is a legitimate messenger for humankind. The Lawgiver would instigate people to do good deeds and would encourage them to pray to God. He would render prayer necessary for people so they would not forget their duties, and their [beliefs] would become firm.

[87] There are several conditions for the prophet [Lawgiver]. He must be appointed apostle by the High Heavens, which is a condition specific to prophets. The rest of the conditions, such as extraordinary acts, foretelling visions, or learning truths without a teacher, may be possessed by other great divinely informed souls. Also, it is possible that some saints and lofty humans be divinely informed. It is not necessary that each and every prophet possess truths of the highest nature [to an extent more than anyone else], because many of the learned people and scholars of their [Muslim] nation—such as Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, Ḥudhayfa, Ḥasan al-Basrī, Dhu'l-Nūn

❖ فصل دهم ❖

در نبوّت ومعجزات وکرامات ومنامات ومثل آنها

[۸۶] بدانکه: چون هر یکی از مردم بهمهٔ کارها و مهمّات خویش قیام نتواند نمود، و از معاملات و قصاص و مناکحات چاره نیست، و بعضی مردم را از بعضی گریز نیست، پس از شرعی متبوع و قانونی مضبوط چاره نیست. پس، «شارعی» ضروریست در هر وقتی، و قومی که فاضل النفس باشد، مطّلع بر حقائق، مُؤَیّد از عالم نور و جبروت. و او متخصّص باشد به افعالی که مردم از آن عاجز باشند، و اگر نه سخن او نشنوند و او را معارضت و مزاحمت نمایند. و این افعال دلالت کند بر صدق سخن او و بر آنکه فرستادهای بر حقّ است بخلق. و ایشان را بر مصالح وقت تحریض کند، و در عبادت حقّ ترغیب نماید، و عبادت را بر ایشان حتم کند تا فراموش نکنند و مستحکم شود.

[۸۷] و نبیّ را شرایط است: یکی آنکه مأمور باشد از عالم اعلی به ادای رسالت، و این یك شرط خاصّ است به انبیا. و باقی چون خرق عادت و انذار از مغیبات و اطلاع بر علوم بی استاد، نیز شاید که اولیا را و بزرگان حقیقت را باشد و لازم نیست که هر یك از انبیا در حقایق بطبقه علیا باشد، که بسیاری از محقّقان و علمای این امّت هم چون ابوبکر و عمر و عثمان و علی و حذیفه و حسن بصری و ذوالنّون مصری و سهل تستری و بایزید و ابراهیم ادهم و

al-Miṣrī, Sahl Tustarī, Bāyzid, Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, Junayd, and Shiblī (may God's paradise be bestowed upon them all) and others—are more learned in the sciences than the Israelite prophets. Moses's need for Khizr (upon him be peace) is indicative of this situation: perhaps a prophet, as Lawgiver, may be in need of enlightened scholars. Also the story of how David employed Luqmān's aid is famous. While what I have said is not clear proof, demonstration does not bar it.

[88] It is not strange that great prophets—such as Enoch, Abraham and our Lawgiver (God's praise be upon them all) and others—have learned truths without a human teacher, because people differ in their degree of intuition. There may be someone who does not benefit at all even from the highest degree of intelligence, due to excessive stolidity. There may be, on the other hand, people who are capable of intuiting many problems without a human teacher. Therefore, it is not farfetched that there exist some people with powerful intuitions who may learn much of the sciences in but a short period of time. Nor is it strange that extraordinary acts—such as producing earthquakes and eclipses, curing disease, and taming wild beasts and birds—be performed by great prophets. You have learned that the body is under the soul's control, and that separate entities control the world of matter. Have you not observed how the body heats up from the soul's anger? Fancy, too, has effects; there are people who, out of fancy throw themselves down from high places. Therefore, if such as I have specified is the state of things I have cited, then it is not strange that a person whose soul is enlightened by the Light of Truth and the High Heavens—which

جُنید و شبلی ــ رضوانُ اللّهِ علیهم اجمعین ــ و امثال ایشان، بر انبیاءِ بنی اسرائیل بعلوم افزوده باشند. و حاجت موسی بخضر ــ علیه السّلام ــ ظاهر حال گواهی می دهد که شاید که پیامبر را، بلکه شارع را، ببعضی محقّقان روشن روان حاجت افتد. و نیز مشهورست استفادت داود از لُقمان. و اگر چه این نمَط حجّت نیست، برهان منع نمی کند این معنی را.

[۸۸] و بزرگان انبیا هم چو ادریس و ابراهیم و شارع ما ــ صَلَواتُ اللّهِ عَلَیْهِم ــ و دیگر کسانی که بر حقائق مطّلع شدند بی استاد بشری. این عجب نیست، که معلومست که مردم در حدس متفاوت اند، و کس باشد که او را از تفکّر هیچ انتفاعی نَبُوَد [و] هیچ فهم نکند، از غایت بلادت. و کس باشد که بحدس بسیاری را از مسائل استنباط کند بی استاد بشری. پس ،دور نباشد که کسی بُوَد که حدسی قوی دارد که بسیاری علوم در زمانی کوچك او را حاصل شود. و افعال غریب از انبیا، هم چو احداث زلازل و خسف و ابراء مرض و حضوع سباع و طیور، ایشان را عجب نیست. که، تو می دانی که بدن مطیع نفس است و مادّت عالم مطیع مفارقات باشند. و ندیدی که از خشم نفس بدن چون منفعل می شود بحرارت؟ و اوهام را نیز آثارست که باشد، که مردم بتوهّم خویش از جایهای بلند بیافتد. پس چون حال چنین است کسی که نفس او بنور حقّ و ملای اعلی روشن شود، و آن

light is the elixir of knowledge and power—may control the realm of matter, and his words and prayers will be heard due to his soul's enlightenment. If you want to know the cause of foretelling visions, a law must be established.

[89] Know that the souls of the celestial spheres are cognizant of their own motions and of their own effects. They possess universal knowledge, know universal laws, and thus know every form and effect that is in this world. When a celestial sphere arrives at a specific point [in its orbit] it becomes cognizant of whatever comes about as a result of achieving that point. In short, it comprehends all temporal causes of events from past to future, as well as the present. Our souls are not disjointed from the spheres, but attachment to body prevents us from conjunction with them.

[90] While sleeping, the external senses are not acting, but the internal senses—especially the faculty of imagination—preoccupy the soul. Therefore, when bodily attachments are lessened, the soul joins the celestial souls—as, [for example], during some people's dreams or the experiences of epileptics or choleric people. The same is experienced by prophets and some saints who perform meditation and purify their natures, and other [similar acts], and thus their souls become related to the souls of the celestial spheres. The same is true of some diviners who have innate weakness [in terms of bodily preoccupations]. It may also be that they seek assistance from things that weaken the outer and inner senses—as when children are busied with things that mesmerize their eyes,

نور اکسیر علم و قدرتست، عجب نباشد که مادّت عالم مسخّر او شود، و از روشنی روان از سخنش در ملای اعلی مسموع باشد و دعایش بشنوند بهر چه ممکن است. أمّا سبب انذار کائنات اگر خواهی که بدانی فایدهای را محقّق باید کرد.

[۸۹] بدانکه «نفوسِ» افلاك عالِم اند بحرکات خویش و آثار حرکات خویش. و پیش ایشان علمی و ضابطی کلّی باشد که اثر هر هیأتی درین عالم چیست، و چون بنقطه ای برسند جزوی، بدانند که از وصول این نقطه چه واقع باشد، و اثرش نیز. و فی الجمله محیط اند به اسباب حوادث و اوقات، از ماضی و مستقبل و آنچه واقع باشد در حال. و نفوس ما منقطع نیستند و مانع از اتّصال بدیشان علائق قوای بدنیست.

[۹۰] و در خواب اگر چه حواسّ ظاهر منع نمی کند، أمّا حواسّ باطن، سیّما متخیّله، نفس را مشغول می دارد. پس چون این شواغل کم شود، هم چنانکه بعضی را در خواب، یا مصروعان و محروران را، یا نفس قوی باشد و منفعل نشود بشواغل حواسّ، هم چو انبیا و بعضی اولیا را که بریاضات توسّل نمایند و بتهذیب اخلاق و غیر آن با نفس ایشان تمام مناسبت بیابد با نفوس افلاك؛ و یا ضعف فطری باشد هم چون بعضی ازکهنه را. و باشد که استعانت کنند بچیزهایی که حواسّ ظاهر و باطن را سست کند، هم چنانکه کودکان را مشغول گردانند بنظر در چیزهایی که

like glimmering waters and shiny black objects of play. Women and children are specified here because their minds are weak. Therefore, souls find freedom from bodily attachments, either in sleep or wakefulness, and become imprinted from the souls of celestial Heavens, just as when an imageless mirror may become imprinted with an image from another mirror. The final result is that when obstacles are removed, the soul may behold whatever it seeks.

[91] Know that souls may "see" varieties of forms because the *sensus communis* knows that whatever form appears is due to the "vision" of that form; and the faculty of imagination will be imprinted from it, as between two facing mirrors. Two things prevent the faculty of imagination from imprinting forms upon the *sensus communis*: when the mind preoccupies the imagination with thoughts; and when outer senses preoccupy it with sense perceptions—resulting in the distraction of the *sensus communis*. One of these two things dies out, just as when senses die out in sleep or when some primary limb's activity is diminished by disease when the soul is attracted by contrary forces of [different] diseases. When the soul is attracted to one of the forces, it will remain hindered from the other. When it is attracted through lust it will remain hindered from anger, and vice versa. And when the soul is attracted by the outer senses, it will remain hindered from the inner one, and vice versa. In sum, what is intended here is that in either of the two cases—we mean when the soul is attracted to diseases of the principle limbs with the aid of natural dispositions or their suppression—then the faculty of imagination will gain control and

چشم را خیره گرداند، هم چو آب و سواد براق و غیر آن. و کودکان را و زنان را تخصیص کنند بدین نظر، که ضعیف باشد عقول ایشان. پس از همهٔ نفوس ایشان را خلاصی باشد – در خواب یا در بیداری – از علائق، و منتقش گردند از نفوس فلك، هم چو آیینه ای بی نقش از آیینه ای منقّش نماید. و چون حجاب از میان برخیزد، آنچه طلب میکند متصوّر شود ایشان را.

[۹۱] و بدانکه مشاهدهٔ صُوَر ممکن است ایشان را، زیرا که حسّ مشترك بدانستی که هر صورت که درو پدید آید بر سبیل مشاهدت دیده شود و تخیّل ازو منفعل می شود، هم چو دو آیینه از یکدیگر. و متخیّله را از نقش افکندن در حسّ مشترك دو چیز باز می دارد: یکی آنکه عقل متخیّله را به افکار مشغول دارد؛ و دیگر حسّ ظاهر که حسّ مشترك را مشغول دارد بمحسوسات. و چون یکی ازین دو فترت پذیرد، هم جنانکه حواسّ در خواب، و هم چنانکه در بعضی امراض اعضاء رئیسه چون نفس منجذب شود بجانب مرضی که قوّتها منازع با یکدیگرند، چون نفس بقوّتی منجذب شود از دیگری باز ماند: چون بشهوت میل کند از غضب باز ماند، و هم چنین بعکس این. و چون بحواسّ ظاهر منجذب شود از حواسّ باطن باز ماند و بعکس این. و فی الجمله غرض آنست که درین دو حالت، اعنی وقت انجذاب نفس تتعضّی امراض اعضای رئیسه و معاونت طبیعت یا رکود، حواسّ متخیّله

will cause various [fantastic] shapes to be imprinted upon the *sensus communis.* Choleric and epileptic people also see images, which they [continue] to see even when they close their eyes. Therefore, [seeing such fantastic images] must be due to inner causes. Jinn and Ghouls are similar types of images that appear to the *sensus communis* because of the faculty of imagination.

[92] The faculty of imagination is continuously in motion [causing] different images [to be seen], and it does not rest. If this were not the case, we would not be able to cogitate. Further, [the faculty of imagination] enables the subject to deduce shapes caused by bodily functions [of biles and humors]. For example when blood is overflowing, it causes red things to be seen, and when phlegm is dominant [in the body], then it causes the subject to imagine snow and rain. When the image of an unseen [thing] is imprinted in the soul, it may soon disappear and no trace of it remain. The image may also be illuminated upon the faculty of imagination and from there fall upon the *sensus communis,* thus making it visible [to the subject]. Thus, the subject may see a pleasant form, which may even speak to the person in pleasant terms; or the subject may not hear a voice nor see a writ. All such phenomena are due to [images] that are imprinted upon the *sensus communis.* It is also possible that the faculty of imagination may transform the image into an opposite, or similar, one. If such things are seen in dreams, then it is necessary that they be interpreted; and if they are seen in wakefulness, then exegesis is necessary.

[93] Dreams [occur] when the animal soul is suppressed away from the outer senses [affecting] the inner ones. And whoever continually meditates upon the heavens and abstains from pleasures,

سلطنت یابد و نقشهای مختلف را در حسّ مشترك بنگارد، و محروران و مصروعان صورتها می بینند، که اگر چشم بر هم نهند هم چنان بینند. پس از سببی باطنی است، و جنّ و غول هم ازین صورتهاست که در حسّ مشترك حاصل شود از متخیّله.

[۹۲] و متخیّله دائم در انتقال باشد، از صورتی بصورتی، و ثبات ندارد. و اگر نه چنین بودی، ما فکرت نتوانستمانی کردن؛ و هیأت مزاجی را و ادراکات نفسی را محاکات کند؛ و کسی را که خون مستولی باشد، بچیزهای سرخ محاکات کند؛ و اگر بلغم مستولی باشد، ببرف و باران. پس چون معنی غیبی در نفس متصوّر شود، باشد که بزودی منطوی گردد و اثرش نماند. و باشد که بر متخیّله اشراق کند، و از متخیّله در حسّ مشترك افتد، و صورت غیب مشاهده کرده آید. و باشد که صورتی خوب بیند، که سخنی هر چه خوبتر می گوید. و باشد که ندائی شنود، و یا مکتوبی بیند. و این جمله در حسّ مشترك باشد. و افتد که متخیله آن را رها کند، و بضدّ او، یا مانند او، نقل کند؛ اگر در خواب بود، بتعبیرش حاجت افتد؛ و اگر در بیداری بود تأویلش باید.

[۹۳] و خواب عبارتست از انحباس روح از ظاهر در باطن. و هر که در ملکوت فکری دائم کند، و از لذّات حسّی و از مطاعم پرهیز کند، إلاّ بقدر حاجت، و بشب نماز کند، و بر بیدار داشتن

including food—save in amounts that are needed for survival—and prays at night holding vigils and reads much of divine revelation and frees the mind through thinking good thoughts and, at times .puts the soul to test and carries inward conversations with God in the High Heavens and praises Him, then "lights" like dazzling flashes of lightning shall be cast upon him. He shall then [experience such things] without interruption so the lights will appear to him even in times other that when meditating. He may also behold pleasant shapes. A tremendous dazzling flash may beckon the soul to the unseen realm. Luminosity more radiant than the light of the sun shall fall upon the *sensus communis,* thus causing one to experience pleasure. This light becomes internalized by the enlightened sages so that, whenever they will it, they shall see it and thus be guided by it to ascend to the realm of light and so come to reside in pure circumstances. These dazzling lights and thunder are not [the same as] scientific knowledge nor mental images, rather they are rays of divine lights. Incorporeal lights appear from the Heavenly realm. The lights of the Necessary Being and the lights of the Intellects are without limits in their degree of luminosity. The enlightened souls shall behold them in the hereafter even more clearly as what the eye sees, more luminous than any corporeal light. The light of separate entities is not in addition to their quiddities, rather they are themselves abstract, incorporeal lights, just as the luminous sage-philosophers have testified based on their visions.

[**94**] Whoever knows philosophy, and perseveres in thanking and sanctifying the Light of Lights, will be bestowed with royal Kharreh and with luminous Farreh, and—as we have said elsewhere—divine light will further bestow upon him the cloak of royal power and

شب مواظبت نماید، ووحی الهی بسیار خواند و تلطیف سر کند به افکار لطیف، و نفس را در بعضی اوقات تطریب نماید، و باملای اعلی مناجات کند و تملّق کند، [باشد که] انواری برو اندازند هم چو برق خاطف، و متتابع شود – چنانکه در غیر وقت ریاضت نیز آیند – و باشد که صورتهای خوب نیز بیند. و باشد که نفس را خطفه ای افتد بعالم غیب. و در حسّ مشترك روشنایی افتد – روشن تر از آفتاب، و لذّتی با او. این نور روشن روانان را ملکه شود، که هر وقت که خواهند یابند، و عروج کنند بعالم نور و در حَفَظهای لطیف. و این «بروق» و «انوار» نه علم است، یا صورتی عقلی، بلکه شعاعیست قدسی. و از عالم قدس نورها آید مجرّد از مادّت، و روان پاکان از آن روشنایی نصیب یابند. و انوار واجب الوجود، و عقول را، نهایت نیست در شدّت. و روشن روانان، در آخرت، این را ظاهر تر از محسوسات بصر بینند، و روشن تر از همهٔ روشناییها. و نور مفارقات زائد بر ماهیّات ایشان نیست، بلکه ایشان نورهای مجرّداند از مادّت؛ هم چنانکه «حکیمانی نورانی» گفته اند از سر مشاهدت.

[۹٤] و هر که حکمت بداند، و بر سپاس و تقدیس نور الانوار مداومت نماید، چنانکه گفتیم، او را «خرّهٔ کیانی» بدهند، و «فرّ نورانی» ببخشند، و «بارقی الهی» او را کِسوتِ هیبت و بها

value. Such a person shall then become the natural Ruler of the Universe. He shall be given aid from the High Heavens, and whatever he commands shall be obeyed; and his dreams and inspirations will reach their uppermost, perfect pinnacle. And God knows best what is true.

بپوشاند، و رئیس طبیعی شود عالم را؛ و او را از عالم اعلی نصرت رسد، و سخن او در عالم علوی مسموع باشد، و خواب و الهام او بکمال رسد. وَاللّهُ أعْلَمُ بِالصّوابَ.



Glossary of Technical Terms

Persian- English



Persian-English Glossary

ابد	eternity
اجرام عنصری	elemental bodies
اجسام اثیری	aetherial bodies
آحاد	units
ادراک	cognizance
ادراک حس	senseperception
ادراک عقل	intellection
ارادتی	by will
ازل	pre-eternity
استحالت	transformation
اصل	principle
استقرا	induction
اصحاب حیل	magicians
اصطلاحات	terms
اضداد	opposites
افلاک	spheres
امتناع	impossibility
امکان	possibility
آواز	sound
اویی	it-ness
بخار	vapor
بدن	body
برق	thunder
برودت	coldness
برهان	demonstration
بسیط	simple
بصر	sight
بی نهایت	infinite
بیشی	more
پسی	posteriority
پیشی	priority
تداخل	inclusion
تر	moist
ترتیب	order
تعریف جسم: «جوهریست مقصودبه اشارات»	body
تن	body
تو	thou
توسط	intermediation
تویی تو	thou-ness
ثقیل مطلق	absolute heavy
ثوابت	fixed stars
جزو	part

atom	جزو لایتجزی
particular	جزوی
particulars	جزویات
simple body	جسم بسیط
mover	جنباننده
moving/movement	جنبانیدن
substance	جوهر
atom	جوهر فرد
ignorance	جهل
four elements	چهار عنصر
thing	چیز
thing-ness	چیزی
thing generated	حادث
memory	حافظه
included	حاوی
outer limit	حد بیرونی
inner limit	حد درونی
essential generation	حدوث ذاتی
heat	حرارت
celestial motion	حرکات افلاک
motion	حرکت
circular motion	حرکت دوری
linear motion	حرکت مستقیم
circular motion	حرکتی مستدیر
sense	حس
sensus communis	حس مشترکست
reality	حقیقت
judgment	حکم
wisdom	حکمت
enlightened sages	حکیمان روشن روان
generated entities	حوادث
inner senses	حواس باطن
outer senses	حواس ظاهر
alive	حی
life	حیات
restplace	حیز
animal	حیوان
animal-ness	حیوانی
specific (attribute)	خاص
dry	خشک
specific	خصوص
absolute light	خفیف مطلق
void/vacuum	خلاء
I/self/I-ness	خود
imagination	خیال
the good	خیر
Pure Good	خیر محض
knowledge/science	دانش

alive	زنده
below	زیر
happiness	سعادت
sequence	سلسله
infinite seq.	سلسلهٔ بی نهایت
ordered sequence	سلسلهٔ اعدادی مرتب
hearing	سمع
extended space	سه امتداد
three dimensions	سه بعد
bravery	شجاعت
evil	شر
noble	شریف
six directions	شش جهت
rays	شعاع
shape	شکل
smell	شم
knowledge	شناخت
enlightened	صاحب بصیرت
sound	صدا
positive predications	صفات ایجابی
negative predications	صفات سلبی
attribute	صفت
smoke	دخان
external reality	در اعیان
in the mind/ideal	در عقل
outside the mind	در بیرون
subject	دریابنده/مدرِک
cognizance/apprehension	دریافتن/ادراک
object	دریافته/مدرک
heart	دل
brain	دماغ
sight	دیدن
essence	ذات
meteor	ذات ذنب
intuition/taste	ذوق
linear motion	راست جنبیدن
humid	رطوبت
vitreous humor	رطوبت جلیدی
thunder	رعد
animal soul	روح حیوانی
natural soul	روح طبیعی
rational soul	روح نفسانی
luminosity	روشناییت
frontal lobe	زایده پیشگاه دماغ
earthquake	زلزله
time	زمان

form	صورت
opposite	ضد
necessity	ضرورت
necessary	ضروری
natural	طبیعی
darkness	ظلمت
Knower	عاقل
realm of power	عالم جبروت
realm of matter	عالم جرم
realm of nature	عالم طبیعت
realm of Intellect	عالم عقل
justice	عدالت
number	عدد
nonexistence	عدم
absolute nonexistence	عدم بحت
accident	عرض
love	عشق
intellect/mind	عقل
Second Intellect	عقل دوم
Tenth Intellect	عقل دهم
Third Intellect	عقل سوم
practical intellect	عقل عملی
Active Intellect	عقل فعال
separate intellect	عقل مفارق
Intellects	عقول
multiplicity of Intellects	عقول بسیارند
cause	علت
science/knowledge	علم
metaphysics	علم الهی
elemental	عنصریات
eye	عین
anger	غضبی
rich	غنی
subject/agent	فاعل
virtues	فضائل
poor	فقیر
cogitation	فکرت
heavens	فلک
High Heavens	فلک اعلی
fixed spheres	فلک ثوابت
nonbeing	فنا
predestination	قدر
motion by constraint	قسری
infinite divisibility	قسمت بی نهایت
predestination	قضا
vegetative faculties	قوای نباتی
control by light	قهر نور
multiplicity	کثرت

the whole/all	کل
universal/general	کلی
universals (in logic)	کلیات
perfection	کمال
less	کمی
limit	کنار
boundary	کناره
generation and corruption	کون و فساد
substance	گوهر
meteor	گیسودار
pleasure	لذت
term	لفظ
general/universal term	لفظ کلی
touch	لمس
matter	مادت
infinite	مالایتناهی
quiddity	ماهیت
principles	مبادی
First Origin	مبدء أول
prior	متأخر
motion from the center	متحرک از وسط
motion around the center	متحرک بر وسط
motion to a center	متحرک بسوی وسط
imagination	متخیله
cogitation	متفکره
prior	متقدم
limited	متناهی
image	مثال
aggregate/set/whole	مجتمع
abstracted of matter	مجرد
impossible	محال
limited	محدود
sense data	محسوسات
place/space	محل
the included	محوی
circumference	محیط
subject	مدرِک
object	مدرک
ordered	مرتب
composite	مرکب
center	مرکز
future contingent	مستقبل
Peripatetics	مشائین
the indicated	مشار إلیه
vision/sight	مشاهده
nonbeing	معدوم
intelligibles	معقولات
caused	معلول

the first caused	معلول أول
meaning	معنی
universal meaning	معنی کلی
separate	مفارق
correspondence	مقابله
measure	مقدار
place/space	مکان
impossible being	ممتنع الوجود
possible	ممکن
possible being	ممکن الوجود
lower possible	ممکن خسیس
higher possible	ممکن شریف
possible existents	ممکنات
I	من
I-ness	منی
thou-ness/thou-in-thou	منی تو
three natures	موالید سه گانه
reproductive faculty	مولده
nonexistence	ناچیز
plant	نبات
soul	نفس
self	نفس خویش
rational soul	نفس ناطقه
point	نقطه
lights	نورها
writing	نویسندگی
limit	نهایت/کناره
Necessary Being	واجب الوجود
absolute one	واحد مطلق
Giver of Life	واهب حیوة
Dator Formarum	واهب صور
mode	وجه
unity/oneness	وحدت
attribute	وصف
estimation	وهم
ark form	هیأت ظلمانی
Prime Matter	هیولی
togetherness	هم/بهم بودن
dryness	یبوست
oneness	یکی
certitude	یقین

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HOSSEIN ZIAI is currently Director of Iranian Studies at UCLA, where he has taught since 1988. He received his B.S. in 1967 from Yale University, and his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 1976.

Dr. Ziai has published several volumes and numerous articles on Islamic philosophy, especially the Iranian illuminationist tradition. His books include: *Philosophy of Mathematics; Anvāriyya* (The Realm of Lights); *Knowledge and Illumination;* and *Shahrazūrī's Commentary on Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq.* He has also contributed many chapters to edited volumes including: "Beyond Philosophy" in *Myth and Philosophy,* edited by Frank Reynolds; "The Source and Nature of Authority" in *The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy,* edited by Charles Butterworth; and three chapters in *The Routledge History of Islamic Philosophy,* edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman.

Shihāb al-Dīn Yahyā ibn Ḥabash ibn Amīrak Abu'l-Futūḥ Sohravardī was born in Sohravard in northwestern Iran in 549/1154. He is one of the best known figures in the history of Islamic philosophy, his status as founder of philosophy of illuminations earned him the honorific title, "Master of Illumination" (*Shaykh al-Ishrāq*). This book, *Partow Nāmeh* , or *The Book of Radiance* is his major theoretical work in Persian. His important writings on the philosophy of illumination are *The Intimations* (*al-Talwīhāt*), *The Apposite* (*al-Muqāwamāt*), *The Paths and Havens* (*al-Mashāri' wa'l-Muṭāraḥāt*), and *The Philosophy of Illumination* (*Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*). These four major works constitute an integral corpus. Philosophy of illumination has played an essential role in the development of systematic thought in Iran, where its impact on intellectual history has been equal to, if not greater than Avicenna's peripatetic thinking. The present volume is a short epitome of illuminationist philosophy, and applies the terminology and other elements of Sohravardī's new illuminationist arguments. The work is cited by his chief biographer, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Shahrazūrī, in a list of forty-six other treatises by Sohravardī.

The Book of Radiance was composed for the Seljuk ruler Sulaymān Shāh, who is said to have been a great patron of philosophy. The work is in an elegant philosophical Persian in ten chapters in which topics selected from logic, physics, and metaphysics are presented.

One of the significant components of *The Book of Radiance* is Sohravardī's use of the ancient Persian concepts of *Kiyān Kharreh* (Kayanid Glory) and *Farreh-ye Izadī* (Divine Glory), in describing manifest qualities of just rule. These concepts are integral to Sohravardi's political doctrine, which associates wisdom, as well as clairvoyance, true dreams, divine inspiration, and other such extraordinary qualities with the just rule of the philosopher-king.

The present volume is the first English translation of *Partow Nāmeh* which is presented in a parallel English-Persian edition. Students of Islamic philosophy have now access to a complete epitome of illuminaitonist philosophy—the most significant development in the post Avicennan period—in English. *The Book of Radiance* has been discussed in historical studies on Islamic philosophy notably by Henry Corbin and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

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